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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the financing of economic growth and development in Jamaica
during the period 1960-1992. In so doing, sources of both domestic and foreign finance are
considered. Three main questions are examined. Firstly, the effects of fmancial variables and
financial liberalisation on the real economy are analysed and the predictions of fmancial
liberalisation models evaluated. Secondly, the impact of external debt on domestic savings,
investment and growth and the qustion of whether or not debt accumulation destabilizes the
balance of payments, are considered. Thirdly, the effects of foreign capital inflows and
outflows including capital flight, on the domestic economy as well as the extent to which
economic growth is constrained by the balance of payments, are examined.
Chapter one deals with the financial and economic performance of Jamaica between
1960 and 1992. Three sub-periods are identified: the years of steady growth from 1960 to
1972; the period of prolonged crisis between 1973 and 1980, and the years of faltering
recovery, 198 1-1992. The social and economic policies of the various political administrations
which governed Jamaica, as well as the role of the IMF and World Bank are explored in
identifying some of the root causes of Jamaica's economic situation.
Chapter two examines the theory of financial liberalisation, the main hypotheses of
which are tested in chapters three and four. Chapter three analyses the role of the real interest
rate, the effect of reserve requirements on credit availability, and the impact of financial
deepening on savings, investment and growth in Jamaica. Chapter four considers the effects of
inflation on real and financial variables and the effects of government expansion on private
sector access to bank resources, private investment and economic growth
The net effect of capital inflows on economic growth, taking into account capital
outflows, is considered in chapter five, as is the effect of capital flows on saving and
investment. Chapter six considers the question of whether long run growth is constrained by the
balance of payments, and fmds that Jamaica's long run growth rate is in fact that rate of
growth consistent with balance of payments equilibrium on current account.
The relevant theoretical and empirical literature pertaining to the various issues
analysed, is briefly explored in each chapter before presenting the evidence on Jamaica.
Chapter seven summarises and concludes the main findings of the thesis.
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This thesis examines the fmancing of Jamaica's economic growth between 1960 and
1992, including the role of both domestic and external fmancing. Three main questions are
examined. Firstly, the impact of domestic fmancial variables such as the real interest rate and
the reserve requirement on real variables such as real saving, investment and growth, is
considered. Secondly, the effect of external debt accumulation on domestic savings,
investment, growth and the stability of the balance of payments, is examined. Thirdly, the
effects of foreign capital flows and the balance of payments constraint on domestic economic
activity are analysed.
The effects of domestic and foreign capital on the real economy are examined against
the backdrop of the government's financial and economic policy over the three decades. That
policy often had much in common with the view that financial liberalisation (e.g. raising
interest rates and removing reserve requirements on bank deposits) increases savings,
investment and growth.
The economic fortunes of Jamaica over the period of this study were bound up with the
impact of the political changes that occurred and with the social and economic philosophy of
the government of the day. The election of a left-wing government in 1972 led to inward-
looking policies and an emphasis on income re-distribution and self-reliance for the rest of the
decade. Jamaica fared little better under the often inconsistent policies of the right-wing
government which came to power in 1980 and which lasted up to 1989. Jamaica became
heavily indebted to the IMF during the latter half of the 1970s and first half of the 1980s, under
both administrations. It was not until the closing years of the 1980s that both left and right-
wing governments seemed to have begun to learn the lessons of the chaotic years of the 1970s
and 1980s, and began to adopt outward-looking policies.
Chapter One describes the fmancial system and economy of Jamaica between 1960 and
1992. The fmancial and economic structure are examined, as are financial and economic
policies and the perfonnance of the economy over the three decades. The identification of three
sub-periods provides a useful framework within which to conduct the analysis. They are: the
years of steady growth 1960-1972; the period of prolonged crisis 1973-1980; and the "stop-go"
period of 1981-1992.
The steady growth, low inflation, and high savings and investment levels of the 1960-
1972 period are analysed against the backdrop of the government's economic objectives and
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policies. The main objectives of economic policy were: to generate "development" by
encouraging foreign saving and exports; to generate domestic saving and non-inflationary
fmance for development by maintaining steady real growth and to protect the balance of
payments by shadowing the exchange rates of Jamaica's main trading partners and by making
nominal interest rates attractive to foreign capital. Credit controls, foreign exchange taxes and
exchange control were introduced to protect the external account, but the controls were not
onerous and restrictions on foreign capital were minimal. The focus of the government's capital
programme was investment in the country's physical infrastructure to support private sector
development.
The impact of a change in government in 1972 and the ensuing policy shift over the
1973-1980 period, is also analysed. It was a period of high public spending, declining savings
and investment and zero or negative real growth rates. The main economic objectives of the
new left-wing government were reducing unemployment and income inequality, increasing
national (i.e. public sector) ownership and control, and attaining self sufficiency in production.
There was a pro-nationalisation stance and anti-foreign rhetoric, and extensive price import
and exchange controls were introduced.
The brief recovery, stagflation and the second recovery of the 1980-1992 period are
also examined in Chapter One. The main economic objectives of the new regime that was
elected in 1980 and which remained in power until 1989, were the restoration of balance of
payments stability and the generation of economic growth after the long years of decline.
The chapter examines the interplay between economic policies and performance in each
of the sub-periods. The circumstances under which Jamaica was forced to borrow from the
IMF in the late 1970s and the 1980s and the impact of the IMF supported programmes are also
considered.
Chapter Two provides a survey of the literature on fmancial liberalisation, starting with
a summary of early contributions to the debate on the importance of the fmancial system to
economic development. Much of the early work surveyed follows the supply-leading approach
which holds that prior-savings and therefore a well developed fmancial system are necessary
for investment and growth. In the alternative demand-following approach it is the investment-
generated growth in real output that causes the fmancial system to develop and respond to the
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demands placed upon it. In general the early researchers stress the importance of financial
organisation and appropriate financial institutions in fostering growth and development.
The greater part of the second chapter analyses the specific proposition of McKinnon
(1973) and Shaw (1973) that fmancial repression retards .economic growth and financial
liberalisation promotes growth, as well as examining other post-1973 theories. The basic
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis that raising the real interest rate increases saving and investment
and promotes growth, is analysed along with dynamic and open-economy extensions of their
model (Kapur 1976, 1983; Mathieson 1979, 1980; Galbis 1977).
Chapter Two also examines the Neo-Structuralist models which possess some
Keynesian adjustment mechanisms, but which are similar to the McKinnon-Shaw models in
their assumption that prior-savings are needed for investment. Informal fmancial markets are
of paramount importance in Neo-Structural models (Taylor 1983; Van Wijnbergen 1983a and
1983b; and Buffie 1984). They find that fmancial liberalisation may lead to stagfiation if
higher interest rates simply divert savings away from the informal market to the formal market.
However, this may not be the case if the assumption of such models that credit supplied in the
informal market is used overwhelmingly for capital purposes, does not hold.
The post Keynesian approach (Burkett and Dutt 1991; Dutt 1991), assumes that prior-
savings are unnecessary for investment. It is investment and effective demand that determine
savings, via the effect of the multiplier on output and income (on which aggregate saving
depends), or via the re-distribution of income among different classes with varying saving
propensities. The effect of a rise in the deposit interest rate is complex and depends on the
relative strengths of various effects. On the one hand there is the possible positive effect on
output via fmancial savings, investment and the profit rate. On the other there is the possible
negative effect on output via the propensity to save (which affects consumption and aggregate
demand) and via the sensitivity of expectations to any decline in the profit rate.
Finally, the second chapter examines from a micro-economic perspective, some of the
institutional aspects of financial markets, possible reasons for market failure and instability,
and situations under which financial liberalisation may not work.
Chapter Three examines recent empirical evidence on the relationship between fmancial
liberalisation and economic growth in various countries, and presents the empirical results for
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Jamaica. The international evidence focuses on one or more aspects of the transmission
mechanism linking financial conditions and growth: the link between the real deposit interest
rate and savings; the link between the availability and cost of credit on the one hand and the
quantity and efficiency of investment on the other and the direct relationship between
liberalisation and growth.
The empirical evidence for Jamaica is then analysed. The determinants of total saving,
fmancial saving, domestic investment and economic growth are examined. The emphasis is on
measuring the impact of fmancial conditions on those variables and in turn exploring the
determinants of fmancial variables where appropriate. The effect of the real interest rate on
saving, investment and growth is given particular attention.
In addition, several related hypotheses of the fmancial liberalisation school are
examined. The first is Shaw's (1973) proposition that fmancial deepening, the growth in
fmancial relative to non fmancial assets, leads to higher real saving. The second one tested is
the hypothesis held by both the McKinnon-Shaw school (Kapur 1976, Mathieson 1979 & 1980)
and the Neo-Structuralists (Taylor 1983, Van Wijnbergen 1983a and 1983b, Buffie 1984) that
required reserve ratios on deposit liabilities tax the banking system and reduce the amount of
credit available for investment. The third hypothesis analysed is the proposition that higher
real interest rates lead to higher investment by improving the availability and cost of credit. In
that regard, McKinnon's (1973) complementarity hypothesis that money and capital
complement one another, ie that prior savings must be accumulated to finance investment and
that higher interest rates increase savings and investment, is considered. The alternative
Keynesian proposition that investment is demand determined is examined. McKinnon's Virtuous
Circle model in which saving and growth have a mutual beneficial effect on one another, is
tested. In particular the positive Portfolio Effect of growth on the propensity to save is
examined.
Chapter Four considers the role of inflation in financial liberalisation models, and its
impact on growth. Inflation in fmancial liberalisation models rises with excess money supply.
Typically in such models, fmancial liberalisation raises the real interest rate and the demand for
money relative to its supply, and lowers the inflation rate.
In structuralist/post-Keynesian models, money is a mechanism through which inflation
is propagated, but money itself is not seen as a cause of inflation. Rigidities in the government,
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foreign trade, agricultural and fmancial sectors are viewed as the primary generators of
inflationary pressures. If this view is correct, monetary policy will have no permanent effect on
inflation without ippropriate structural changes to the economy.
This chapter also examines the financial liberalisation contention that inflation lowers
fmancial savings and reduces the amount of credit available for investment. In addition, the
argument that inflation widens the budget deficit and crowds out private sector borrowing from
the banking system, is considered. Whether or not private investment is physically crowded out
is also examined, as is the assumption of the financial liberalisation theories that the
productivity of private investment is higher than that of public investment.
Chapter five looks at the effect of foreign capital flows and the stock of foreign debt on
savings, investment and economic growth. If capital inflows are used entirely for investment,
then they may have a positive impact on savings. On the other hand if foreign capital is partly
consumed, then it may lower savings by encouraging consumption.
Not only is the effect of total capital inflows on domestic economic aggregates
considered, but so is the effect of components of total inflows. In particular, capital inflows
are disaggregated into public and private flows, which are further disaggregated into
government borrowing and government grants for public flows, and foreign direct investment,
private grants, and other capital for private flows. In addition, the net effect of capital flows on
savings, investment and growth is considered. The concept of the net transfer of resources is
employed to determine the overall effect of capital flows on domestic aggregates (see Bocha,
1992 and Thirlwall, 1994).
This chapter also considers the question of whether or not the stock of foreign debt has
any effect on savings, investment and growth. Fry (1995) argues that low levels of foreign debt
encourage savings, investment and growth, while the opposite effect is engendered by high
stocks of foreign debt. In addition, Fry's (1995) argument that the stock of foreign debt might
be destabilising, that is it might persistently worsen the balance of payments if it causes
domestic savings to contract more than investment, or investment to grow faster than savings,
is examined.
Chapter Six examines the extent to which economic growth in Jamaica is constrained
by the balance of payments. Thiriwall's (1979) hypothesis is that a country's long-run growth
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rate caimont exceed that rate consistent with balance of payments equilibrium on current
account. The model predicts that long-run growth is determined by the ratio of a country's
export growth rate to its income elasticity of demand for imports (see Thirlwall, 1979 and
Thiriwall and Hussain, 1982, the latter of which incorporates capital flows). In addition, the
question of whether long-run growth is driven primarily by export growth or by the growth of
external capital inflows, is considered. Chapter Seven summarises and concludes the major
findings of the thesis.
The principal data sources used are: the International Monetary Fund's (1960-1995)
International Financial Statistics; The International Monetary Fund electronic databank (1960-
1990); the Government of Jamaica's (1960-1992) Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica; the
Bank of Jamaica (1985); the World Bank's (1976, 1987, 1988/9, and 1993) World Tables; and
the World Bank's (1986/7 - 1993/4) World Debt Tables.
The quality of economic data is usually of some concern in research on developing
countries, and this is no less so for Jamaica. There are inconsistencies among the various data
sources, particularly between the IMF and the Government of Jamaica data for the decade of
the 1960s. The two series are more consistent in later years as Jamaica received technical
assistance from the IMF and World Bank in statistical gathering, compilation and reporting
along IMF/IBRD lines, and as the IMF and the reporting authorities in Jamaica improved their
understanding of the social and economic structure of Jamaica. The IMFs International
Financial Statistics contained the most consistent fmancial and macroeconomic data, and was
the main source used, but it was supplemented by data from the Government's Economic and
Social Survey where necessary.
In addition, the performance of the economy of Jamaica was markedly different during
the three sub-periods identified above, Various governments with dissimilar ideologies pursued
different policies which in turn produced quite different results. The Chow stability test is used
throughout the thesis to ensure that the parameters of the various models employed are stable.
Other econometric techniques used, are described in each chapter.
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CHAPTER 1
THE ECONOMY OF JAMAICA, 1960-1992
1.1	 Introduction
This chapter provides an analysis of the economy of Jamaica and its performance over
the three decades spanning the period 1960-1992, with particular emphasis on fmancial
developments. In analysing the latter, attention is focused on the monetary and fmancial system
and the principal financial indicators, as well as on monetary and financial policy. Subsequent
chapters examine financial variables and policy in the context of the financial liberalisation
hypothesis.
Three distinct sub-periods can be discerned within the 1960-1992 period: the years of
high growth, 1960-1972; the period of prolonged crisis, 1973-1980; and the period of
Intennittent Recovery, 1981-1992. During the first sub-period, real growth averaged 5.2 per
cent and was achieved without running into balance of payments problems. However, this sub-
period is important not only because of the emergence of Jamaica from its post-colonial era as a
rapidly growing, stable democracy. It is also important because the difficulties and crises that
emerged in subsequent years had, to some extent, their roots in the 1960s.
The second sub-period, 1973-1980, is characterised by negative economic growth for
every year except 1973 and 1978, high inflation, growing and unsustainable government
deficits and balance of payments problems. The government was also obliged to enter into
Standby and Extended Fund agreements with the IMF, in an attempt to redress the imbalances
on its external and domestic accounts and to restore confidence in the economy. It is no
accident that Jamaica experienced severe social and political unrest during those years.
During the third sub-period, 1981-1992, the economic fortunes of Jamaica fluctuated,
as erratic and sometimes conflicting policies led to a short-lived recovery followed by vigorous
adjustment measures and generally depressed conditions, and followed again by another
tentative recovery. This period also tells the story of two approaches of IMF supported
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adjustment: the gradual, flexible, moderately-paced approach, and the "heavy-handed",
inflexible, rapid-adjustment approach.
In general, the comparatively steady growth and economic stability of the 1960-1972
period embracing laissez-faire policies, was brought to an abrupt end by a combination of
domestic policies and external economic shocks. in addition, economic decline was exacerbated
by an inward-looking strategy exemplified by import-substitution policies, right up to the latter
part of the 1980s. It is only towards the end of that decade and the beginning of the 1990s that
consistent outward-oriented strategies combined with economic liberalisation have been
consciously implemented. Their effectiveness will be examined later on.
1.2	 Overall Financial and Economic Structure and Performance
Jamaica, the third largest island in the Caribbean, has an area of 11,000 square
kilometres and a population of 2.47 million growing at around 1 per cent per annum. The
labour force is well educated and skilled, and the country is well endowed with natural
resources. 1 Its 1992 per capita GNP was approximately US$ 1,340, with its principal
economic activities being tourism, manufacturing, agriculture, and the mining and processing of
bauxite/alumina. Agriculture accounts for about 7.4 per cent of GDP, bauxite/alumina 8.7 per
cent, manufacturing 18.5 per cent, and services 67.6 per cent (with fmancial services
contributing about 11.4 per cent).2
I World Bank (1994), Tnnds in Developing Economies, 1994, IBRD, Washington DC, p.239.
2 n and Social Survey, Jamaica, 1992, Section 1.1.
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A comparison of figures (1.1) and (1.2) indicates the relative growth in importance of the
fmancial sector from 4 per cent of GDP in 1960, to 11.4 per cent in 1993, and of
manufacturing from 14 per cent to 18.5 per cent. The depicted decline of agriculture (from 12
per cent to 7.4 per cent) and mining (from 10 per cent to 8.8 per cent), does not tell the full
story. Agriculture declined to 5.9 per cent in 1989 before recovering to 7.4 per cent in 1993 as
a result of the export promotion policies of the government, while mining peaked at 13 per cent
in 1974, then declined to 5 per cent in 1985 before recovering to 8.8 per cent in 1993. Section
1.4 below and subsequent sections, examine the underlying reasons for these changes in the
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case of the bauxite industry (i.e, the mining sector). The strength of the bauxite sector had
important implications for investment, export earnings, capital flows, the government deficit
and growth during. the 1960-1992 period.
Jamaica's historical ties with the UK continued to influence its trade and financial
arrangements (i.e, its currency and monetary policy), especially during the 1960's, despite its
proximity to the USA. Even today, its history and geographic attributes continue to influence
its economic structure. Imports and exports were each around 70 per cent of GDP in 1992, and
given its size, openness and dependence on foreign markets, Jamaica is inescapably sensitive to
changes in the external economic environment.
The strong economic growth of the 1960-72 period shown on figure 1.3, was fuelled by
bauxite/alumina exports, tourism, and substantial capital inflows invested in the bauxite
industry. The decline of bauxite production from 10 per cent of GDP in 1960 to 6 per cent in
1976, the drastic reduction in capital inflows and the large government deficits, all contributed
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In an effort to reverse the economic contraction, the government negotiated Stand-
By/Extended Fund agreements with the IMF four times between 1977 and 1980. For the most
part it failed the IMF performance tests and the period was characterised by high inflation and
shrinking real incomes.
There was a brief recovery between 1981 and 1983, during which the new conservative







Official capital inflows improved under the various IMF Agreements as shown on Table 1.1,
and economic growth was positive for only the second time in eight years. Table 1.1 gives
some basic data on Jamaica, including: real growth; inflation; ratios of savings, investment and
the government deficit to GDP; the velocity of broad monetary liabilities; the nominal bilateral
exchange rate of the Jamaica dollar to the U.S dollar and capital inflows from governments and
international organisations (mainly the IMF and the World Bank.) However, inflation was not
brought under control and substantial borrowing from international institutions laid the
foundation for debt problems later on.
TABLE 1.1
GDPR gdprg	 cpi	 pcpi	 e	 gdefy	 LLve(	 SY	 IY	 gov't k-
_______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ mu
______ J$m _______ index	 %	 J$/us$	 %	 %	 %	 %	 us$m
196(	 74.06.	 5.63.	 0.71	 1.01	 4.65	 27.38	 21.94	 1.8
1961	 75.82	 2.37	 6	 6.57	 0.71	 2.13	 5.40	 29.23	 20.87	 3.8
1962	 76.52	 0.92	 6.09	 1.50	 0.71	 2.44	 4.22	 27.46	 19.7	 0.5
1963	 79.86	 4.36	 6.2	 1.81	 0.71	 2.09	 3.94	 27.19	 17.89	 14
196	 86.62	 8.47	 6.32	 1.94	 0.71	 2.56	 3.75	 22.95	 20.54	 0.1
1965	 93.53	 7.98	 6.49	 2.69	 0.71	 2.44	 3.76	 25.03	 20.28	 2
1966	 97.32	 4.06	 6.61	 1.85	 0.71	 2.69	 3.56	 33.57	 22	 2.6
196	 99.33	 2.06	 6.81	 3.03	 0.72	 3.13	 3.5	 31.81	 23.76	 4.6
1968 105.13	 5.83	 7.21	 5.87	 0.83	 3.67	 3.01	 32.68	 28.05	 12.8
1969 112.84	 7.34	 7.67	 6.38	 0.83	 2.06	 3.06	 28.5	 35.15	 15.8
197(	 120.72	 6.98	 8.8	 14.73	 0.83	 2.71	 2.98	 27.33	 31.51	 4.4
1971 125.69	 4.11	 9.27	 5.34	 0.83	 3.73	 2.61	 24.96	 32.14	 12
1972 135.75	 8.01	 9.77	 5.39	 0.77	 4.13 - 2.48	 19.04	 27.38	 11.7
1973 139.84	 3.01	 11.5	 17.71	 0.91	 5.26	 2.58	 21.92	 31.51	 36.4
197	 132.45	 -5.28	 14.62	 27.13	 0.91	 7.78	 2.49	 14.08	 24.32	 98.2
1975 130.70	 -1.32	 17.16	 17.37	 0.91	 7.92	 2.70	 15.42	 25.76	 122.9
1976 122.82	 -6.03	 18.84	 9.79	 0.91	 15.48	 2.62	 9.36	 18.17	 60.9
19fl 119.84	 -2.43	 20.95 - 11.20	 0.91	 14.47	 2.59	 13.58	 12.23	 47.2
1978 12055	 0.59	 28.27	 34.94	 141	 16.67	 2.77	 18.22	 14.99	 71.6
1979 115.26	 -1.89	 36.48	 29.04	 1.76	 15.28	 2.79	 18.33	 19.15	 62.9
198(	 111.52	 -5.70	 46.45	 27.33	 1.78	 20.66	 2.59	 15.76	 15.9	 190.5
1981 114.38	 2.56	 52.37	 12.74	 178	 16.49	 225	 11.57	 20.29	 72.5
1982 115.95	 1.38	 55.79	 6.53	 1.78	 15.28	 1.95	 10.07	 20.88	 263.7
1983 118.53	 2.22	 62.26	 11.60 _1	 13.46	 1.79	 14.76	 22.25	 138.4
198	 117.55	 -0.83	 79.57	 27.80	 3.94	 13.75	 1.99	 16.68	 23.12	 455.5
1985 112.03	 -4.69	 100	 25.68	 5.56	 17.87	 1.87	 14.84	 25.32	 150
1986 109.66	 -2.12 115.11	 15.11	 5.48	 9.36	 1.83	 22.87	 18.52	 -156.1
198	 117.99	 7.60 122.76	 6.65	 5.49.	 1.88	 25.73	 22.25	 211.3
1988 121.68	 3.12 132.91	 8.27	 5.49.	 1.63	 27.31	 25.72	 35.5
1989 128.85	 5.90 151.96	 14.33	 5.74.	 1.79	 16.06	 28.65	 191.8
199(	 138.98	 7.86 185.33	 21.96	 7.18.	 1.96	 18.53	 27.97	 69.9
1991 137.20	 -1.28	 280	 51.08	 12.12.	 1.90	 19.4	 28.59	 10.6
1992 145.64	 6.15 495.93	 77.12	 22.96.	 1.81	 20.6	 28.61	 -65.7
Source: International Monetary Fund (1960 - 1995); Government of Jamaica (1960 - 1992);
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In Table 1.1: (GDPR) represents real gross domestic product and (gdprg) is the growth
rate of (GDPR); (cpi) is the consumer price index while (pcpi) is its growth rate; (e) is the
nominal bilateral exchange rate measured as Jamaica dollars per US dollar; (gdefy) is the
government deficit as a percent of gross domestic product; (LLvel) represents the velocity of
circulation of liquid liabilities in the economy, calculated as gross domestic product divided by
liquid liabilities; (SY) and (IY) are savings and investment respectively as percentages of gross
domestic product, while the last column shows the value of public sector capital inflows.
The recovery did not last and a strong IMF adjustment package (including substantial
currency devaluation as indicated in table 1) was implemented in 1984, the aftermath of which
was stagflation from 1984 to 1986. An outward-looking strategy involving export promotion
resulted in positive growth in the closing years of the 1980s and the early years of the 1990s,
with the exception of 1991 when growth was negative and inflation reached unprecedented
levels, casting doubt on the sustainability of the recovery. The strong growth performance came
despite the widespread destruction caused by Hurricane Gilbert in September, 1988, which put
severe pressure on the government budget and on domestic resources in general. External
capital inflows in the form of grants and the settlement of insurance claims helped to finance
the reconstruction effort. High inflation, particularly in 1991 and 1992, was associated with
substantial currency devaluations in those years (see Table 1.1), under yet another IMF
programme signed in 1990, Stringent expenditure control measures and tough controls on
money and credit contributed to negative growth in 1991, but did not contain inflation.
The secular decline in the income velocity of broad money from 4.65 in 1960 to 1.81 in
1992 (see Table 1.1), is an indication of a declining efficiency in the use of the liquid resources
of the economy as a whole. This is partly a result of the poor growth performance between the
mid 1970s and the mid 1980s. In general, increasing amounts of nominal liquidity are
associated with sluggish or even contracting aggregate output. The next sub-section examines
financial variables and their relationship to the macro-economy in greater detail.
1.2.1 The Financial Sector
Jamaica's financial institutions comprise: the Bank of Jamaica, the country's Central
Bank; ten commercial banks (which are British, Canadian, American, or locally owned) with
combined assets in 1993 of J$62.3 billion; twenty-two merchant banks with assets of J$10.9
billion; seven finance houses/trust companies with assets of J$477 million; ten building
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societies with assets worth J$i8 billion; and a national insurance fund with assets of J$3.1
billion (1991). Current data on insurance and private pension funds are unavailable (the assets
of the former were estimated to be around J$1 billion in 1985).
The World Bank4 describes Jamaica as having a well-developed financial system.
Goldsmith (1955, 1966, 1968) develops various ratios to measure financial development, most
of which make use of the notion of national wealth or national assets (both real and financial).
Since the measurement of those stocks is not available for Jamaica, another ratio suggested by
Goldsmith as an indicator of a country's monetary and financial development will be examined,
that is, the share of money in the assets/liabilities of financial intermediaries.
Gurley and Shaw (1960) describe three broad stages through which countries pass (see
Chapter 2). In the first stage, financial intermediation is undeveloped and money is
predominantly of the 'outside' variety. 5 In the second stage, financial intermediation and inside
money (ie money backed by debt-creating assets) assume greater importance, and the economy
experiences greater financial innovation and an increase in the variety of financial institutions.
The third stage is characterised by the provision of a wide variety of fmancial instruments by
both intermediaries and centralised financial markets (eg stock markets). Towards the end of
the second stage and during the early part of the third stage, the share of the monetary sector
can be expected to decline somewhat, as other intermediaries proliferate.
Money6 as a per cent of liquid liabilities of the financial system was steady in real
terms, at around 50 per cent for the first few years of the 1960's, but had declined to 35 per
cent by 1991. Commercial banks had already been established in the fmancial system by the
1 960s, so their share of financial assets showed little growth though they dominated the system.
Indeed, as the plurality of financial institutions and the complexity of the financial system grew
over the three decades, the share of the monetary sector in financial assets declined. To the
multiplicity of types of institutions described in the opening paragraph of this sub-section, must
be added a stock market with a 1993 trading volume of J$8.4 billion and new capital raised of
J$2.3 billion (the secondary function being predominant).
4 Trends in Developing Economies, 1994, p 239.
That is money not backed by debt-creating assets.
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Source: International Monetary Fund (1960 - 1995)
Figure 1.4 shows the growth of Ml, M2 7 and Liquid Liabilities8 of the fmancial system
in real terms, between 1960 and 1992. The gap between Ml on the one hand and M2 and
Liquid Liabilities on the other, widens progressively as the complexity of the fmancial system
grows. The glaring exception is the 1973-80 period of crisis, in which private sector
confidence was severely shaken, resulting in a decline in saving and time deposits of the banks
and the non-bank intermediaries. It is also interesting that Liquid Liabilities and Money
(broadly defmed) are virtually indistinguishable up to 1970, with both growing faster than
narrow money. This indicates that the banks maintained their relative dominance of the
fmancial system, but generated financial growth by expanding their non-monetary (or
alternatively, broader monetary) assets, Liquid Liabilities grew faster than broad money after
1972, despite the crisis in business confidence. This can be accounted for by the emergence
and growth of government financial institutions aimed at supporting the social programmes of
the new left-of-centre government.
1.2.1.1 Interest Rates and Financial Savings, 1960-1992
Table 1.2 shows the movement of the real deposit interest rate, liquid liabilities and real
fmancial savings over the period 1960 - 1992.
'' M2 = Ml plus time, savings and foreign currency deposits of the banking system.
8 Liquid Liabilities = M2 plus time and savings deposits of the finance houses, trust companies, building
societies and other financial intermediaries.
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Real deposit interest rates were positive or hovered around zero for most of the 1960-
1972 period, except for 1961 and 1970 when they were sharply negative as a result of relatively
high inflation in those years.
TABLE 1.2
Id	 pcpi	 real r	 Liq. Liab Fin. Say. ________
%	 %	 J$million J$million ________
1961	 2.7.	 ________	 18.12 ________ _______
1961	 3.8	 6.57	 - -2.77	 15.67	 -6.23 ________
196	 5	 1.50	 3.50	 20.53	 2.61 _______
196	 4	 1.81	 2.19	 22.9	 3.53 _______
196	 4.5	 1.94	 2.56	 24.84	 1.66 _______
196	 4.5	 2.69	 1.81	 26.04	 3.31 _______
1961	 5	 1.85	 3.15	 29.35	 3.33 _______
196:	 5	 3.03	 1.97	 31.28	 2.31 _______
196	 4.5	 5.87	 -1.37	 37.73	 7.32 ________
196	 5	 6.38	 -1.38	 42.37	 5.75 ________
197	 8	 14.73	 -6.73	 44.66	 5.51 ________
1971	 6	 5.34	 0.66	 53.07	 6.88 ________
197	 4.5	 5.39	 -0.89	 59.47	 6.56 ________
197	 8.3	 - 17.71	 -9.41	 58	 3.52 ________
197	 10.5	 27.13	 -16.63	 59.37	 14.66 ________
197	 9	 17.37	 -8.37	 56.06	 0.8 _______
1971	 11.55	 9.79	 1.76	 54.67	 7.18 _______
197:	 11.69	 11.20	 0.49	 54.65	 -5.18 _______
197	 10.46	 34.94	 -24.48	 47.86	 2.86 _______
197	 8.91	 29.04	 -20.13	 42.16	 6.7 _______
1981	 10.29	 27.33	 -17.04	 39.66	 10.9 ________
1981	 11.56	 12.74	 -1.18	 45.03	 5.82 _______
198	 9.61	 6.53	 3.08	 54.04	 11.86 _______
198	 13.06	 11.60	 1.46	 62.59	 13.42 _______
198	 15.58	 27.80	 -12.22	 58.97	 11.81 _______
198	 21.31	 25.68	 -4.37	 59.97	 16.59 _______
1981	 19.02	 15.11	 3.91	 65.84	 12.74 _______
198:	 17.5	 6.65	 10.85	 72.17	 13.37 ________
198	 17.92	 8.27	 9.65	 89.61	 25.28 ________
198	 19.04	 14.33	 4.71	 85.88	 15.02 ________
1991	 26	 21.96	 4.04	 83.97	 19.52 _______
1991	 27.40	 51.08	 -23.68	 79.78	 10.44 _______
199	 38.42	 77.12	 -38.70	 80.67	 2.81 ________
Source: International Monetary Fund (1960 - 1995)
Where: id is the nominal deposit interest rate & r is the real rate (defined in chapter 3)
pcpi is the inflation rate based on the consumer price index
Fin.Sav.is real fmancial saving (defined in chap 3) & Liq.Liab=liquid liabilities
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Nominal deposit rates during the period 1960-1972 were fairly steady, averaging 4.8 per cent.
The stated interest rate policy was to protect the balance of payments, since the economy was
highly dependent on trade and foreign capital inflows. There was a tendency to shadow the
interest and exchange rate policies of the UK, irrespective of the domestic monetary situation.
The one exception was 1970 when the interest rate was raised by 60 per cent, ostensibly to
combat inflation.
The trend of real financial saving was generally positive over the sub-period 1960-
1972. With moderate inflation, real monetary liabilities grew steadily. As shown on Table 1.1,
the savings ratio fluctuated from year to year between 1960 and 1972. The determinants of
savings will be examined in chapter three, where the relative influence of income and interest 	 -
rates in relation to the Keynesian and Neoclassical perspectives will be analysed.
The behaviour of key financial and economic variables was markedly different between
1973 and 1980. Despite consistently higher interest rates on nominal deposits, real deposit
rates were sharply negative or virtually zero over the sub-period (see Table 1.2). This can be
accounted for by a sharp rise in average inflation as a result of the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979
as well as the effects of a lax fiscal stance which was at odds with the attempts to tackle
inflation by raising nominal rates to an average of two and a half times their level in the 1960-
1972 period. The fiscal deficit increased in unprecedented fashion from an average of 2.7 per
cent of GDP between 1960 and 1972, to an average of 12.9 per cent of GDP between 1973 and
1980.
Real fmancial savings fluctuated between 1973 and 1980, and its erratic behaviour
probably reflects the uncertainty caused by inflation and its effect on the real interest rate, and
the actions of an interventionist government on the interest rate (see section 1.4). As table 1.2
shows, overall real liquidity declined markedly by 33 per cent between 1972 and 1980.
The 1981-92 period is characterised by two episodes of recovery at the beginning and
end of the decade, separated by a three year period of severe depression from 1984-1986.
Inconsistent policies, heavy-handedness in their application, failure to restructure the real
economy and the inflexible nature of the 1984 IMF programme probably lie at the heart of the
slump.
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Over 198 1-83, the government deficit was cut from 21 per cent of GDP in 1980 to an
average of 15 per cent in real terms. Inflation fell from 27 per cent in 1980 to 6.5 per cent in
1982, its lowest level for a decade, and capital inflows improved as a result of IMF loans. Real
growth averaged 2 per cent compared to minus 5.7 per cent in 1980. The real deposit rate
became positive and real financial savings showed sIgnificant growth. However, In order to
stimulate the growth rate of the economy which was considered to be too low, the Jamaica
dollar was devalued by around 8.4 per cent in 1983 with further devaluations of 104 per cent
and 41 per cent in 1984 and 1985 respectively. High inflation returned, averaging 23 per cent
over the next three years 1984-1 986, business confidence was badly affected and the real
growth rate once again became negative (see figure 1.3). The real deposit rate again became
negative and real fmancial savings declined. The economy once again showed signs of
developing the crisis symptoms of the 1970s and the policy response was to impose tighter
restrictions on the financial sector including more stringent credit controls, higher liquid asset
ratios on commercial banks and higher Central Bank discount rates. The government failed the
various IMF tests, leading to the abandonment of the IMF programme.
From 1987 to 1992 there was a determined policy shift, despite the change in
government in 1989 which restored the Socialist party to power, with both the economy as a
whole and the fmancial system being systematically liberalised. Although the real growth rate
rose significantly, high inflation returned. The dramatic rise in inflation in 1991 was associated
with negative real growth in that year. However, continued high inflation in the following year
was accompanied by strong growth. Perhaps economic agents had already adjusted their
expectations of inflation in 1992 and it did not have the shock effect of 1991. Financial savings
were positive between 1987 and 1992, but they declined markedly in 1991 and 1992, as did the
real interest rate which became negative in those years as a result of high inflation.
1.2.1.2 Financial Assets and Credit Policy, 1960-92
Table 1.3 presents the asset side of the consolidated balance sheet of the Monetary
Sector in real terms, divided into net foreign assets and domestic credit to government and the
private sector. In effect, the table depicts the extent to which liquid liabilities from the liability
side of the balance sheet were used by the banking system to finance government and the
private sector. The table also shows the extent to which the amount of liquidity is supported by
international reserves of the monetary system.
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TABLE 1.3
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6
	
Liq.Liab.	 net	 domestic	 private	 public overall net
________ ________ foreign ________ _________ ________ ________
	
assets credit, net	 credit	 credit	 position
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ (1-2-3)
	
________ J$million	 J$m	 J$m	 J$m	 J$m	 J$m
196i	 18.12	 8.10	 9.45	 13.96	 -5.58	 0.57
1961	 15.67	 -0.05	 16.08	 14.52	 0.17	 -0.37
196	 20.53	 2.86	 17.64	 13.63	 2.81	 0.03
196	 22.90	 6.74	 16.08	 12.37	 2.84	 0.08
1964	 24.84	 4.18	 20.52	 16.52	 3.34	 0.14
196	 26.04	 4.35	 21.48	 19.58	 168	 0.22
196i	 29.35	 7.59	 21.66	 20.45	 104	 0.09
196:	 31.28	 9.31	 21.94	 21.47	 154	 0.03
196	 37.73	 12.19	 25.46	 24.06	 189	 0.07
196	 42.37	 9.99	 32.31	 31.98	 0.66	 0.08
1971	 44.66	 10.74	 32.30	 31.89	 2.86	 1.63
1971	 53.07	 14.14	 36.67	 35.44	 4.78	 2.27
197	 59.47	 8.93	 45.13	 43.02	 8.35	 5.41
197	 58.00	 2.98	 47.24	 41.30	 8.27	 7.77
197	 59.37	 5.44	 41.51	 38.15	 4.48	 12.42
197	 56.06	 -0.62	 48.87	 37.85	 14.16	 7.81
197	 54.67	 -11.43	 59.03	 33.46	 25.8	 7.08
197:	 54.65	 -11.74	 61.57	 26.34	 33.0	 4.83
197	 47.86	 -22.13	 65.80	 23.45	 33.2	 4.18
197	 42.16	 -23.61	 62.60	 21.51	 43.33	 3.17
1981	 39.66	 -20.88	 57.73	 19.67	 31.78	 2.81
1981	 45.03	 -25.34	 67.29	 23.69	 43.06	 3.08
198	 54.04	 -29.31	 79.02	 30.33	 45.67	 4.34
198	 62.59	 -71.54	 128.18	 34.29	 54.96	 5.95
1984	 58.97	 -65.28	 118.03	 31.35	 46.86	 6.21
198	 59.97	 -64.36	 116.74	 26.13	 31.78	 7.59
198	 65.84	 -57.31	 115.40	 27.33	 36.66	 7.74
198	 72.17	 -46.65	 107.97	 32.95	 19.64	 10.85
198	 89.61	 -58.54	 13347	 42.80	 7.13	 14.68
198	 85.88	 -35.80	 105.63	 48.90	 -2.14	 16.05
199	 83.97	 -30.62	 100.17	 47.24	 -10.43	 14.42
1991	 79.78	 -37.13	 106.83	 43.26	 -18.91	 10.08
199	 80.67	 -4.55	 73.71	 29.30	 -7.66	 11.51
Source: International Monetary Fund (1960 - 1995)
Where all the variables are measured in real terms.
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Table 1.3 shows that real liquidity9 grew over three hundred and forty five per cent
between 1960 and 1992. The pattern of that growth over the period reflects the impact of the
financial policies undertaken in, and the fmancial and economic climate of, each of the sub-
periods. In general, Liquidity increased substantially during the laissez-faire years of high
growth, 1960-1972, declined during the crisis years 1973-80 as well as during the
stagflationary period 1984-86, and recovered thereafter.
Domestic credit was also a function of the credit policies of the government over the
1960-92 period, as well as of general financial and economic conditions. Between 1960 and
1972, real credit to the private sector was relatively high compared to credit to the government.
The latter did not place any undue burden on the banking system, and credit was readily	 -
available to finance private sector activity. The net foreign assets of the fmancial sector were
positive throughout the sub-period 1960-72 (except in 1961), the only time that this was so
over the entire three decades of our study, except for 1973 and 1974, which can be seen as a
carry-over from the 1960-72 period, Finance was generally available, there was no crowding-
out of private sector borrowing by the government, and the banking system more or less
accommodated the demands made upon it.
The 1973-80 period saw a dramatic rise in real government borrowing from J$8.3
million in 1973 to J$31.8 million in 1980, at the expense of private-sector borrowing which
declined from J$41.3 million to J$19.7 million. Credit to the private sector was squeezed in
order to finance government expansion. In addition, in an effort to tackle inflation and stabilise
the balance of payments, extensive credit controls were put in place. Overall domestic credit
grew more or less steadily over the period, but its mix between public and private sectors
shifted decisively towards the former.
Government borrowing declined markedly between 1981 and 1992 under various
administrations committed to reducing the size of the public sector and bringing the fiscal
deficit under control. Indeed, there were net government deposits to the financial system for the
last four years of the period. Private sector borrowing recovered as a result, though not
dramatically, perhaps because of uncertainty and tight monetary conditions during the 1984-86
period and again in 1991-92 under the latest IMF programme. Consequently, as Table 1.3
shows, overall net domestic credit grew moderately between 1981 and 1992.
i.e. liquid liabilities as defined earlier.
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It is worthy of note that net foreign assets were negative from 1975 to 1992, reflecting
the chronic balance of payments problem faced by Jamaica, It is indicative of both capital flight
and a substantial r.eduction in capital inflows, even taking account of official inflows during the
years when Jamaica had IMF adjustment programmes.
1.3	 The Years of HiRh Growth: 1960-1972
The main objectives of economic policy during the period 1960-1972 ) were to generate
development10 and to support the initiatives taken by private capital. Sustaining the strong
growth in output achieved in the 1950s was seen as the way to generate development. The
government saw its role as a supportive one for the private sector, and to that end sought to	 -
build up the country's physical infrastructure and create favourable conditions for foreign
investment. Fiscal incentives (tax holidays, etc) were used to induce new private capital,
particularly foreign capital.
The economy grew in real terms by an average of 5.2 per cent over the period,
stimulated principally by the bauxite sector and to a lesser extent tourism and manufacturing.
Mining/processing of bauxite/alumina grew from around 8 per cent of GDP at the end of the
195 Os to 11 per cent by 1972, with manufacturing growing from 13 per cent to 17 per cent over
the same period". The manufacturing sector as well as tourism, distribution, and services
benefitted from the foreign inflows of capital that fuelled the growth of the bauxite industry.
Strong economic growth manifested itself in a growing deficit on the current account of
the balance of payments, but this was consistently financed by capital inflows. The authorities
were satisfied with the performance on the external account and the growth of the economy as a
whole. Yet the high degree of openness of the economy (imports averaged 42.5 per cent of
GDP and exports 37.7 per cent of GDP), and the uneven structure of production and exports
(in favour of bauxite and tourism), meant that the potential existed for payments difficulties if
export earnings or capital inflows were adversely affected.
In addition, the aforementioned decline of agriculture which was labour-intensive, led to
a substantial rise in unemployment from 13.5 per cent in 1960 (89,000 persons) to 23 per cent
10 Boyd
Investment as a per cent of GDP grew from 21.9 per cent in 1960 to 35 per cent in 1969.
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in 1972 (183,000). Bauxite production and processing, manufacturing and many services were
more capital intensive than agriculture, so that although the economy grew rapidly it did not
absorb signiflcant.numbers of the unemployed. Indeed the unemployment figures would have
been higher were it not for the safety net of migration to the UK , the USA and Canada.
Thousands of people migrated during the 1960's in search of jobs and a better standard of
living.
Although there was a tendency to equate growth with development, the reality was that
the degree of inequality increased between 1960 and 1972. Available income distribution data
for the period 195 8197212 indicate that the income of the bottom 40 per cent of earners fell
from 8,2 per cent of national income in 1958, to around 7 per cent in 1972. At the same time,
the income of the top 5 per cent increased from around 30 per cent to about 37 per cent over the
same period. Boyd (op cit, p.1 1) also points out that it deserves to be borne in mind that the
level of income earned by the vast majority of households was extremely low in absolute terms.
It was not until the mid 1970's that the problems of inequality and poverty were addressed
directly by the government, but with disastrous consequences.
1.3.1 Money, Credit and Financial Policy, 1960-72
Monetary and financial policy during the years of high growth were aimed at protecting
the balance of payments. Changes in Bank Rate reflected changes in interest rates in the United
Kingdom and to some extent the USA, the main sources of capital. The objectives were to
preserve the inflows of capital and to discourage any outflows that might be enticed away by
higher interest rates abroad.
The Jamaica dollar was devalued by 1.4 per cent in 1967 and 15.3 per cent the
following year, in response to the devaluation of sterling in November 1967. The rationale of
the Jamaican authorities was to protect exports of bananas, sugar and citrus to the UK.
Monetary policy after the devaluation was increasingly directed at keeping aggregate demand in
check, particularly as inflationary pressures became more pronounced' 3 . Bank Rate was kept
at a higher average level of 5.7 per cent between 1967 and 1972, compared to 5.0 per cent
between 1961 and 1966. At the same time selective credit controls were imposed to help
contain aggregate demand, and specifically to curb imports. Included in the credit controls
' 2 BOyd, p.11.

















were quantitative restrictions on the absolute amount of credit given by banks and finance
houses and on credit to non resident companies and individuals. In addition, taxes on the
purchase of foreign exchange were raised, and exchange control was introduced.
While it seems that various measures continued to encourage foreign capital inflows,
their effectiveness in dampening domestic demand and in reducing the current deficit on the
external account was limited. Higher interest rates did not dampen demand because the
economy was to a large extent driven by foreign firms and foreign capital. Indeed foreign
capital inflows contributed to the ready availability of liquidity. The Reserve Requirement
imposed by the Central Bank was not onerous, increasing from 15 per cent in 1963 to 18.5 per
cent in 1972. More to the point, it was not seen to be onerous by the banking and business
sectors in the high-liquidity environment. In addition, credit controls did not appear to be
unduly stringent, while the demand for imports for both consumption and investment seemed to
be inelastic with respect to price: imported inflation did not contain the demand for imports
provided that foreign exchange continued to be freely available to pay for them. Foreign
exchange was readily available throughout the period.
Figure 1.5. shows the upward trend over the period, of real capital inflows (K), the
investment/GDP ratio, the import/GDP ratio and gross national expenditure/GDP. Buoyant real
economic growth and moderate levels of inflation except for 1970 when price controls on
various domestic items were removed and inflation was high in Jamaica's main trading partners,
were also features of the period.
FIGURE 1.5
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With moderate inflation and steady nominal interest rates, real deposit interest rates
were positive for most of the period, or hovered around zero (except for 1961 and 1970 as
explained above, when they were sharply negative). The growth rate of real fmancial savings
was generally positive, increasing one hundred and fifty per cent in real terms between 1962
and 1972. The growth rates of real money narrowly defined, private sector financial savings
and real liquid liabilities, were generally positive over the period.
Figure 1.6
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The substantial increase in liquidity over the period supported an increase in real (net)
domestic credit from j$9 million in 1960 toj$45 million in 1972. As discussed earlier, most of
the increase took .place after 1967. The overwhelming share of credit went to the private
sector, although the government's use of bank credit, though still low, had begun to creep
upwards by the start of the I 970s. These relationships are demonstrated on Figures 1.6 and 1.7,
with the latter showing the trends of net domestic credit (NDC/GDP) and liquidity (LL/GDP),
both as a ratio of GDP. The period 1960-1972 was a period of fmancial deepening, with both
the liquidity/GDP and credit/GDP ratios increasing.
1.4	 The Period of Prolonged Crisis: 1973-1980
The stability and high growth of the 1960's and early 1970's were dramatically reversed
during the 1973-80 period under a new leftist government elected in 1972'. The State sought
to intervene in and control the economy quite overtly and on an unprecedented scale. The
laissez-faire economic strategy of the 1960-72 period was replaced by an inward-looking one
that emphasised national ownership and control, import substitution and seif-detennination.
The means for achieving it were perceived to be vigorous government intervention aimed at
controlling the commanding heights of the economy.
The main objectives of the new left-of-centre government that was elected in 1972 were
the lowering of unemployment which, despite the high growth of recent years had reached 22.8
per cent in 1972, and the reduction of the income inequality that had become endemic. Fiscal
policy was the main tool used initially, in an attempt to achieve those objectives. However, as
economic performance declined, other macro-economic policy instruments were brought into
play, as the government tightened its control of the economy.
The government embarked on an ambitious spending programme that involved
numerous social projects designed to reduce poverty, increase employment and improve income
distribution. The measures included free education, skills training, literacy programmes and
nationalisation of various enterprises. As Figure 1.8 shows, the government deficit increased
dramatically, the new programmes being paid for by domestic and external borrowing. After
averaging 2.7 per cent per year between 1960 and 1972, the government deficit as a per cent of
GDP grew from 4.1 per cent in 1972 to 20.7 per cent in 1980. Public debt grew from 26.8 per
cent of GDP in 1972 to 84 per cent in 1980, of which just under 40 per cent was external.
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Source: (1) IMF (IFS)
(2) World Bank (World Debt Tables - various).
At the same time, the government adopted a policy of maintaining the value of the real
wage. The oil shocks of 1973 and to a lesser extent 1979, and multiple devaluations of the
Jamaica dollar combined with escalating costs in the labour market, led to an unprecedented
average inflation rate of 21.8 per cent between 1973 and 1980. Spiralling costs and various
developments in the bauxite sector had an adverse effect on domestic production.
The bauxite sector declined between 1973 and 1980 as a result of several factors: the
emergence of Australia and Guinea as competitive producers of bauxite/alumina; the global
recession triggered by the two oil shocks; the increasing international use of plastics; the oil-
dependent technology used by Jamaica to produce alumina which resulted in a doubling of
costs, and the imposition by government of a levy on the production of bauxite which increased
the tax revenue from bauxite from J$ 27 million in 1973 to J$ 180 million in 1974 alone.
Jamaican Bauxite (alumina) as a per cent of world production, declined from 18.8 per cent (8.7
per cent) to 13.0 per cent (6.9 per cent) between 1972 and 1980, with bauxite output actually
falling in absolute terms.
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In addition, the government's policy and rhetoric on nationalisation did not encourage
foreign investment. Also, uncertainty in international currency markets associated with the end
of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and the fact that the US dollar, to which
the Jamaica dollar was pegged, was devalued in 1973, undoubtedly affected investor
confidence. All these factors affected foreign investment adversely. Having averaged 1$ 85.6
million per annum between 1963 and 1972, net foreign investment fell from J$ 75 million in
1973, to J$ 23 million in 1974, and to minus J$ 27 million in each of the years, 1978 and 1979.
There were net investment outflows between 1975 and 1979, and capital flight is thought to
have seriously eroded the balance of payments account."
The decline in the bauxite industry and foreign investment and the cost pressures on the
domestic sector, led to negative real growth every year between 1974 and 1980, except for
1978 when it was just above zero. Wide-ranging import controls were imposed on both fmal
and intermediate goods, creating bottlenecks and further reducing efficiency in the production
sectors. However, they were not consistently applied over the period and in any case export
earnings and net capital inflows which together had kept balance of payments problems at bay,
were no longer sufficient. External debt grew from 9 per cent of GDP in 1972, to 33 per cent
in 1980.
In 1976 Jamaica's net international reserves became negative,' 6 and the authorities were
forced to direct their attention to the unsustainable external account. They had always been
against borrowing from the upper-tranche facilities of the IMF, and instead tried to implement a
self-imposed structural adjustment programme that included the following measures:' 7 tight
import and exchange controls; foreign exchange rationing; a dual exchange rate system; wage
restraint and a suspension of external debt repayments. However, foreign capital failed to flow
into the economy and Jamaica eventually concluded a two year Standby Agreement with the
IMF in July 1977.
The Fund Agreement brought austerity without liberalisation. 18 A wholly inadequate
sum of US$79.6 million was to be made available over two years, in return for which the
15Boyd
p.26.
1! Boyd, op. cit.
" Findlay and Wellisz, p.88
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government deficit, domestic credit expansion and external borrowing were to be drastically
reduced. However, the dual exchange rate, quantitative import restrictions, price controls,
subsidies and the social programmes were to remain. It was a case of doing too little, too late,
and of the 1MF making available too few resources. The fiscal and monetary targets were not
met, real growth was still negative, and the Agreement was abandoned in December 1977.
A more comprehensive Extended Fund Facility was negotiated in 1978 (and re-
negotiated in 1979), under which US$250 million was made available. However, this time the
conditions were more stringent and included: a single exchange rate; an immediate 15 per cent
devaluation and a further 15 per cent devaluation over the succeeding 12 months; the removal
of price controls and gradual reduction of subsidies; tax reform, the further reduction of the
fiscal deficit and the curtailment of government borrowing and money creation by the Central
Bank; limits of 15 per cent for the first two years on wage increases; a ceiling on commercial
bank credit of 5 per cent above the level existing on the eve of the Agreement and an increase in
the liquidity ratios of commercial banks to 40 per cent.
Once again, not all of the IMF targets were met and the Agreement was suspended in
1980. In general, the 1978 and 1979 IMF programmes resulted in a slight improvement
between 1978 and 1980 in liquidity and the balance of payments, in part because of the inflow
of official capital. However, the government deficit reached record levels in 1980, and real
growth declined even faster (from 0.6 per cent in 1978 to minus 5.7 per cent in 1980).
The persistent negative growth rates and the erosion in economic welfare between 1973
and 1980, helped to undermine democracy and led to the 1980 "IMF" elections being fought in
a virtual 'civil war' climate. Hundreds of people were killed in gun battles between supporters
of the two main parties. Ironically, neither the social programmes of the government over the
1973-80 period, nor the IMF adjustment programmes had succeeded in improving the lot of
Jamaica's poor. It can be argued that the IMF programme required more time and greater
political will for it to be successful, but there is little doubt that it exacerbated the hardship
being experienced, especially by the poor.
As for the huge fiscal expansion over the period, it failed to achieve its stated objectives
of reducing unemployment and inequality. Unemployment in 1980 was 26.8 per cent, having
peaked at 31.1 per cent in 1979, compared to 22.8 per cent in 1972.19 Although accurate
' 9 Findlay, op. cit. p.190
28
information on income distribution between 1973 and 1980 is hard to come by, Boyd (op. cit.
Chapter 7) presents some evidence which suggests that inequality declined in the mid 1970s but
that the trend was .reversed during the latter half of the 1970's. The evidence indicates that the
government's economic objectives were not achieved during the period of decline and that the
social cost of the policies employed was high.
1.4.1 Money, Credit and Financial Policy, 19 73-1980
Financial policy during the years of decline is inextricably bound up with the expansion
of the government sector between 1973 and 1978 and with the various adjustment programmes
implemented between 1978 and 1980. Indeed, as far as the latter sub-period is concerned, it is
not at all an easy task to separate the effects of monetary and fmancial measures from other
adjustment measures. Nevertheless, this section attempts to examine some important financial
policy variables, changes in other variables, and possible links between them during the years
of decline.20
The objectives of fmancial policy during the 1973-1980 period were essentially
twofold: to stabilise the balance of payments, and to fmance the government's economic and
social programmes, the aims of which were to increase employment and reduce income
inequality and poverty. Implicit in the latter objective was the fmancing of economic
programmes ostensibly designed to increae domestic output, correspondingly reduce the
dependence on imports and thereby stimulate economic growth.
As far as the fmancial sector is concerned, the policy responses of the authorities to the
chronic balance of payments problems that arose during the 1970's and which have already
been described, were directed at the capital and current accounts. Rearding the capital
account, Bank Rate was raised from an average of 5.4 per cent between 1961 and 1972, to 8.9
per cent between 1973 and 1980, with a view to encouraging capital inflows and discouraging
outflows. As private capital inflows were determined by the factors discussed earlier and not
particularly by interest rates, capital inflows continued to decline, becoming negative for the
five year period up to 1979.
The growing current account deficit in the first half of the 1970's was exacerbated by
the high inflation caused by the 1973 oil shock and the multiple currency devaluations (see
20	 actual behavioural relationships are analysed in subsequent chapters of the dissertation.
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Table 1.1). The government sought to support its import licensing regime with controls on
credit for a wide range of consumer and producer goods. That policy was successful in
achieving its objective in so far as it was effectively implemented. The Imports/GDP ratio
actually declined between 1974 and 1978, being in 1977 for example, just 76 per cent of its
1974 level.
The Reserve Requirement, that is, the ratio of liquid liabilities to demand liabilities of
the Central Bank, was raised from 18.5 per cent in 1972, to 29.5 per cent in 1977,21 at which
level it remained for the rest of the period (see the Appendix to this chapter). This was an
additional instrument used not only to dampen demand pressures, but to fmance public sector
expansion.
Despite high nominal interest rates, high inflation meant that real deposit interest rates
were negative for the most part and the real liquidity of the banking system declined
substantially (see Table 1.3)
The heavy-handed credit and import controls on intermediate goods created severe
shortages of capital equipment for production, which had a serious effect on economic growth.
In addition, the rapid expansion in government borrowing from the banking system was effected
at the cost of private-sector borrowing. The government used the financial system to generate
cheap credit (i.e. at negative real interest rates), which was often squandered on non-productive
programmes, Stone and Wellisz (1993) have this to say:
"Most of the government's new schemes proved to be expensive, ill-conceived, and
mismanaged" (p.182).
As Table 1.3 shows, real credit to the government grew dramatically at the expense of
credit to the private sector between 1973 and 1980. Real credit to the private sector declined
by 52 per cent, while governemnt borrowing grew nearly three-fold. Investment as a per cent of
GDP declined by 50 per cent (see Table 1.1), while the real economic growth rate was negative
for virtually the entire 1974-80 period.
In general, the policies of high nominal interest rates and credit controls were reinforced
under the IMF programmes adopted between 1977 and 1979. It is remarkable considering the
21 DaW	 Christine E (1992).
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usual approach of the IMF, that under the 1977 Agreement the fiscal expansion, wage
indexation, and the regime of price controls and subsidies were allowed to remain largely intact.
It is only after the abrogation of the 1977 Agreement that the IMF insisted on reversing those
three sets of policies in the 1978 and 1979 Agreements. Yet Jamaica's economic performance
continued to be poor and if anything worsened. It may be that more time was needed for
positive results to begin to show, or that a more stable political climate was required to restore
private-sector, worker and international confidence in the economy.
In addition, though little information is available on the size and influence of the
informal currency and credit markets, their emergence and growth in response to financial and
economic controls must have had some impact on economic performance. In particular, it is
likely that they helped frustrate government policy by facilitating capital flight, the substitution
of foreign currency (particularly US dollars) for domestic currency, hoarding of foreign
exchange and exacerbation of foreign currency shortages. The performance tests relating to the
1979 Agreement were failed at the end of that year, the Agreement was suspended, and Jamaica
descended into chaos and anarchy during the months leading up to the general election in
October, 1980.
1.5	 The Period Of Intermittent Recovery: 1981-1992
The period 1981-1992 was characterised by initial recovery lasting from 1981-1983,
severe adjustment and stagflation between 1984 and 1986, and a second recovery from 1987 to
1992.22 A pro-business and pro-IMF government was elected in 1980, and relations with the
IMF improved. The decade is also characterised by the implementation of various IMF-
supported adjustment programmes, but the policies followed by the authorities were not always
in keeping with macro-economic objectives.
The main economic objectives over the 1981-1990 period were the restoration of
balance of payments stability and the generation of economic growth after the long years of
decline. During the 1970's the government expected growth to occur almost as a by-product of
its employment and re-distribution programmes. After the spectacular deterioration of real
output and general economic well-being, it was obvious that there had to be a re-orientation of
priorities. Real growth had to be made a specific objective of economic policy.
22)j, Op.clt.
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1.5.1 The Short-Lived Recovery of 1981-1983: Financial and Economic Developments
In the immediate aftermath of the elections in October 1980, the atmosphere of business
insecurity was replaced by one of optimism. Private capital inflows were positive for the last
quarter of 1980, and the shortage of food and consumer items was, to some extent, abated by
the relaxation of some import controls. Yet because of the foreign exchange and balance of
payments problems, a comprehensive liberalisation of imports could not be contemplated. The
government's policy response to the balance of payments problem was to borrow from the IMF
in 1981 (SDR 537 million over 3 years, of which SDR 237 million was made available in the
first year), in order to finance the current account deficit. At the same time the partial
relaxation of import controls, especially on capital goods, and the selling off of selected state
enterprises to the private sector, were intended to boost domestic production and exports. it
was also the government's aim to reduce the fiscal deficit by at least ten per cent in order to
release fmancial resources for private sector growth.
In practice the current account deficit of the balance of payments actually worsened, in
part because of the relaxation of import controls, and in part because export performance did
not improve. Stimulating exports was not simply a matter of demand management but required
the targeting of specific products and markets, incentives to encourage manufacturing, and
restructuring of the real economy. Exports were still dominated by the bauxite sector which
was still depressed.
Although the current account deficit widened, it was financed by capital inflows.
However, the composition of those inflows had changed from the heady days of the 1960s.
Nearly all were official flows generated by direct government borrowing or government
guaranteed loans. In addition to the IMF loan, three Structural Adjustment Loans totalling
us$191 million were obtained from the World Bank during the early l980s. The IMF and
World Bank applied cross conditionality to their lending programmes, so that IMF loans were
not forthcoming without structural adjustment, while the World Bank loans were given subject
to the IMFs stamp of approval on Jamaica's fmancial management.
The structural adjustment programme included the reduction of import and price
controls, the removal of food subsidies and subsidised interest rates for farmers, government
divestment of land and public enterprises, and more effective marketing of export crops. The
Structural Adjustment Loans went to the government and not directly to farmers or the
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agricultural sector. In practice the removal of subsidised interest rates discouraged agricultural
production, while the export marketing effort became bogged down in bureaucracy and was not
effective. There was no real structural adjustment, but the build-up of foreign debt was
substantial. Although private inflows had improved immediately after the election, this situation
did not last, as a 'wait and see' attitude descended upon the private sector which had been
responsible for the earlier capital flight. In any case the huge bauxite related inflows were a
thing of the past. Thus the IMF and World Bank loans while being a temporary salve, led to
even greater long-term debt problems than those with which the country was already saddled.
The percentage of debt to GDP grew from 84.6 per cent in 1980, to 130 per cent in 1983, while
the external debt/exports ratio doubled from 33% to 66% over the same period. Chapter 5 of
this thesis examines the effect of external debt on domestic savings, investment and economic
growth in Jamaica.
The monetary and fmancial policies implemented in pursuance of the government's
economic objectives included the relaxation of credit controls on some items of a capital nature
in an attempt to stimulate both output (with some success) and exports (with, as has already
been mentioned, limited success).
The IMF had not initially insisted on devaluation as is their wont, and wage increases
were contained. Consequently, inflation averaged a relatively moderate 10.3 per cent between
1981 and 1983, compared with 30.4 per cent on average over the previous three years (see
Table 1.1).
Bank rate was kept at its 1980 level and with moderate inflation, the real deposit rate became
positive in 1982 and 1983. Liquidity increased and real credit to the private sector improved
(see Table 1.3). The government's fiscal performance over the period improved substantially.
However, the reserve ratio on the banking system, was increased from 29.5 per cent to 36.0 per
cent in 1982 and 44.0 per cent in 1983. These increases probably helped to limit the impact on
demand, of the relaxation of credit.
In general, this was a period of a certain degree of economic liberalisation and some
fiscal discipline. The real growth rate was positive for the first time since 1973 (except for
1978 when it was less than 1 per cent), and was an average 2.1 per cent from 1981 to 1983.
However, the recovery was evidently fragile and the prospects were not good. The current
account of the balance of payments had worsened substantially, debt had risen, and real
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growth though positive, was sluggish. Restructuring of the real sector had not taken place and
inflation had actually begun to rise again in 1983. Net capital inflows were again negative in
1983, and the breaching of the IMF targets on international reserves and domestic financial
assets led to the suspension of the IMF Programme.
1.5.2 Severe Adjustment and Stagfiation, 1984-1986
The government called a snap election in December 1983 in order to seek a fresh
mandate to take whatever action was necessary on the economic front. The election was not
contested by the opposition and the new government immediately negotiated a rigid one year
adjustment programme with the IMF' supported by a Structural Adjustment Loan from the
World Bank, which was followed by an equally austere two year programme in 1985. They
were much less flexible than previous ones. The main economic objectives were balance of
payments stabilisation, the containment of inflation which had begun to rise again and the
generation of a higher level of savings in order to "lay the foundation for sustained economic
growth". 23 The received wisdom from the IMF was that prior savings had to be generated to
allow economic growth to take place.
In order to remove distortions affecting domestic economic activity and to stimulate real
growth, the authorities removed all price controls and dismantled the system of import licensing
under the terms of the World Bank loan. It was hoped that the latter measure would remove the
constraint on the importation of capital goods for industry.
Financial measures included a 63 per cent rise in deposit interest rates between 1983
and 1985, in an effort to attract foreign capital and dampen domestic demand. There was a
massive devaluation of the currency, of 184 per cent between the end of 1983 and 1986 in an
attempt to improve the competitiveness of exports, discourage imports (apparently, no
calculation was made of import elasticities to determine the likely impact on imports), and
reduce the current account deficit. Further attempts were made to reduce the fiscal deficit and
there were cuts in public sector employment, services and subsidies, and increases in taxes,
duties, and levies.
Ceilings were imposed on commercial bank credit to the private sector and the
government, and the reserve requirement was increased from 44 per cent in 1983 to 48 per cent
Boyd, op. cit., p.61.
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in 1984. Even when the reserve requirement was lowered in subsequent years, it remained high
at 38 per cent in 1985 and 35 per cent in 1986.24 It was the standard IMF medicine of tight
fiscal and monetary policy to contain inflation and generate savings, the liberalisation of price
and quantity controls to restore free-market forces and stimulate growth, and devaluation to
restore international competitiveness and stabilise the balance of payments.
The outcome however, was quite different. The removal of price controls and the
massive devaluation resulted in high inflation, which was an average 23 per cent between 1984
and 1986, more than double the average over the previous three years. Export performance
improved under targeted export promotion schemes fmanced by the World Bank, but was more
than offset by the substantial increases in imports, and the current account deteriorated. High	 -
nominal interest rates did not stem the net outflow of private capital, and overall capital inflows
were positive in 1984 and 1985 only because of heavy government borrowing from the IMF. In
1986, however, the heavy external debt burden came home to roost and overall net capital
inflows were negative as repayments on official debt exceeded receipts.
The tight monetary and fiscal policies succeeded in reducing real credit somewhat, but
the measures may have been too harsh and implemented over too short a time period. Business
confidence was certainly adversely affected by the numerous multiple devaluations, while the
atmosphere of austerity gave rise to widespread social unrest and great uncertainty about future
economic prospects. The real growth rate of the economy again became negative in 1984 (-0.8
per cent), 1985 (-4.7 per cent), and 1986 (-2.1 per cent). The widespread feeling was that
adjustment had been too rapid. Despite (perhaps because of) the strong measures, the criteria
under the IMF programme were not met, leading to the termination of the Agreement in 1985.
Yet there were signs in 1986 - improvement in the growth rate and the reduction in inflation
from 25.7 per cent in 1985 to 15.1 per cent in 1986 -that recovery may have been imminent.
1.5.3 The Second Recovery: 1987-1992
During the years 1987-1992, the pace of adjustment was deliberately reduced, as the
government opted for a strategy of "adjustment with a human face". The old concerns about
the balance of payments and economic growth had not receded but, influenced by protests from
4 DaWSO Christine (1992).
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all strata of society as well as by the adverse impact of the severe austerity measures of 1984-
1986, the new approach emphasised the need for a more moderate process.
The new Agreement reached with the IMF in January 1987, paid special attention to the
need to reduce inflation and to restore not only business confidence, but worker confidence in
the economy. Price controls on basic foods, medicines and agricultural imports were re-
imposed to help check inflation, but retrenchment in the public service was reduced and wages
raised. On the financial side the exchange rate was kept virtually stable until 1990, while Bank
Rate was actually lowered in 1987 and 1988 in an attempt to keep costs facing firms from
rising.
As a consequence of the above measures, inflation dropped in one year, 1987, by more
than half to 6.7 per cent, and was just 8.3 per cent a year later. It rose again in 1989 to 14.3
per cent, probably because of a lagged effect due to the relaxation of the government's tight
control on wages, as well as increasing business costs associated with rising interest rates and
further currency devaluation. Interest rates were raised to increase liquidity and attract capital
inflows. The Reserve Ratio on commercial banks was lowered, borrowing by the government
drastically reduced, and credit by the banking system to the private sector significantly
increased (see Table 1.3).
The financial policies were used to support other measures taken to stimulate real
activity and improve the balance of payments. Numerous agricultural sector reforms, including
the re-vitalisation of the banana industry, the provision of incentives and the subsidising of non-
traditional agriculture, all helped to boost agricultural production and exports. The
privatisation of much of the state owned tourism plant, the recovery of world demand and the
increase in credit to the tourism sector, all increased export earnings from tourism. In addition,
reductions in the bauxite levy, the negotiation of new agreements with US companies and
recovery in international demand led to some recovery in the bauxite sector.
The improvements in export agriculture, tourism and the bauxite industry, contributed
to the strong growth rates experienced during the period. Jamaica was devastated by hurricane
Gilbert towards the end of 1988. Despite this, growth performance was strong in that year and
in subsequent years (see Table 1.1), and was partly financed by private and public capital
inflows earmarked for the re-construction of the physical infrastructure. However, one
unhealthy aspect of the state of the government and external accounts was the high public
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sector debt repayments caused by the heavy borrowing of previous years. Arrears of debt
service amounted to J$200 million in 1990 and the government concluded a Standby Agreement
for SDR 82 million, in that year supported by an Agricultural Sector Adjustment Loan of us$25
million from the World Bank. The large currency devaluation of 25 per cent under the IMF
agreement, and subsequent devaluations sent inflation soaring to 51 per cent in 1991. This,
combined with the onerous public expenditure controls imposed by the IMF, provided a
substantial shock to the economic system in 1991 and Jamaica experienced negative economic
growth of -1.3 per cent. Strong positive growth resumed in 1992 as the onerous fiscal stance
was eased, but inflation reached a staggering 77 per cent as the currency was devalued by a
further 89 per cent.
A new government was elected in 1989, but it seemed unwilling to return to the days of
high fiscal deficits and appeared more ready to embrace prudent economic management. Indeed
both political parties appeared to have learned from their mistakes: the government of 1981-
1989 realised somewhat belatedly, that people and their well-being must be the objects, not the
incidental by-products of policy. For its part, the government in power during the 1973-80
period seemed to have been chastened by the unmitigated disaster of that period, and
undertaken to target external stability and growth as objectives of policy, and to nurture private
enterprise while relaxing government controls. Dealing effectively with poverty and inequality
is a long-term process and sacrificing sound management in the short and medium term
exacerbated the very inequality that the government had tried to reduce. Nevertheless, given the
heavy debt burden and multiple currency devaluations under various IMF programmes between
1977 and 1990, it is difficult to see how Jamaica can service its foreign debt (particularly the
multi-lateral debt denominated in foreign currency), and still grow at a sustainable pace without
substantial debt forgiveness by the international community. Jamaica's external debt stood at
around J$3.8 billion in 1990, while public sector debt service payments (mainly to the JMF and
World Bank), exceeded the inflows of new loans. In addition, it is doubtful whether the high
inflation rates of the 1990s are favourable to economic growth. The effect of inflation on
growth is examined in Chapter 4.
1.6	 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has examined the structure and performance of the Jamaica economy
between 1960 and 1992. Three distinct sub-periods were identified: the period of high growth
and low inflation, 1960-1972; the period of high inflation and mainly negative growth, 1973-
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1980 and the period of intermittent recovery in which growth performance and inflation were
mixed, 1981-1992.
During the first sub-period, 1960-1972, government policy was aimed at encouraging
private enterprise, attracting foreign capital and supporting the export sector. The government
deficit was low over the period, growing from 1 per cent of GDP in 1960 to 4 per cent in 1972.
Nominal interest rates were generally kept below 5 per cent and real interest rates were mainly
positive. The balance of payments was generally in deficit on current account, but it was
adequately financed by capital inflows.
However, the government failed to give attention to the lop-sided structure of
production and exports, the high degree of openness of the economy and the significant
inequalities in the distribution of income. The economy was dominated by bauxite and
traditional agricultural production and little attempt was made to diversify output or exports.
This was to prove costly in later years when both traditional agriculture and capital inflows
declined.
The second sub-period, 1973-1980, was characterised by rapid expansion of the public
sector, the use of high nominal interest rates in an effort to increase savings and curb inflation
and the use of IMF loans towards the end of the period. The fiscal deficit grew from 5,3 per
cent of GDP in 1973 to 21 per cent in 1980, as the government attempted to reduce income
inequality by initiating a wide range of social programmes. As mentioned above, many
contemporaneous commentators maintain that there was a great deal of government waste,
inefficiency and corruption. As shown on Table 1.3, real government borrowing from the
banking system grew nearly three-fold between 1973 and 1980, while private borrowing
declined by around 52 per cent. Subsequent chapters of this study examine the question of
whether or not government expansion crowds out private borrowing and private investment or
has any impact on economic growth in Jamaica.
The policy of raising interest rates to contain inflation and generate economic growth
did not seem to be effective in either of the two sub-periods, 1973-80 and 1981-92. The
economy experiencced severe inflation throughout the sub-period 1973-80 and for much of the
sub-period 1981-92.
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The approach of the authorities in Jamaica to financial policy, particularly from 1973
onwards, followed conventional wisdom in its belief that raising the nominal interest rate
increases saving and promotes growth. On the other hand, this policy was coupled by rapid and
unbridled expansion of the public sector, certainly between 1973-1980. As argued above, it is
doubtful whether this fiscal strategy or the financial policies achieved the stated objectives of
high employment and growth, low inflation and a more equitable distribution of income. Heavy
foreign borrowing and multiple currency devaluations under various IMF and World Bank
programmes have inflicted a heavy debt burden on Jamaica, with the numerous devaluations
contributing to the emergence of severe inflationary pressures at various times, but particularly
during the early years of the 1990s. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that IMF and World
Bank policies in Jamaica have largely failed to bring about sustained growth, as have the
policies of various administrations between 1972 and 1992. IMF and World Bank
conditionality seems to have been too onerous in the late 1970s and during the 1980s, while the
structural adjustment programmes of the Bank seem to have been inappropriate and less than
successful. The experience of Jamaica is similar to that of many developing countries that have
received balance of payments support from the IMF or structural adjustment loans from the
World Bank (see Mosley et al, 1995)
Chapter 2 examines the financial liberalisation hypotheses on which many of the
fmancial policies undertaken by developing countries were based, knowingly or unknowingly,
and often under the influence of the IMF. Subsequent chapters analyse the behavioural
relationships among financial variables and between financial and real sector variables. An
assessment is then made of the efficacy of financial and economic policy and the extent to
which the predictions of financial liberalisation models are appropriate for Jamaica.
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APPENDIX 1.1
Statutory Reserve Requirement Imposed on Commercial Banks

































•THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND THE THEORY OF
FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION
2.1	 Introduction:
The importance of the institutional and structural arrangements of the financial system
and the growth of the fmancial sector for economic development, have been emphasized in the
economic literature since the 1950s. The role of finance in capital formation and development
has, from the earliest days, been considered to be an important part of economic inquiry (e.g.
Adam Smith 1776, Robertson 1926, Clark 1935, Keynes 1936, Schumpeter 1934 and 1939).
However, the 1950's and 1960's brought renewed interest in the question of the linkages
between the financial economy and economic growth.
There are two broad approaches to the analysis of the link between financial
development and economic growth and development (Patrick, 1966). They are the prior-saving
(supply-leading) and the investment-led (demand-following) approach. The former holds that
prior savings are necessary for investment and growth, and that the development of the
fmancial system increases loanable funds, facilitates credit expansion, generates more
investment and brings about greater economic growth. The policy implications call for
measures that increase savings with the presumption that such an increase leads automatically
to more investment (see Thirlwall, 1989). In the investment-led approach, it is investment-
generated growth in real output that causes the financial system to develop and respond to the
demands placed upon it,
The two approaches to the analysis of financial development and growth have different
policy implications. If it is believed that prior savings are required for investment and growth,
then economic policy will be geared to improving the savings effort. On the other hand, if it is
believed that it is investment that stimulates growth and savings, then the focus of policy will
be on improving the amount and efficiency of investment.
Section 2.1.1 of this introduction provides an overview of some of the early
contributions to the issue of the role of the financial sector in development. Virtually all the
contributions implicitly or explicitly assume that prior savings are essential for investment.
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Consequently, the financial system plays a key role in stimulating savings and making fmancial
resources available for investment. It is perhaps natural if one holds this view, to go one step
further as McKinnon and Shaw did independently in 1973 and argue that repressing the
financial system is inimical to growth, and liberalising it promotes growth.
Section 2.2 of this chapter analyses the theories of financial liberalisation. Sub-section
2.2.1 clarifies the meaning of financial repression and fmancial liberalisation, while the original
contributions of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) are analysed in Sub-section 2.2.2. Static,
dynamic, and open-economy extensions of the McKinnon-Shaw framework developed by Kapur
(1976, 1983), Mathieson (1979, 1980) and Galbis (1977), are examined in Sub-section 2.2.3
and the Neo-Structuralist position is considered in Sub-section 2.2.4. Neo-Structuralists (e.g.
Taylor 1983, Van Wijnbergen 1983a and 1983b, and Buffle 1984), employ some Keynseian
adjustment mechanisms in their models. For instance, adjustment in goods markets are brought
about mainly by changes in income not prices. However, their analysis of the workings of
fmancial markets, in particular the curb market which assumes great prominence in their
models, is based on the premise that prior savings are needed for investment.
The Post-Keynesian position typified by the work of Burkett and Dutt (1991) and Dutt
(1991) is dealt with in Section 2,3, Their view is that investment and effective demand
detennine output, income and savings through the multiplier or through the re-distribution of
income among different classes with different saving propensities.
The chapter would be incomplete without considering some of the recent work on the
limits to financial liberalisation in Section 2.4. Many of the arguments presented are of a
different sort than those of the rest of the chapter, in that they address the 'micro' or
institutional aspects of financial market failure and instability. In essence the argument is that
financial liberalisation is rendered ineffective or is short-circuited by various forms of market
failure, which impose limits on the extent to which liberalisation can be pursued. Indeed, the
very notion of fmancial liberalisation is called into question. Sub-section 2.4.1 considers the
limits to fmancial liberalisation and the extent to which controls on and rigidities in the
financial system (for example credit rationing) can persist even in liberalised financial markets.
Sub-section 2.4.2 looks at the limits that free competition and imperfect bank supervision can
place on financial liberalisation by creating instability in fmancial markets. The overall
summary and conclusions of the chapter are presented in Section 2.5.
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2.1.1 The Financial System and Economic Development: A Brief Overview of Some Early
Contributions
Abramovitz (1952) analyses the role of finance in capital formation and growth,
although he considers the precise links between money and credit on the one hand, and growth
on the other, to be unclear. For him, finance involves two kinds of activity: fmancial
intermediation or the transfer of funds from savers to investors, and credit creation or the
provision of credit to investors in excess of planned saving. In practice, economic growth is
achieved by improving the effective productivity of capital (i.e. by increasing the net yield of
additions to the capital stock), in which process financial intermediation and fmancial
organisation have a key role to play.
Lewis (1955) stresses the importance of the organisation of the business environment in
facilitating savings and investment, particularly limited liability and the easy marketability of
assets which he refers to as the chief institutional requirements for an easy flow of savings from
lenders to borrowers. He also places great emphasis on the need to tailor both saving and
investment institutions to suit the respective economic agents at the local and community levels.
Lewis' (1955) vision of the intermediation process includes a strong role for government
in creating adequate fmancial incentives for savings and investment. Interest rates are to be
subsidised if necessary to make them more attractive to savers, while savers are to be
sufficiently protected to encourage them to lend to investors. Governments are to create
specialised institutions to channel funds into priority sectors, and they also have the prime
responsibility of channelling forced savings (taxation) into public works, public utilities etc,
which Lewis sees as being essential prerequisites of development.
In his study of thirteen "advanced" countries,' Goldsmith (1955) seeks to discover how
differences in their fmancial structure are responsible for differences in their rate and character
of economic growth. His conclusions regarding the direction of causation between financial
development and growth are tentative and inconclusive. Nevertheless, he does conclude that
growth and the development of the fmancial economy go hand-in-hand. In his later study of
financial institutions in the American economy, he writes (Goldsmith 1968, p.155):
i.e. countries with high values of real per capita national product and fully developed financial
systems.
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"The development of financial mtennediaries over the past century is so closely
intertwined with the growth of the entire American economy, ... with modifications of
the structure of the economy, such as the declining share of agriculture and the hand
trades, ... with the introduction of new forms of financial instruments, ... and last but
not least with the technical and economic innovations in the field of financial
intermediation. .. 1l
The contribution of Gurley and Shaw (1955, 1960) draws on the work of Goldsmith but
develops the idea that development is associated with the creation and expansion of debt, and
that the institutionalization of saving and investment (i.e. fmancial intermediation), quickens the
growth rate of debt2 relative to that of income and wealth. The very process of financial
intermediation reconciles surplus and deficit spending in the economy, and acts as a stimulant
to economic growth.
For Gurley and Shaw, it is a mistake to net out the non-bank fmancial sector and to
assume that it is sufficient to concentrate on the monetary and banking systems. It is precisely
the developing diversity of the fmancial system as a whole, that facilitates an ever-growing
quantity and variety of fmancial assets and debt. This diversity generates greater choice, opens
up a larger spectrum of channels for the flow of loanable funds (from ultimate surplus to
ultimate deficit spending units), and provides the potential for greater economic growth.
As development takes place, there is a tendency for indirect fmancing to grow relative
to both self-finance and direct finance. The deficits of economic units leave a residue: debt and
a change in financial capacity, and Gurley and Shaw3 insist that the theory of growth is
incomplete without taking account of the fmancial sector. Specifically, changes in the terms of
trading (including market prices) of loanable funds, debt accumulation and its relative
distribution among economic units, and changes in financial capacity may affect growth.
In addition, Gurley and Shaw (1960) argue that in general countries go through three
broad stages of financial development. The first stage is characterised by the predominance of
outside money (i.e. money backed by non debt-creating assets), which, on account of the
undeveloped nature of financial intermediation in the economy, retards growth. In the second




stage, inside money (i.e. money backed by debt-creating assets) and financial intermediation
assume greater importance in the process of mobilising and providing loanable funds for
investment. In th third stage, a wide variety of financial instruments is provided by both
intermediaries and centralised financial markets, with the latter providing both a primary
function of raising new money and the secondary one of facilitating the exchange of existing
shares (the secondary function being predominant). The precise characteristics of the financial
system depend on the particular stage of economic development of the country at some chosen
point in time.
Tun Wai (1956) examines the size and structure of the organised money markets of a
selection of developed and developing countries. He concludes that not only is the
institutionalised money market larger relative to national income in developed countries, but
.that their level of interest rates is generally lower and the range of rates more narrow than for
developing countries. Furthermore, in his later study of unorganised money markets of
underdeveloped countries (Tim Wai, 1957), he finds that interest rates are generally very high
relative to those in the organised money markets, as well as in relation to what is needed for
capital accumulation and rapid economic development. All these characteristics reflect the
smaller number and variety of financial institutions and the narrower range of financial
instruments in developing countries which collectively give rise to relatively underdeveloped
and inefficient financial systems. The link between the persistence of immature financial
systems and low levels of economic development is, for Tim Wai, inescapable.
In his studies on the role of the money market in supplementing monetary policy (1967),
and on the importance of household savings in development (1972), Tun Wai finds that
although financial savings grow faster than overall savings in both developed and
underdeveloped countries, the ratio of fmancial savings to national savings is smaller for the
latter group. He argues that financial savings depend on the rate of interest, financial stability,
and the growth of per capita income, and as a matter of policy the rate of interest should be
kept high to increase domestic savings for development. This prescription and his previous
findings that unsustainably high interest rates are a fact of life in underdeveloped countries (and
somehow seemed to be tied up with economic backwardness), make strange bedfellows. His
policy prescription seems to be a precursor of the liberalisation hypothesis of McKinnon-Shaw
mthe 1970s.
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Cameron (1962, 1967, 1972),' and Patrick (1967) attempt to discover the "operational
linkage" between fmancial and industrial development. Financial innovation increases the
degree of specialisation in the receipt and disposition of income, thereby improving the
allocation of resources and generating higher productivity and economic growth. In addition to
the role of intermediation and that of supplying the means of payment, financial institutions
also supply initiative and enterprise for the creation, transformation, and expansion of
industrial ventures. The role of the financial system is not passive or merely "demand
following". The link between fmancial and economic development is two-way, with the
fmancial sector being proactive rather than responsive to industrial development. The key is
fmancial innovation which affects the demand for and supply of investable funds by: (a)
improving the techniques of collection and distribution (of funds); (b) increasing security
differentiation which appeals to the demand by surplus and deficit spenders for diversification
of assets and liabilities, and (c) transforming the lending process via the spreading of risks, the
passing on of economies of scale through cost reductions, accelerating the specialisation of
intermediaries, and providing additional advisory and other services.
In Patrick's(1966) view, there is a strong connection between the financial system and
the capital stock, and in turn a strong, direct, and monotonic link between the capital stock and
real output. The financial system influences real growth via its influence on the capital stock.
This is effected in three ways: (1) intermediation between various types of asset-holders
changes the ownership and composition of tangible wealth, thereby making its allocation more
efficient; (2) intermediation between savers and investors re-allocates new investment to more
productive uses and (3) by inducing increases in the rate of capital accumulation, the financial
system provides incentives to save, invest and work.
The contributions described so far as well as the majority examined later in this chapter
(with some notable exceptions, in particular the Keynesian and Post Keynesian models), lie in
the mainstream of the prior-savings approach - i.e. they assume that it is necessary to
accumulate savings which are then more or less automatically transformed with the help of the
financial system into investment and growth. This assumption leads the proponents of the prior
savings approach to argue that savings must be encouraged by maintaining high yields on
financial assets, and by removing any restrictions on their growth. Interest rates must be kept
positive and high, the banking system must not be taxed by reserve requirements and the
financial system must be free of other distortions like credit controls. As a result the savings
effort will be greater, thereby leading to more investment and a higher rate of economic growth.
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However, the early contributions reviewed so far were general in nature and did not
provide an in-depth analysis of the links between perceived distortions in fmancial markets and
economic growth. It was left to McKrnnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) to systematically analyse
the relationship between fmancial repression and growth, and to argue the case for financial
liberalisation.
2.2	 Theories of Financial Liberailsation
In their seminal work undertaken separately, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) go
beyond the various approaches of their predecessors to examine the nature of fmancial
repression in developing countries. The alternative strategy of fmancial liberalisation that each
of the two authors argue in favour of, has formed the basis of financial and economic policy by
many governments of developing countries and by regional and international organisations (e.g.
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank).
This section begins by clarifying the concepts of fmancial repression and financial
liberalisation, and then proceeds to analyse the principal models of fmancial liberalisation to be
found in the literature on financial development. The original models of McKinnon (1973) and
Shaw (1973) are first analysed. An evaluation is then made of the main extensions (static,
dynamic, and open-economy) of the McKinnon-Shaw model, followed by an examination of the
Neo-Structuralist models with their emphasis on informal fmancial markets. Although the
latter share some common assumptions and insights with Keynesian-type models, the
justification for placing them together with the theories of financial liberalisation, is that
ultimately they do not appear to be fundamentally opposed to the liberalisation hypothesis per
se, but rather to the way in which it is often implemented and the sectors that are affected. In
addition, the Neo-Structuralists are diametrically at odds with the Keynesian view that prior
savings are not needed for investment.
2.2.1 Financial Repression and Financial Liberalisation
Before proceeding further, the terms 'financial repression' and 'fmancial liberalisation'
need to be clarified. Financial repression generally refers to the existence of (often
indiscriminate) "distortions of fmancial prices including interest rates and foreign exchange
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rates and by other means 11 (Shaw). 4 In a fmancially repressed economy, the Monetary
Authorities 5 distort the financial markets by imposing various regulations on them. These may
include ceilings on deposit or loan interest rates (or both), compulsory credit allocations with or
without subsidised interest rates and reserve requirements on commercial banks. The main
argument is that fmancial repression discourages the growth of savings and investment, and in
the words of Shaw (1 973),6 reduces "the real rate of growth and the real size of the financial
system relative to nonfinancial magnitudes. In all cases this strategy has stopped or gravely
retarded the development process."
McKinnon (1973) argues that developing economies are generally fragmented, with
access to bank credit and the formal banking sector being the "financial appendage of certain
enclaves: exclusively licensed import activities, specialised large-scale mineral exports, highly
protected manufacturing, large international corporations, and various government agencies."
Consequently, fmancing of the rest of the economy must be met from the "meager resources of
moneylenders, pawnbrokers, and co-operatives". It is this phenomenon, which McKinnon
views as being bound up with the regulation of the financial sector and the poaching of its
resources to fmance the current account deficits of governments, that McKinnon calls financial
repression. In such a situation, economic agents desirous of investing have to resort to a much
greater degree of self-finance and the size of the financial sector is unduly constrained.
Financial liberalisation refers to the process of removing or significantly reducing the
degree of repression of the financial sector. In practice this means unshackling interest rates
and the allocation of credit from government controls, and reducing inflation in order to raise
real interest rates. The argument is that higher real interest rates increase savings which, when
coupled with a competitive financial system, raises both the quantity and quality of investment,
thereby generating economic growth.
2.2.2 McKinnon and Shaw
The work of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) provides a theoretical framework for
analysing the role of financial development in economic growth. Specifically, they argue that
financial repression retards economic growth and they stress the need to liberalise the financial
Op. Cit., p.3




system as an essential part of any growth-enhancing strategy. They challenge important
assumptions in the monetary models of Keynes, Keynesians, Neo-Classical and Neo-
Structuralists, inthe context of developing countries. They argue that financial repression in
such countries often manifests itself in nominal interest rate ceilings, high inflation, credit
controls, high reserve requirements on banks and unbridled fiscal expansion which absorbs
scarce financial savings.
In particular, nominal interest rate ceilings coupled with inflation, might give rise to
negative real interest rates that serve to make consumption more attractive at the expense of
savings. Low savings have an adverse effect on investment and capital accumulation.
Conversely, higher real interest rates encourage savings and lead to a greater quantity and
quality (by discouraging low-yield investment) of investment. Figure 2.1 (from Fry, 1988) and
the ensuing analysis summarise the main common elements of the McKinnon-Shaw model.
Financial institutions intermediate between savers and investors, with saving being a
positive function of the real interest rate at any given rate of economic growth. Financial
repression which is shown by the line FF, is reflected in a fixed nominal interest rate and
therefore a real interest rate of r 0 held below its equilibrium level. With the initial savings
function at Sg0, investment is limited to lo, the amount of savings evoked by the real interest
rate r0.
If the ceiling does not apply to the interest rate on loans, the borrower would have to
pay the interest rate r3, with the spread r3-r0 being spent on non-price competition by a more or
less competitive (though regulated) banking system. Financial resources for investment would
be limited to 10, and would be expensive at interest rate r3 . Raising interest rates from FF to
F 1 F 1 increases saving along Sgo initially, and then shifts the saving function to Sg 1 as the rate
of economic growth increases in response to more productive investments being undertaken. At
the higher rate of interest r 1 , investments with yields lower than r 1 are no longer profitable, so
that borrowers undertake more productive investments. Raising the interest rate ceiling from
FF to F 1 F 1 increases both saving and investment to Ii. Removing fmancial repression as
represented by a ceiling on the deposit interest rate, increases both saving and investment to
their equilibrium level of 12, with a lower cost to investors, a higher degree of productivity of





If there is a binding and effective ceiling on the loan rate of interest, risk-taking on the
part of fmancial institutions may be discouraged and there is likely to be non-price rationing of
loanable funds. There is a tendency for relatively low-yielding investments (represented by the
rectangle r0r 1pq in figure 2.1), to be fmanced in the presence of financial repression.
Also, with the other forms of financial repression such as credit controls, the loan rates
are typically negative and encourage non-repayment, which further exacerbates the fragility of
the fmancial system. In addition, reserve requirements on commercial banks represent a tax on
the banking system. In the McKinnon-Shaw framework, financial repression manifests itself in
various forms, but in the words of Fry (1988), it is the real rate of interest that is the crucial	 -
factor:
"Thus the real rate of interest as the return to savers is the key to a higher level of
investment, and as a rationing device to greater investment efficiency. The increased
quantity and quality of investment interact in their positive effects on the rate of
economic growth. Growth in the financially repressed economy is constrained by
saving; investment opportunities abound here."





institutional interest rate or taking appropriate measures to reduce the rate of inflation will
stimulate economic growth.
Although the models of McKinnon and Shaw are generally lumped together as
illustrated in the foregoing analysis, there are noteworthy differences in their approaches.
McKinnon assumes that: (11) economic agents are confined to self finance, and (2) there are
substantial indivisibilities in investment, giving rise to investment expenditure that is more
lumpy than consumption expenditure. The former assumption in his model derives from his
observation that markets (including capital markets) in developing countries are fragmented.
There is a wide divergence of technologies, resources, prices, and information confronting
economic units, with little hope of a reduction in the disparities. Consequently, surplus units 	 -
may be unable to fmd productive outlets while deficit units may exist in quiet desperation
elsewhere. Resources are therefore not allocated efficiently and firms and households are
largely constrained to self-fmance. In effect, McKinnon's formal model is couched in terms of
outside money, since economic agents are constrained to self-financing.
Because of the lumpiness of investment expenditure (assumption 2), potential investors
must accumulate money balances prior to undertaking investment. Money and capital are
complementary - this is McKinnon's Complementarity Hypothesis. The higher the real deposit
rate of interest (or the lower the opportunity cost of accumulating real money balances), the
greater is the incentive both to accumulate money (broadly defined) and to invest. There is the
accompanying implication that the greater the proportion of investment in total expenditure, the
greater the aggregate demand for money (because of the lumpiness of investment expenditures
for which money must be accumulated).
Complementarity between money and capital is reflected in the demand for money
function in which money is determined by income, the ratio of investment to income, and the
real interest rate:
(M/P)d = f(Y, I/Y, d - 	 (2.1)
Where M is the stock of money (broadly defied), P is the price level, I/Y is the ratio of gross
investment to GNP, and (d - it°) is the real deposit rate of interest (d is the nominal deposit rate
and e is the expected inflation rate).
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For McKrnnon9 complementarity works both ways: "The conditions of money supply
have a first-order impact on decisions to save and invest ... In particular, if the real return on
holding money increases, so will self-financed investment over a significant range of investment
opportunities" (McKinnon's emphasis). Consequently, the complementarity hypothesis can also
be described by the following investment function:
IIY=f(r, dite)
	 (2.2)




Complementarity is reflected in the partial derivatives of the demand for money
function:
________	 8(I/Y)
> 0 and	 > 0 or <0	 (2.3)
S(I/Y)
An increase in desired investment raises the real demand for money, while an increase in the
real return on holding money raises the real demand for money and leads to more self-fmanced
investment "over a significant range of investment opportunities" (McKinnon, op .cit). The
direct relationship between the real deposit rate of interest and investment (the "conduit effect")
works until the "competing asset effect" of money becomes dominant (in which case the partial
derivative becomes negative). McKinnon sunimarises the two effects in the following diagram:




In Figure 2.2, complementarity between money and capital exists up to a point such as M,
where the real return on holding money is less than the real return on investment. Beyond point
M where the real interest rate exceeds the real return on investment, it is more attractive to hold
money for its own sake (i.e. for the return that it brings), rather than to accumulate it as a
conduit for investment. Beyond point M money and capital become competing assets or
substitutes in asset portfolios. McKinnon believes that the conduit effect exists over a
significant range, and emphasises the need for high positive real interest rates to encourage self-
fmanced investment. Even if real interest rates are in the "competing asset" range, there will in
all likelihood be a positive effect on the productivity of capital, since capital with returns lower
than the return on money will be weeded out.
Shaw's (1973) Debt Intermediation View utilizes a model based on inside money (i.e
money backed by private sector debt). In his model investment is not primarily self-fmanced,
and the banking system plays a crucial role in intermediating between savers and borrowers.
Savings and investment are constrained in a repressed financial system, but if market forces are
allowed to work, real interest rates allowed to find their equilibrium levels and financial
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deepening occurs,'° then the increased supply of financial resources in the banking system
becomes available for productive investment. There is no room for complementarity as
investment is not primarily self-fmanced, and it is financial intennediation that mobilises
savings which are then ploughed into a greater quantity and quality of investment.
Shaw's demand for money function can be depicted as follows:
(M/P)" = f(Y, v, d -	 (2.4)
where v is a vector of the real opportunity cost of holding money. In Shaw's framework, real
yields on all forms of wealth (including money), have a positive effect on the savings rate, and
he expects the substitution effect 11 of higher real yields to be dominant over any possible
income effect.'2
In the models of McKinnon and Shaw, a rise in the real return on holding money leads to an
increase in savings which is then assumed to be a stimulus for investment and growth. McKinnon'3
goes on to argue that growth also influences savings. This is MeKinnon's (1973) Virtuous Circle
hypothesis which stresses the inter-dependence of savings and growth in the presence of monetary
assets that possess positive yields. Not only does saving influence growth, but growth influences
saving in a virtuous circle. "A healthy financial system seems necessary for 'reverse causation" 4 to
be a significant economic phenomenon even though it is difficult to quantify econometrically"
(McKinnon 1975).'
Firms and households keep their portfolios in balance by holding stocks of liquid monetary
assets which have a "convenience" yield, in a balanced relationship with current income. When
income grows, the propensity to save out of income increases in order to maintain the desired
portfolio target or ratio of money to income. The higher the rate of economic growth and the higher
the desired ratio of money to income, the more pronounced the "portfolio effect" (as McKinnon calls
it) of growth on saving. McKinnon uses a modified version of the Harrod-Domar growth model to
illustrate the portfolio effect, as follows:
i.e. the accumulation of financial wealth at a faster pace than non-financial wealth.
"i.e. of more wealth for less consumption now.
12 i.e. of more consumption now.
13 Op. Cit.
14 i.e. for growth to influence saving.





where Y is total real output and K is the stock of physical capital. Labour does not enter explicitly as
a separate constraint on production, as it is assumed that technical change is sufficiently labour
augmenting to maintain equilibrium. The output/capital ratio a is therefore assumed to be constant.
I=—=sY
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where t is time and s is the propensity to save out of income. Differentiating (2.5) with respect to




Y = a s
	
(2.8)
The rate of growth Y*, is the product of the marginal output/capital ratio a and the marginal
propensity to save s. The propensity to save is in turn determined by Y*, the growth rate of output,
and p, various interacting variables (such as the real return on holding money), which influence the
willingness of economic agents to hold financial (and other) assets in a "convenient ratio to current
income:
S = s(Y, )
	
(2.9)
where: 0 <s < 1; ös/öY*> 0 and &/öp > 0.




The growth rate "now depends on the portfolio effect of growth itself operating on intended saving?
(McKinnon's emphasis). 16 The virtuous circle describing the two-way interaction between growth
and saving is represented by the following partial derivatives:
(2.6)
(2.7)








Raising the real return on money increases the propensity to save directly, which in turn
leads to growth (i.e. öY*/ös >0). Higher growth then stimulates greater savings (i.e. ös/Y >0) this
is McKrnnon's "growth dividend", which occurs by virtue of the existence of organised financial
markets. In the words of McKinnon (op.cit. p129):
"The rise in desired holdings of real money balances not only stimulates saving directly but,
once growth begins, channels even more saving through "organised" financial processes."
2.2.3 Static, Dynamic and Open-Economy Extensions of the McKinnon-Shaw Model
This sub-section looks at various extensions of the McKinnon-Shaw model. Steady-
State equilibrium models and dynamic extensions incorporating factors that affect the
adjustment paths between equilibria, are examined. Open-economy extensions which consider
the role of the exchange rate and the effects of capital flows are also considered.
The models of Kapur (1976, 1983) and Mathieson (1979, 1980) are, in the words of
Fry (1988)17 "by far the most impressive theoretical work on formal models of fmancially
repressed developing economies". They focus on the effect of financial liberalisation on the
quantity of investment, while Galbis (1977), focuses on the quality of investment. The
following is an examination of the various extensions to the McKinnon-Shaw models, and of
their contribution to the debate on financial intermediation and growth.
2.2.3.1 Kapur's Model of Price Stabilisation
Kapur (1976) argues that raising nominal interest rates on money holdings has a







where Y is real output, K is total utilised fixed and working capital and c is the output/capital
ratio which is assumed to be constant. In effect, this assumption allows fmancial liberalisation
to affect the quantity, but not the quality, of investment. The proportion of utilised fixed
capital 18 to total utilised capital is a, so that the corresponding ratio of working capital to total
utilised capital is 1-a. Since Kapur (1976) assumes that the developing economy is
characterised by unused fixed capital, working capital provides the binding constraint on
output.
The	 increase in total utilised capital in real terms is given by:
= 1 [AL - APO(1 - a)K]
1-a	 P
where 8 is the fixed fraction of the cost of replacing working capital in real terms, and is
provided only from bank credit. AP is the change in the price level, while AL is the nominal
increase in bank loans. In the model, businessmen repay the fraction 9 of bank loans used to
fmance working capital before borrowing afresh to finance more depleted working capital. If
all working capital is used up in each time period, the additional nominal bank credit required
to maintain working capital at a constant real level is given by the expression [ApB (1-a)K].
The supply of bank credit can be linked to the stock of money in Kapur's model.
Assuming a fixed required reserve ratio C/M (where C = high powered money), no excess
reserves, and for simplicity, that the public hold only deposit money, 19 the ratio of bank credit
to money L/M is q:
LqM	 (2.14)
The rates of growth of bank loans and deposit money are controlled by the Central Bank via the
rate of growth of nominal reserve money, so that AC/C = AL/L = AM/M = t (Fry, 1988). If it
is substituted for AP/P, for AM/M, qM for L, and since AK/K is equal to the rate of growth
AY/Y and cr equals Y/K, equation (2.13) can be rewritten as:
18 Which is combined with working capital in a constant ratio.







7 = 111.	 .	 — ,rO
P.Y (1—a)
(2.15)
In equation (2.15), monetary growth .t, the output/capital ratio a-, the ratio of loans to money q
and the ratio of utilised fixed capital to working capital a all affect the rate of economic growth
in a positive way. A higher required reserve ratio 1-q (which lowers q), the fraction of bank-
fmanced replacement working capital e, and the velocity of circulation P,Y/M, all affect the
rate of economic growth negatively.
The critical aspect of Kapur's model is the real supply of bank credit that is available to
finance net additions to working capital. The supply of bank credit is in turn dependent upon
the fmancing proportion 0, the ratio of loans to money q, the rate of monetary growth and real
demand for money. The real demand for money function is:
p = Y. e'"'
	
(2.16)
Where Md/P is desired real money balances, 7e is expected inflation, and d is the nominal
deposit interest rate. With a constant velocity of circulation assumed by Kapur, and with ic C =
it in equilibrium, ire p. - y. Substituting this into equations (2.15) and (2.16) and then
equation (2.16) into (2.15), gives an equation that depicts the relationship between monetary
and economic growth:
Money affects real growth via : (i) the effect of changes in the inflation rate on real money
demand and real credit supply. Higher inflation reduces both, given fixed nominal deposit
interest rates and also has an adverse effect on growth; (ii) the required reserve ratio which
imposes a tax on financial intermediation which rises with inflation and which affects growth
adversely; and (iii) the fmancing arrangements represented by 020 which imply that faster
20 All net working-capital investment, but only a fraction of replacement working-capital are financed
by banks.
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monetary expansion (and inflation) places the burden of (inflation-induced) increases in the
replacement cost of workmg-capital on the borrower, and increases the availability of bank
resources to finance net working capital.
The policy implications of Kapur's model involve monetary measures aimed at
enhancing economic growth. In particular, Kapur argues that a rise in the nominal deposit
interest rate towards its competitive level can be expected to increase real money demand, the
real supply of bank credit, real investment and growth. In addition, a reduction in or removal
of the required reserve ratio lowers or removes the effective tax on the banking system and
generates more resources for investment. Two shortcomings of Kapur's model are that (i) it
does not have a savings function or constraints that prevent investment increasing indefinitely.
"Kapur provides no indication of where the extra saving comes from to finance the extra
investment" (Fry, I 988);21 and (ii) the constant output/capital ratio prevents fmancial
liberalisation from having an effect on the quality or efficiency of investment.
Kapur further extends his model of the basic McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis to incorporate
dynamic adjustment (Kapur, 1976) and open-economy effects (Kapur, 1983). Kapur examines
two sources of dynamic adjustment in the context of economic stabilisation programmes, since
fmancial liberalisation is often pursued in such a setting (not uncommonly at the behest of the
IMF). The two sources of dynamic adjustment are adaptive expectations of inflation where
expected inflation is based on current inflation and money market disequilibrium which utilises
an expectations-augmented Phillips curve. The strategy of reducing the rate of growth of the
nominal money supply in order to control inflation, leads to a decline in the real money supply,
an initial rise in the velocity of money and a fall in expected inflation. The supply of bank
credit, the availability of working capital for businesses and real output all fall.
The alternative approach of raising the deposit interest rate has the effect in Kapur's
model of raising the demand for money in real terms, lowering inflation by removing the excess
supply of money, increasing the availability of credit for investment 22, and stimulating output.
Raising the deposit rate lowers inflation and raises output, whereas reducing the money growth
rate has an adverse impact on real growth.
21 
p.36
22 Since bank deposits increase.
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Kapur's (1983) approach to financial liberalisation in the context of an open economy
undergoing a programme of stabilisation, is to raise both the deposit rate of interest and,
initially, the rate of growth of money providing inflation is not too high. Raising both
encourages real growth while keeping inflation in check. In addition, the open-economy
extension of Kapur's model introduces the complexity of the exchange rate, but choosing its
most appropriate level is not at all straightforward, The particular exchange rate chosen must
not be incompatible with the interest rate policy, otherwise undesired capital flows may be the
result. A policy of high deposit rates and exchange rate depreciation, often an aspect of
stabilisation programmes, may give rise to capital inflows, particularly if the interest rate is
above world levels, if the exchange rate depreciation serves to dampen expectations of a further
depreciation, and if the productivity of capital is higher as a result of the fmancial
liberalisation. Capital inflows could hinder efforts to control the money supply and inflation,
so that the choice of exchange rate policy depends, inter-alia, on the initial and the target levels
of inflation.
2.2.3.2 Mathieson's Model of Financial Reform and Economic Stabilisation
Like Kapur,24 Mathieson (1980) assumes that the efficiency of investment and the
currency/money ratio are constant, and that the ratio of working to total utilised capital is
fixed. His production function is the same as Kapur's23 but unlike Kapur, Mathieson assumes
that fixed capital is fully utilised and that banks finance a fixed proportion 9 of all investment -
not just replacement capital. Consequently, the demand for loans in real terms is:
Lu/P = OK.	 (2.18)
The supply of loans in Mathieson's 25 model depends upon the demand for deposits and the
required reserve ratio:
L'/P = q(DIP),	 (2.19)
where D is the level of deposits, the real demand for which is determined positively by a
multiplicative function of the real interest rate (d1te) and real output (Y).
Provided that the increase in the demand for money induced by the higher deposit rate, exceeds the




DIP = f(dite)Y.	 (2.20)
In Mathieson's model, capital accumulation depends essentially upon the saving behaviour of
firms, which in turn is determined by the fixed real return on capital r' and the real loan rate of
interest (l_lte):
AK = s(rI 1+ite)Y. 	 (2.21)
Given the production function Y=aK, equation (2.21) gives rise to the growth rate function:
1 = s(r_1+ir e)cy , 	 (2.22)
in which there is a positive relationship between growth on the one hand, and the real return on
investment, expected inflation, and the output/capital ratio on the other, and a negative
relationship between growth and the nominal interest rate on loans.
The equilibrium deposit rate in Mathieson's model is detennined by the demand function
of equation (2.18), and the supply functions of equations (2.19) and (2.20). If the deposit or
loan rates are fixed below their free-market equilibrium levels or if there is a positive reserve
requirement (without a competitive rate paid on it), then excess money or a higher inflation rate
will cause d-t° and the real supply of loans to fall, and the real loan rate to rise. Both effects
can be expected to lower investment and growth. The policy implication is that financial
liberalisation in the from of abolishing interest rate ceilings to allow interest rates to find their
free-market levels, and removing the reserve requirement or paying a competitive rate on
reserves, will lead to an increase in investment and the rate of economic growth. Like Kapur's
model, Mathieson's suffers from the shortcoming of not allowing for variations in the quality or
efficiency of investment through which changes in monetary conditions can influence real
growth. In addition, they both ignore the Keynesian argument to be examined later, that prior
savings are not necessary for investment and growth and that savings, investment and growth
are driven primarily by demand factors rather than by interest rates.
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Mathieson26 extends his equilibrium model to incorporate two sources of dynamic
adjustment: adaptive expectations of inflation27 and a declining supply of bank loans
characterised by fixed interest rates for the duration of each loan. Financial liberalisation
places great pressure on established fmancial institutions which are faced with greater
competition from new entrants, but which are forced to maintain low interest rate loans for
some time because the interest rates are fixed from the outset. Financial liberalisation could
have an initial destabilising effect on the banking system and could even force some existing
institutions into bankruptcy. Mathieson assumes that the loan rate lies initially below its free-
market equilibrium level and that the economy is fmancially repressed with high inflation and
low growth. Mathieson contends that in those circumstances, and bearing in mind the possible
destabilismg forces that may occur, the optional policy approach would probably be to increase
the deposit and loan rates by manageable discrete amounts at a time.
In the open-economy extension to his model, Mathieson's (1979) approach to the
possible destabilising effects of capital flows (see Kapur, 1983), is to argue that they may not
be problematic if they are anticipated. Unlike Kapur (1983) who argues that both the deposit
interest rate and the rate of money growth should be increased (initially), Mathieson's (1979)
approach is to: (i) increase both loan and deposit rates in order to remove credit-rationing and
increase output, but to do so moderately so as not to attract heavy capital inflows; (ii) reduce
the rate of monetary growth to combat inflation; and (iii) over-depreciate the exchange rate to
improve the current account and to prevent expectations of a further depreciation, thereby
encouraging the moderate inflow of capital facilitated by the interest-rate policy. It is, of
course, essential to co-ordinate the interest rate and exchange rate policies.
2.2.3.3 Galbis on the Efficiency of Investment
Galbis (1977) examines the effect of financial liberalisation on the efficiency of
investment and consequently on economic growth, by modelling an economy of two sectors: a
traditional sector with a constant but low return to capital r 1 and with investment completely
self-fmanced; and a modern sector with a high constant return to capital. Total output is the
sum of output in both sectors, while the output of each sector is generated by the capital and
labour used in that sector and their respective returns:
26	 Cit.
27 Like Kapur, Op. Cit.
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Y = Yi+ Y2 = r 1K1 + W 1 N1 + r2k2 + W2N2,	 (2.23)
where W1 and .W2 are the respective returns (i.e wages) to labour, N. The crux of the argument
is that because the return to capital in the modem sector, r 2, exceeds the return in the traditional
sector, r 1 , a reduction in K 1 and an increase in K 2 (with a constant total capital stock K), leads
to a rise in the average output/capital ratio a and a rise in Y.
Investment in the traditional sector is positively related to the return on capital in that
sector and negatively to the real deposit interest rate, and is self-fmanced. The traditional
sector cannot borrow from the banking system, but may acquire financial assets as part of its
savings which then become available to the modern sector for investment at the higher rate of
return for that sector. Thus, if the deposit interest rate were fixed by the government below its
equilibrium level, a policy of financial liberalisation would raise the real deposit rate, thereby
raising real money demand, reducing investment in the traditional sector and making more
resources available for investment in the modern sector. Given the higher productivity of
capital in the modern sector, the average productivity of investment and output for the economy
as a whole would rise.
In Galbis' model where fmancial markets are liberalised, fmancial intermediation has
the effect of channelling the savings of the traditional sector from less efficient investment in
that sector, to more efficient investment in the modem sector. Galbis' model is not dynamic in
the sense of tracing out the paths between equilibria, nor does he develop an open-economy
model. Nevertheless his contribution regarding the possible effect of financial liberalisation on
the quality of investment is an important one.
2.2.4 The Neo-Siructuralists
The neo-structuralist models of developing economies specify what are essentially
Keynesian adjustment mechanisms, and possess some of the features of the Post-Keynesian
models to be examined later (see section 2.3). Adjustment in the goods market is typically
effected through changes in income, while prices are determined by fixed markups on costs and
wages are determined exogenously or through class conflict between capitalists and workers
(see Taylor, 1983).
63
However, Neo-Structuralists part company with Keynesians in their analysis of the way
that financial markets work. Adjustment in the money and credit markets takes place through
changes in the nominal market-determined interest rate in the informal financial market. The
informal market is itself of paramount importance, and fmancial liberalisation brought about
for example by a restrictive monetary policy that increases interest rates, can lead to
stagflation, especially if it is combined with a stabilisation programme that includes
devaluation.
While Neo-structuralist models are critical of the efficacy of financial liberalisation and
in some important respects are Keynesian in spirit, they share a fundamental similarity with the
McKinnon-Shaw models in that they assume either implicitly or explicitly, that prior savings
are needed for investment. In so doing, they are basically at odds with the Keynesian approach.
In addition, Cho1s (1990) view is that the Neo-Structuralist models are quite close to the
McKiimon-Shaw models in a non-trivial way, in that they also advocate the removal of reserve
requirements, and despite their misgivings about the financial liberalisation hypothesis, believe
that liberalised financial markets are more efflcient.
This section examines the contributions of three economists of the Neo-Structuralist
1school t, namely, Taylor (1983), Van Wijnbergen (1983a and 1983b), and Buffle (1984).
In Taylorts (1983) model, households hold gold or other inflation hedges, bank deposits
and curb-market loans in their portfolio of assets, compared to the two-asset portfolio (Inflation
hedges and money) of the McKinnon-Shaw models. The increase in financial savings predicted
by the McKinnon-Shaw models as a result of a rise in the real deposit interest rate may not
mean that total credit increases. If the source of the rise in deposits is the stock of non
productive assets, that is if households reduce their holdings of inflation hedges such as gold
and increase their holdings of bank deposits, then the overall supply of credit to the business
sector would in all likelihood increase. If, however, households increase their bank deposits at
the expense of their curb-market assets then total credit would in all likelihood decline, given
that there are reserve requirements on the banking system but not on the informal financial
sector. In addition, a second argument of Taylor ts is that increased saving lowers total demand
and retards growth.






Van Wijnbergen (1983b) constructs an IS-LM model that makes use of the above
argument. Households hold currency, time deposits and curb-market loans in their asset
portfolios. The deposit interest rate in his model does not affect the IS schedule but it does
affect the LM schedule which shows money-market equilibrium. Asset holders can move freely
between the formal and informal financial markets and the relative responsiveness of curb-
market assets (i.e. curb-market loans) and money-market assets, detennines whether the LM




0	 g1	 g0	 g2	 output g
29	 depicts commodity-market equilibrium.
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The demand (Ld) by households for curb-market loans is a function of the inflation rate
it, the nominal curb-market interest rate i, the real time deposit interest rate itd, and real income
y:
L' = f(it,	 'ed, y)W.	 (2.24)
where W is wealth. In particular, the demand for curb-market assets is related positively to the
curb-market rate of interest and negatively to the bank deposit interest rate:
0,. -- < 0	 (2.25)
td
A rise in the bank deposit rate of interest has one of two effects. If households move into time-
deposits at the expense of curb-market loans, the total supply of credit to the business sector
falls (since banks are subject to reserve requirements, while the informal market is not), the LM
curve shifts upwards to the left, and output declines to g 1 . On the other hand, if households
hold more deposits at the expense of currency, the supply of credit rises, the LM curve shifts
downwards to the right, and output increases to g. Van Wijnbergen expects the former effect
to be predominant and even to persist in the long run. Kohsaka (1984) arrives at similar
conclusions. Even for an open economy undergoing a stabilisation programme that involves a
tight monetary policy and depreciation of the exchange rate, growth is reduced if the effect of
the depreciation on the current account of the balance of payments is outweighed by the tight
monetary effect just described (Van Wijnbergen, 1983a).
Buffie (1984) argues along similar lines as Taylor and van Wijnbergen, but
incorporates foreign bonds in asset portfolios which consist of currency, bank deposits, foreign
bonds, and curb-market loans. Financial repression, particularly in the form of interest rate
ceilings and reserve requirements, reduces the supply of credit and encourages the curb-market
to expand to fill the breach. Financial liberalisation can lead to a decline in the availability of
credit if curb loans constitute a sizable proportion of total loanable funds and are good
substitutes for deposits. if, on the other hand, currency and foreign assets are better substitutes
for deposits, then the growth in deposits arising from an increase in the deposit interest rate
would not lead to a decline in credit, and fmancial liberalisation can be successfully pursued.
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Informal credit markets are undoubtedly important in developing countries (Shaw 1973,
Tun Wai 1957), but accurate information on their size and on their institutional and structural
arrangements is scanty (apart from Korea. See Cho, 1989). The Neo-Structuralists implicitly
or explicitly assume that credit supplied in the informal market is used overwhelmingly for
capital purposes. However, that may not be so at all and if it is used mainly for consumption,
then the neo-structuralist argument that liberalisation generates less resources for investment
and growth, is weakened.3°
In addition, the Neo-Structuralists do not seem to have taken account of the fact that
the reserve requirement may well be used by governments for capital purposes. Indeed its use
for such purposes is widespread in the developing world. If it is used for capital investment
then it is not lost to investment as a whole, nor is there any 'a priori' reason to believe that it
will be used any less efficiently than capital in the hands of the private sector. Its use by the
government for capital purposes and the impact that it may have on growth need not be
diminished.
2.3	 The Post-Keynesians
This section examines the Post-Keynesian models which argue that prior-savings are
not needed for investment, but that it is investment and effective demand that determine savings
via the effect of the multiplier on output and on income (on which aggregate savings depends),
or via the re-distribution -of income among different classes with varying propensities to save.
Growth can even be induced through inflation (Mundell 1965, Thirlwall 1974 and 1989),
although such a policy is fraught with its own dangers and pitfalls. Inflation raises the nominal
return on investment and lowers the real interest rate (and therefore the real yield on financial
assets), thereby encouraging investment (Thiriwall, 1974). The high real interest rate policy
advocated in the McKinnon-Shaw models might well discourage investment, effective demand,
and real growth.
The model of Burkett and Dull (1991) typifies the argument found in the Post-
Keynesian literature on the effect of fmancial liberalisation on growth. In the credit market, the
supply of credit (L') is determined by the proportion of free reserves lent to businesses by the
banks (a), the market-determined interest rate on bank loans (i), the reserve ratio (q), and the
amount of bank deposits held by households (D):
30 See the argument in the previous two paragraphs.
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V a(i)(1-q)D.	 (2.26)
Deposits are in turn determined by household wealth (W), and the real deposit interest rate (id),
as follows:	 -
D = b(id)W,	 > 0.	 (2.27)
8 li
Raising the real interest rate increases deposits and the supply of credit. The demand for credit
is constant in the short run, and is determined by the difference between the stock of physical
capital (pK) and total business wealth (F):
Ld = pK- F=L.	 (2.28)
In the short run the interest rate on loans does not affect the demand for credit directly,
although it does affect investment through expectations and through its contribution to business
costs:
81	 81I = I(r,i), —> 0 - < 0 	(2.29)
Sr
Where I is planned investment, r is the rate of profit, and i is the interest rate on loans.
Investment is not affected directly by changes in the supply of credit, but rather by the loan rate
of interest.
Burkett and Dutt31 consider the possible effect of consumption on demand (and
therefore on real growth), and in their model consumption (C) depends upon income (Y) and the
propensity to save (s(id)):
pC = 11 -s(id)]Y, S'(id) > 0,	 (2.30)
31 Op.Cit.
68
where P is the price level. They assume that the deposit interest rate has a positive effect on
saving. Credit market equilibrium gives the following relationships:
Ls=L	 (2.31)
a(i)(1-q)D = pK - F =L	 (2.32)
where L is the fixed demand for credit. Substituting equation (2.27) into equation (2.32)
gives:
a(i)(1-q) b(id)W = L	 (2.33)





There is a positive relationship between the equilibrium rate of interest and both the demand for
credit and the reserve ratio (q in this model), and a negative relationship between the
equilibrium interest rate and the deposit rate, wealth, and the proportion of free reserves loaned
to businesses. These relationships feed through into the commodity market and impact on
effective demand. Output (X) in the commodity market is the sum of consumption and
investment:
x=c+I.	 (2.35)
Substituting equations (2.30) and (2,29) into (2.35) gives:
X = Il-s(id)IY + I(r,i).	 (2.36)
In the model, income Y is divided into wage income and interest income from bank deposits:
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Y = waX + idD,	 (2.37)
where w is the given money wage and a is the technologically fixed labour/output ratio.





Combining (2.36), (2.37), and (2.38), and treating income as real income gives a revised
equation for equilibrium output:
X = [1-s(id)JIX/(l+z) + id(DIP)] + I(r,i).	 (2.39)
Equilibrium in the commodity market is determined by effective demand, given the equilibrium
interest rate:
Xe Ll-s(id)IIX/(l-z) + id(DIP)J + I(r,ie).	 (2.40)
The impact of raising the deposit interest rate on effective demand and real growth is then
analysed. The actual relationship between fmance (i.e. credit) and growth is complex in the
Post-Keynesian approach, and depends on the actual structural and institutional arrangements
of the economy concerned.
A rise in the interest rate on deposits has two possible effects in the Burkett and Dull
model. On the one hand, there is a positive effect as the supply of deposits (from equation
2.27) and credit (from equation 2.26) are increased. The equilibrium loan interest rate falls
(equation 2.34), investment rises as a result of lower costs and more optimistic expectations of
higher net returns on capital (equation 2.29) and output rises (equation 2.40). A positive
income effect on consumption also comes into play and causes output to grow as the rise in the
deposit rate increases income (from equation 2.37), consumption (equation 2.30), and output
(equations 2.35-2.40).
On the other hand, a rise in the deposit rate of interest has a substitution effect that
increases the propensity to save and reduces consumption (equation 2.30), which in turn
reduces aggregate demand and output (equations 2.35-2.40). As a result, the rate of profit and
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investment are likely to decline (equation 2.29), and as Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994) have
pointed out, if as a result entrepreneurs become more pessimistic about future profits the fall in
investment could be quite substantial. In addition, they stress that the inclusion in the model of
accelerator effects on investment could cause the impact of financial liberalisation on
investment to be strongly negative.
The ultimate effect of a rise in the deposit rate on output and growth depends on the
relative strengths of the opposing effects discussed above. On the one hand, the positive effect
on output depends on the responsiveness of financial savings to the deposit rate of interest, and
of investment to the loan interest rate and the net profit rate. On the other hand, the negative
effect on output depends on the responsiveness to the deposit rate of the propensity to save
which then affects consumption and aggregate demand, and on the sensitivity of expectations to
the decline in the net rate of profit.
The Post-Keynesian approach is the antithesis of models that assume that prior savings
are necessary for investment. In addition, Post-Keynesian models stress the role that the
propensity to save plays in the contraction of effective demand (via a reduction in
consumption), in response to higher deposit interest rates. The Burkett and Dutt (op.cit) model
focusses on the short-run as is typical of Keynesian models, assumes that excess capacity exists
in the economy and does not make use of any accelerator effects.
Dutt (1991) extends the Burkett and Dutt (1991) model for an economy at full capacity.
Financial liberalisation may lead to higher growth because of higher saving, and lower inflation
because of lower excess demand. However, an increase in the rate of growth is by no means
guaranteed, as increasing costs over time may undermine net returns to capital and desired
investment. Also, the incorporation of an accelerator effect exacerbates the negative effects of
liberalisation on growth in the presence of excess capacity. In addition, in the long run the
negative effects of liberalisation are aggravated as increasing costs lead to higher prices and
lower real wages, smaller aggregate demand and even lower capacity utilisation, with its
concomitant negative effect on growth.
Dutt (1991) also argues that in an open economy liberalisation is often accompanied by
an over-valuation of the real exchange rate, which puts pressure on the current account of the
balance of payments and reinforces the negative effect of liberalisation on aggregate demand.
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Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994) point out that there may be other forces at work on
effective demand that exacerbate the Post-Keynesian influences and that may lead to fmanciat
instability. For instance, if banks engage in positive maturity transformation (i.e borrow short
and lend long), then a rise in the deposit rate could lead to large losses if they are unable to
increase the loan rate in the short run. This may well be the case if past repression subjected
the banks to perverse credit controls and forced them to have a substantial proportion of their
loans on a fixed interest rate basis.
Another possible adverse influence comes from the effect that higher interest rates have
on increasing the public sector debt burden and therefore its deficit, if the size of the
government debt is large. Liberalisation may have an even greater negative impact if taxes on
the fmancial sector32 are reduced, if fmancial institutions no longer have to hold government
bonds and if the government is forced to reduce its spending. 33 However, it is noteworthy that
the recent fmancial development literature (McKinnon 1989, the World Bank 1989) stresses the
importance of bringing the public sector fmances under control as a pre-requisite for successful
financial liberalisation.
Beckerman (1988) argues that the equilibrium real interest rate may be very low, zero
or negative, and that increasing nominal rates above the inflation rate may have adverse effects.
Equilibrium rates may be low or non-positive because of low expectations or a high degree of
uncertainty which depresses investment demand, but those rates may still elicit savings because
individuals who may not have access to credit may wish to accumulate funds for an uncertain
future or to make large purchases, Whatever the reason, depositors may be willing to accept
low or even negative real interest rates. A policy of forcing them up, or 'upward fmancial
repression', may lead to instability in the banking system. If the resulting additional liquidity
is not lent out then bank profitability may be affected, and if it is lent out, the probability of
default is likely to be high since excessive liquidity in itself implies that insufficient profitable
investment opportunities exist at the going rate.
The role of commercial banks in the actual creation of credit adds to the veracity of the
Post-Keynesian approach, although the models examined thus far do not incorporate such a
function. The argument that investment is not constrained by savings but by liquidity, is in the
32 e.g. reserve requirements.
See Dutt, (1991).
Which in certain situations can be used to advantage - for example, to discourage capital flight.
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spirit of the Post-Keynesian approach. Asimakopoulos (1986), Davidson (1986), and Thiriwall
(1989) all emphasise the role of the financial sector in creating credit irrespective of planned
saving though its effectiveness in that role may well depend upon the maturity of the banking
system.
24	 Institutional Aspects of Financial Markets: Market Failure and Instabily
The financial liberalisation models are firmly part of the Neo-Classical tradition, in which
the market is sacrosanct and should be allowed to function freely under liberal institutional
arrangements. Savings and investment will balance if the credit market is left alone, but the market
will not clear if governments fix interest rates, impose credit controls or otherwise 'repress' it.
However, the free market solution may simply not be viable and credit rationing may persist even in
the absence of "deliberate" financial repression. Financial intermediaries play a key role in gathering
information and reducing uncertainty (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1994), and are important for
developing high quality, long-term relations among market participants (Soskice, 1991).
Consequently, they may use information gathered in the normal course of business to ration credit in
their own long-term self-interest.
This section examines the role of information asymmetries and market failure in causing
credit rationing to persist (even in the absence of financial repression), and in effectively defining the
limits to 'financial liberalisation'. In addition, the argument that the existence of externalities and
economies of scale and scope may produce allocative inefficiency, render the free market solution
untenable, promote instability and retard growth, is examined. The case for some degree of
government intervention in the market (through adequate bank supervision) is considered. Gibson
and Tsakalotos (1994) point out that all govennnent intervention cannot be reasonably seen as being
repressive, and the very definition of the term 'financial repression' is called into question.
2.4.1 Credit Rationing and the Limits to Financial LTheralisation
The view that financial liberalisation leads to the disappearance of credit rationing has been
challenged by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Market failure in the form of information asymmetries may
cause credit rationing to persist, even in the absence of interest rate ceilings or other forms of
governmental control.
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As Stiglitz (1989) has pointed out, credit markets are not homogeneous and it is likely that
borrowers may know considerably more about their individual projects than lenders. Although
banks can draw up general profiles of classes of borrowers, they cannot know exactly which
borrowers have high default probabilities and cannot monitor their actions (which might affect their
ability to repay) perfectly. As interest rates rise the return on projects falls, and the overall riskiness
of the banks' asset portfolios increases. If banks use the interest rate as a means of selecting
borrowers then they may attract high-risk borrowers who may be willing to pay high rates, who
know more about their projects than the bank, and who may not be too concerned about the
probability of default. Consequently, when the demand for credit is buoyant a profit-maximising
bank will be reluctant to raise interest rates and will ration credit.
If, as intimated above, banks are able to distinguish between classes or categories of
borrowers but not between borrowers within a particular group, then it is possible that some
categories may be wholly excluded from borrowing even though the projects of some borrowers
within the group may have excellent potential returns. Thus the effect of credit rationing behaviour
by lenders may have even more perverse effects than expected, despite the absence of official control
of the financial sector. Indeed, the failure of the market mechanism or its inadequate functioning,
may provide a case for appropriate government intervention.
Cho (1986) argues that the effect of imperfect information may discourage bank financing of
innovative projects which are often more risky, and may therefore affect the allocative efficiency of
capital35 and economic growth adversely. Cho's 36 solution is to develop the equity markets so that
they play a bigger role in financing economic development. However, equity markets are slow to get
going in developing countries and their contribution to the financing of development is usually very
low. Even in developed countries they generally account for less than five per cent of new net
finance (Mayer, 1990), with the exception of the USA and Canada where the figure is around ten to
twelve per cent.
In addition, the development along Western lines of equity and financial markets in
developing countries, has been called into question (Hughes 1986, Soskice 1991, Gibson and
Tsakalotos 1994). Such markets and their related institutions as found in the USA and UK, have
been accused of focussing too much on short-term profits and dividends than on long-term
Since industries may not have sufficient financing to enable them to take advantage of changing
opportunities in a rapidly developing economy.
36 op. Cit.
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flnance,competitiveness and profitability funds for innovation and technology, and on building long-
lasting relationship among institutions and businesses built on trust and dependability (as, for
example, obtains in Japan and Germany). Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994), as well as practically all
the early contributions covered in section 2.1.1 of this chapter, stress the importance of tailoring
financial institutions to the particular needs and traditions of developing countries, and of developing
appropriate relations among all the participants in the financial markets in each specific cultural
context.
24.2 Competition, Efficiency and Bank Supervision
The financial liberalisation hypothesis constitutes part of the Neo-Classical tradition, in its 	 -
implicit assumption that the magic hand of the market will restore imbalances and facilitate growth if
the market is left alone by govermnents. As Fry (1 988) puts it:
"The policy implications of these models are that economic growth can be increased by
abolishing institutional interest rate ceilings, by abandoning selective or directed credit
programs, by eliminating the reserve requirement tax, and by ensuring that the financial
system operates competitively under conditions of free entry."
The deposit rate of interest will find its own level and increased savings, investment, and growth will
ensue. Free competition among banks will reduce spreads between deposit and loan rates thereby
improving "functional efficiency" (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1 994)3S while allowing free entry into the
market will help promote further competition which is seen as not just desirable, but essential for
development.
Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994) argue that not only may a competitive financial system not
produce allocative efficiency because of information asymmetries 39 but that possible problems
related to externalities and economies of scale and scope, may promote instability and adversely
affect growth and development. The free-market solution may well mean that some banks will be
squeezed out - ie will fail. However, the negative externality of such failure is the social cost
amplified by the fact that banks are inter-linked with other banks and financial institutions and with
the real sector. The multiplier effect caused by a bank failure could be quite widespread and cause
p.420.
38 p.615.
As discussed in section 2.4.1.
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untold damage and loss of confidence, especially in small economies where there are only a few
banks and the bank that fails is a major one. A stable banking system really is a public good.
Gibson and Tsakalotos also point out that even though there are positive externalities arising from
bank financing (eg in the from of greater employment and higher aggregate demand), the free market
solution may still be sub-optimal, as investment may in a sense, be 'underproduced'.
In addition, in a highly competitive banking system where banks are relatively small, neither
functional nor allocative efficiency may occur: the former because it may be cheaper but beyond the
capacity of the bank to provide a wide variety of services to the same customer; the latter because a
small bank would be hard-pressed to simultaneously reap the benefits of diversification and of
economies of scale or scope through specialisation. Banks of larger size in a less competitive
environment may be able to do both.
The general point is that the competitive system underlying the financial liberalisation
models may not be at all appropriate in the presence of externalities and economies of scale or scope,
and may lead instead to instability and loss of confidence in the system, as some banks come under
pressure from which they may not recover. A highly competitive environment forces banks to
become more adventurous and take more chances, so that credit limits may be loosened, the
prudential risk-return relationship compromised, speculative activity become more entrenched and
profits undermined. The net result may well be a reduction in the flow of resources for investment
and growth as funds are re-directed into what are perceived to be more profitable short-term
ventures.
The reform of the financial system inherent in financial liberalisation policies may, for the
reasons advanced above and also because of an unstable macroeconomic environment (McKinnon,
1989), lead to financial crises. Several countries that have experienced financial crises after
implementing financial liberalisation policies include Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and the Philippines.
There is a strong case for adequate bank supervision because of the potential external costs of such
instability in the financial sector. This is even more the case where moral hazard (see Diaz-
Alejandro, 1985) exacerbates the problem, that is where banks become even more irresponsible if
there is a commitment from the government to intervene to prevent bank failures (there may even be
formal deposit insurance schemes in operation).
Vigilant supervision of the financial system, proper bank regulation, and sound financial
polices are essential co-requirements for financial reform but not all developing countries have the
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resources, the knowledge, or the political will to provide them. Inadequate bank supervision would
seem to have been a contributing factor in many financial crises that followed liberalisation, and the
effects of such crises on the further development of the financial system itself and on economic
development have been profound (see Diaz-Alejandro, 1985).
2.5 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed the literature on the role of the fmancial system in growth
and development, with special reference to the theory of fmancial liberalisation. Several
hypotheses were analysed.
One central hypothesis is that high real interest rates increase savings, credit,
investment and economic growth. Even if high interest rates might increase financial savings,40
actual credit given by the financial system might not increase. Credit rationing might still take
place even in the presence of financial liberalisation, because of institutional rigidities and
market failure (see Section 2.4). In addition, if the post-Keynesians are right, then credit and
investment might be driven by demand rather than by the supply of financial savings. High
interest rates increase business costs and might deter investment. In addition, banks are able to
create credit irrespective of the availability of financial savings. On the other hand, it is
possible that high interest rates might improve the efficiency of investment by encouraging
high-yield projects, which might in turn be a stimulus to economic growth (see Galbis, 1977).
The very notion that financial liberalisation is necessarily superior to government
intervention in the financial markets has been questioned (see Section 2.4.2). Where the free
reign of the market is, or is likely to be disruptive, 41 government involvement might be
necessary to restore or maintain stability. Concerning the argument that reserve requirements
deprive the banking system of resources that could be loaned out for investment, if the
government uses those reserves for public investment 42 then economic growth could actually be
stimulated.
40 One weaknes of most financial liberalisation models is that they do not distinguish between total savings
and financial savings.
41 For example competition might force the closure of small banks which in turn might have severe
repercussions on business and consumer confidence in the financial system.
42 and does so more efficiently than private investors would,
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Chapters Three and Four examine the empirical evidence for Jamaica, on various
aspects of the financial liberalisation hypotheses. in particular, the effect of financial
liberalisation on savings, investment, growth and inflation is considered, and the validity of the
postulates of the financial liberalisation theories is evaluated.
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CHAPTER 3
SAVING, INVESTMENT, GROWTH AND FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION
3.1	 Introduction
The thrust of this chapter is three-fold. Firstly, recent empirical evidence concerning
the basic hypotheses on financial liberalisation is described in this introductory section. The
international evidence on the effect of fmancial liberalisation on savings rates, the quantity and
efficiency of investment and the rate of economic growth are considered in sub-sections (3.1.1),
(3.1.2) and (3.1.3) respectively. Secondly, empirical evidence on financial liberalisation,
saving, investment and growth in Jamaica is analysed in section (3.2). Sub-section (3.2.1)
examines fmancial saving and its determinants, sub-section (3.2.2) considers the effects of
financial liberalisation on total domestic savings and on private savings, sub-section (3.2.3)
considers financial liberalisation and investment and sub-section (3.2.4) examines financial
liberalisation and economic growth. Thirdly, our conclusions are presented and the financial
and economic policy of the government of Jamaica are evaluated in section (3.3).
This section examines some of the empirical evidence on the relationship between
fmancial liberalisation and economic growth. The evidence comprises econometric studies that
purportedly analyse or explain the links among key variables and the experience of countries
that have undergone liberalisation programmes (often as part of macro-economic stabilisation
programmes).
The various econometric studies focus on one or more of the components of the
transmission mechanism embodied in the McKinnon-Shaw models: the link between fmancial
conditions, in particular the real deposit rate of interest and the volume of savings; the link
between the availability of credit from increased savings and the quantity and efficiency of
investment; and the link between the effects of liberalisation on real economic growth.
Quantitative measures of fmancial conditions that are frequently used include the real deposit
rate of interest, the density of commercial banking as measured by the population per bank
branch, and some financial intermediation ratio.
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The econometric evidence on the relationship between liberalisation and growth is quite
mixed. There is no general consensus, and Fry's (1988)' view is that much of the disagreement
springs from the employment of different measures for the variables used. Gibson and
Tsakalotos (1994),2 argue that, even after taking account of differences in the sample
specifications (size, period, etc), the differences in the results are such that "it is difficult not to
conclude that the wide variety of results reflects problems with the data. [For instance] savings
are notoriously difficult to measure even in the most advanced industrial countries."
3.1.1 Financial Liberalisation and Savings Rates
Several studies look at the determinants of savings and the link between the real deposit
rate of interest and the savings rate. Boskin (1978) tests a savings function for the United
States and finds a positive and significant interest rate coefficient. Fry (1978) fmds a positive
relationship between real interest rates and savings in seven less developed Asian countries.
Fry (1988) examines fourteen Asian developing countries for the period 1961-1983 using two-
stage least squares on pooled time series data. He finds that on average an increase in the real
deposit rate of interest by one percentage point, raises the national savings rate by about 0.1
percentage point. The result is statistically significant, but Fry acknowledges that it is not
sufficiently large to use as the basis for fmancial policy.
Giovannini (1983), re-estimates the savings function in Fry (1978) for seven Asian
countries using different periods, but finds no significant real interest rate effect on savings, as
do Cho and Khatkhate (1989) for a sample of five Asian countries. De Melo and Tybout
(1986), find that savings responded positively to real interest rates in Uruguay during the pre-
reform period (1962-73), but not after financial liberalisation took place (post 1973). They
admit, however, that their findings are not free of measurement problems. Warman (1993) and
Warman and Thirlwall (1994) make the important distinction between total savings and
financial savings in their empirical studies of Mexico from 1960 to 1990. They find that the
rate of interest has a strong and positive effect on financial savings, but little effect on total or
private savings. Warman and Thiriwall (op. cit.) offer two possible explanations. Firstly
substitution between assets takes place as real interest rates change, so that a higher rate
attracts into the financial sector, non-financial savings or capital held abroad. Secondly, the




of interest on its domestic private sector debt, allows the private sector to purchase financial
assets.
The experience of South Korea has been invoked by researchers on both sides of the
fmancial liberalisation debate to support their views, During the first attempt at financial
liberalisation in 1965 interest rates were doubled, with the result that fmancial savings grew
rapidly over the next five years. Cho (1989) estimates that the ratio of broad money to GNP
grew from ten per cent in 1964 to thirty-five per cent in 1970. Both McKinnon (1973) and
Shaw (1973) point to Korea as an example of successful financial liberalisation. Harris (1988)
and Cho3 on the other hand, argue that the extensive control of the financial sector by the
government in fact created a greatly augmented pool of savings for the government to use (more
or less successfully) for industrial development. In this case it was the intervention of the
government in the financial markets (albeit employing the strategy of raising deposit rates), not
the liberalisation of the financial markets as a whole, that seemed to have provided the impetus
for growth (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1994). The effective control of interest rates and financial
markets also seems to have been effective in raising savings in Taiwan and Japan right after the
Second World War.
The impact of financial liberalisation on Chile (mid 1970s to mid 198 Os) seems on the
whole to have been disastrous (see Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1994), with the effect of high real
interest rates on savings being negligible. Despite the rapid expansion in financial
intermediation and the substantial rise in real interest rates (Edwards and Edwards, 1991, and
Diaz-Alejandro, 1985), the savings rate seemed to have been roughly the same as it had been
during the preceding decade. McKinnon (1989) attributes the root causes of Chile's problems
to an unstable macroeconomic environment reflected in poorly co-ordinated interest and
exchange rate policies, an overvalued currency, and an unsustainable labour-market policy.
Diaz-Alejandro points to the paucity of supervision and control of the financial system by the
monetary authorities as major contributing factors. Financial liberalisation in Argentina and
Uruguay in the 197Os seems to have had a similar negligible effect on savings (Diaz-Alejandro,
1985). In general, the fmancial liberalisation hypothesis that high interest rates increase
savings seems to have little empirical support.
Op. Cit.
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3.1.2 The Quantity and Efficiency of Investment
Fry's (1.981) study of twelve developing Asian countries as well as Fry (1980), finds
that the second component of the relationship between financial liberalisation and growth holds;
that is, that a rise in the deposit interest rate towards its market-determined equilibrium level,
first increases real domestic credit and then stimulates investment (Fry, 1988). The positive
relationship between the deposit rate and credit availability is supported by Fry (1980, 1981),
while the positive relationship between credit availability and investment is again supported by
Fry (op. cit.) and Leff and Sato (1980).
The actual mechanism through which financial liberalisation is meant to affect
investment (Fry, 1988) is either via McKinnon's complementarity hypothesis 5 or through a
savings response. Fry (1978) finds that support for the complementarity hypothesis is weak,
but supports the savings-response effect (Fry, 1988). In the case of South Korea (discussed
above under section 3.1.1), the strong savings response to higher interest rates in the 1960s and
1970s elicited a vigorous investment drive (led by the public sector). Post-war Japan and
Taiwan had similar experiences. The situation was somewhat different in Chile. Diaz-
Alejandro (1985) and Burkett and Dutt (1991) show that investment did not increase
significantly. Increases in private investment were more than offset by reductions in public
investment, as the latter sector brought its finances under control.
In addition, Fry finds that raising interest rates improves the efficiency of investment in
Turkey (Fry, 1979) and in twelve Asian developing countries (Fry, 1981). The Asian
Development Bank (1985) finds a similar relationship for eleven Asian developing countries.6
It is found that for Turkey and for the Asian countries that an increase in the real deposit rate
of interest raises the incremental output capital ratio.7
Warman and Thirlwall (1994) examine the possible positive effects of the rate of
interest on investment via fmancial savings and the supply of credit to the private sector, and
via the release of the constraint that savings places on investment if the real interest rate is
below its equilibrium level (in a classical sense). They also consider the possible negative
effect of the interest rate on investment (holding the supply of credit constant), if the rate of
p. 147.
i.e. that money balances must be accumulated prior to undertaking investment.
6 Rerted in Fry (1988).
'Provided that the average efficiency of investment is monotonically related to the incremental
output-capital ratio.
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interest is above its equilibrium level and is a proxy for the price of credit. They find that the
net effect of the real interest rate on investment appears to be negative for Mexico: a one
percentage point increase in the interest rate leads to a decline of 2.6 billion pesos in
investment. They therefore conclude that the financial liberalisation hypothesis is not
supported by the evidence for Mexico, but that the results are more in keeping with the
Keynesian view stressing the negative net effect described above combined with a positive and
significant lagged accelerator affect of growth on investment. Indeed, high real interest rates
deter investment by raising the cost of capital and adversely affecting the willingness to invest
by reducing expected yields. The possibility of an improvement in the productivity of
investment remains, but it was not tested in the study.
3.1.3 Financial Liberalisation and the Rate of Economic Growth
The third component of the transmission mechanism in the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis
is the link between fmancial liberalisation and the rate of economic growth in both the short and
medium term. Fry (1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981) finds that for the various Asian Developing
Countries covered, a one percentage point increase in the real deposit rate of interest is
associated with a rise in the rate of economic growth of about 1/2 percentage point on average
(Fry, 1988).8 He does note that 'association' does not mean 'causality', especially as there may
be a myriad of other factors at work. Nevertheless, his analysis and findings lie explicitly
within the McKinnon-Shaw approach, and the link that his results purport to make between
financial liberalisation and growth is inescapable. The World Bank (1989) too, finds a positive
link between financial liberalisation and growth for 33 developing countries over the period
1965-1985.
Jung (1986), using Granger-causality 9 tests on 56 countries, fmds that financial
development leads to economic growth in seven of the eight high-growth developing economies
considered. Ortiz and Solis (1979) and Horiuchi (1984), conclude that there is a positive
relationship between fmancial deepening and high interest rates on the one hand, and economic
growth on the other, for Mexico and Japan (1953-78) respectively. Roubini and Sala-i-Martin
(1992) find that their somewhat more elaborate model which takes into account such factors as
human capital and political stability in addition to measures of financial repression, lends
8 p. 152
9variable x Granger causes variable y if current and past information on
x help improve the forecasts of y. This is based on predictability and
is not true causation.
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support to the fmancial liberalisation hypothesis when applied to a cross-section of developing
countries.
Warman and Thiriwall (1994) test McKrnnon's (1973) virtuous circle of growth model
and in particular, his 'portfolio' effect of growth on the propensity to save. They fmd that there
is no empirical support for the portfolio effect in Mexico (its coefficient in their equation turns
out to be negative and close to zero), and that the real rate of interest has no effect on growth.
The World Bank (1989) study of 33 countries which finds a positive relationship between real
interest rates and growth, has been challenged by Dornbusch,'° who finds that there is no such
relationship when the extreme observations in the sample (ie countries with 'vastly negative real
interest rates') are removed.
Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994) point out that a general criticism of empirical studies on
the links between financial liberalisation and growth, is that they often suffer from omitted
variables and mis-specification. In addition, financial liberalisation is often accompanied by
other measures in a package of macroeconomic measures, and it is often difficult to isolate the
effect of fmancial conditions or to establish causation.
3.2	 Jamaica: The Empirical Evidence
This section tests the basic hypothesis underlying the fmancial liberalisation models for
Jamaica: that raising the real rate of interest leads to greater saving, stimulates investment and
generates economic growth. The determinants of financial saving, total domestic saving,
private saving, domestic investment and economic growth for Jamaica are examined. The
effect of the real interest rate on those variables is given particular attention.
In addition, three related hypotheses of the financial liberalisation school are examined.
The first is Shaw's (1973) proposition that fmancial deepening, or the growth in fmancial
relative to non fmancial assets, leads to higher real saving. The second one tested is the
hypothesis held by both the McKrnnon-Shaw school (Kapur 1976, Mathieson 1979 & 1980)
and the Neo-Structuralists (Taylor 1983, Van Wijnbergen 1983a and 1983b, Buffie 1984) that
required reserve ratios on deposit liabilities tax the banking system and reduce saving and
investment. The third hypothesis analysed is the proposition that higher real interest rates lead
to higher investment by improving the availability and cost of credit. In that regard,
10 See Gibson and Tsakalotos, (1994).
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McKinnon's (1973) complementarity hypothesis that money and capital complement one
another, ie that prior savings must be accumulated to finance investment and that higher
interest rates increase savings and investment, is considered. The alternative Keynesian
proposition that investment is demand determined is examined.
The years of steady economic growth in Jamaica, 1960-1972, were followed by eight
years of crisis. In its aftermath and also in the wake of the oil shocks of the 1970's, the
authorities turned their attention to the mobilisation of domestic fmance for development. With
the assistance of the IMF and also because of growing social unrest, various attempts were
made to liberalise the economy and generate greater savings. Chapter One analysed these
policies, but their efficacy is again briefly considered in section 3.3, in the light of the evidence
of this section on financial liberalisation in Jamaica. The balance of this section provides an
empirical analysis of the determinants of fmancial saving, total saving, private saving, domestic
investment and economic growth in Jamaica.
Unless otherwise specified, all variables are measured in real terms using annual
observations for the period 1960 to 1992, or such lesser period as is allowed by the availability
of data.' 1 The appropriate deflator, such as the CPI or the relevant implicit GDP deflator is
used. In general, the Ordinary Least Squares approach is used to estimate the models, and the
adjusted R2, t-ratios, F-statistics and Durbm-Watson statistics are reported, along with the
relevant diagnostic tests for higher order serial correlation, functional form, normality,
heteroscedasticity and parameter stability. The statistical software used is Microfit 38612, and
other techniques are reported when used.
3.2.1 Financial Saving And Its Determinants
Financial saving may be defined as the change in the real stock of liquid liabilities
(LL) 13 net of coin, currency and demand deposits (Ml). Ml is excluded because it is not
expected to respond to changes in the real interest rate. Therefore, fmancial saving is:
FS = (LL-M1) - (LL-M1) 1	(3.1)
' Coverage is vety rarely smaller than the period 1963-1989.
12Version 3.22 by Pesaran, B & M H Pesaran, Oxford Univ. Press, 1991
'3 LL is defined as money and quasi money in the banking system plus demand, time and saving deposits held
th the non-bank financial intermediaries.
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where LL is the stock of nominal liquid liabilities deflated by the CPI and where the stock of
Ml is also deflated by the CPI. FS measures the flow of savings into the fmancial system.
FIGURE 3.1
Financial Saving, Interest and Output
150T
Figure 3.1 shows real fmancial savings (FS), real output (GDPR) and the real deposit rate of
interest (r) in Jamaica over the period 1960-1992. A visual inspection indicates that the real
interest rate is both negative and volatile for much of the period, particularly during the years
of negative growth and high (and volatile) inflation. Consequently, it is difficult to identify any
apparent relationship between the rate of interest and fmancial savings from the diagram. This
needs to be tested in a formal way, as does any link between real output and fmancial savings
predicted by Keynesian analysis.
The sensitivity of fmancial saving to the real domestic deposit interest rate (r) and to
real gross domestic product (GDPR), is tested in this subsection. The real interest rate (r) is
obtained from the World Bank's (1989) formula in which the nominal deposit interest rate (id)
is adjusted by the rate of inflation (p):
+ idrI	 -1	 (3.2)
Li+
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In order to test the attractiveness of saving at home relative to holding foreign fmancial assets,
fmancial saving is also regressed on the differential between the real domestic interest rate and
the real yield on foreign financial assets (rdiff) = r - r5 - e. 14 The variable r0 is the real deposit
interest rate in the USA, calculated in a manner analoguous to that for the real domestic interest
rate (r). The variable (e) represents the predicted rate of change of the real exchange rate
(Jamaica dollars per US dollar), calculated by regressing the growth of the real exchange rate
on the lagged dependent variable and taking the predicted values. The predicted exchange rate
is a proxy for the expected real exchange rate.
The relationship between (r) and financial saving (fs) is expected to be positive, since
the allocation of saving is expected to be influenced by the yield on various forms of fmancial
assets. Similarly, the relationship between (rdiff) and fmancial saving is expected to be
positive. In theory, an increase in real yields abroad makes the relative return on domestic
financial assets less attractive, encourages capital flight and reduces real financial saving.
The last explanatory variable included is (PSURP), which is a proxy for uncertainty.
High inflation rates and volatile exchange rates are likely to have an adverse effect on financial
stability, private sector confidence, and domestic financial saving. The variable (PSURP) is
generated from the residuals of the following equation (3.2), and represents the surprise (or
volatility) element of inflation:
	
pcpi = -0.23 + 0.66 (pcpi)t1 + 0.15 (nilg) + 0.28 (eg)
	
(3.3)
(-0.12)	 (6.00)	 (2.33)	 (5.68)
R2 = 0.87,	 R 2 = 0.85, F(3 ,27) = 59.02,	 S.E. = 6.23
D.W = 1.86,
Serial Correlation f (1)
Functional Form	 f (1)
Normality	 f (2)
Heteroscedasticity f (1)








financial assets is based on interest rates on 3-month US treasuly bills.
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where (pcpi) is the inflation rate based on the consumer price index, (mig) is the growth rate of
the money supply15 and (eg) is the rate of change of the nominal bilateral exchange rate
(Jamaica dollars per US dollar). The t-statistics are in brackets beneath the respective
coefficients. All the variables have the expected positive signs. The coefficient on the lagged
dependent variable suggests that 34 per cent of the adjustment to long-run equilibrium inflation
occurs within one year. In addition, there is a positive association between the narrow money
supply and inflation. An insignificant relationship was found between broader measures of
money supply and inflation, suggesting that it is money as a medium of exchange rather than
the asset value function of money, which is linked to inflation. The exchange rate is also
significant and captures the effect of currency changes on domestic inflationary impulses.
Chapter Four examines in greater detail, the determinants of inflation and its effects on the
macro-economy. For present purposes equation (3.2) is used to generate the inflation surprise
variable (PSURP) from the equation's residuals, for use in subsequent estimation. Equation
(3.2) has stable parameters (as suggested by the Chow stability test), and is well determined as
indicated by its diagnostic above.
Returning to the estimation of fmancial savings, the coefficient of (PSURP) is expected
to be negative, since greater uncertainty is expected to have an adverse effect on financial
saving. The results of the estimation of fmancial saving are as follows:
FSR = -9.79 + 0.11 (GDPR) + 0.68 (r) + O.66(rdiff)
	
(3.4)
(-2.10) (2.75)	 (2.91)	 (3.09)
-0.24 (PSURP)
(-2.24)
R2 = 0.50,	 R2 = 0.41, F(4,22) = 5.58,	 S.E. = 2.83
D.W = 2.21,











as currency and demand deposits.
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where: (FSR) represents real financial saving in millions of Jamaica dollars; (r) is the real
domestic rate of interest on deposits; (GDPR) is real GDP in millions of Jamaica dollars and
(PSURP) is the uncertainty variable from equation (3.3). Although the values on R 2 and
R 2 are not particularly high, the equation satisfies the various diagnostic tests, including those
for serial correlation and parameter stability, and is well determined.
The estimation results shown in equation (3.4) indicate that all the explanatory
variables are significant and have the expected signs. The real interest rate (r) exerts a positive
and significant effect on real fmancial savings (FSR), as expected. A one percentage point
increase in the interest rate (r) increases fmancial savings (FSR) by 0.68 million Jamaica
dollars. The interest rate differential (rdiff) also exerts a significant positive effect on financial
savings. An increase of one percentage point in (rdiff) increases real fmancial saving by J$0,66
million. This means that a rise in the foreign interest rate would encourage capital flight and
lower financial savings. Financial savings are also determined by income as represented by real
gross domestic product (GDPR), which was found to have a positive and significant effect. In
addition, uncertainty, represented by the statistically significant variable (PSURP), discourages
fmancial savings. When faced with uncertainty, economic agents probably hold more money
for transactions purposes, given the higher cost of transactions and given the erosion in the
value of financial assets.
A dynamic specification of the model was tested but the lagged dependent variable was
not significant, indicating a fairly rapid adjustment of real fmancial saving to changes in the
interest rate, income, and uncertainty. In general, the real interest rate would seem to have been
an important tool for increasing financial saving in Jamaica. The next sub-section examines the
importance of the interest rate in stimulating total domestic saving and private saving.
3.2.2 Domestic Saving and Private Saving
This Sub-section examines the determinants of real saving and real private saving in
Jamaica overe the three decades of our study. Their trends over the period are shown on
Figure3 .2, along with the real interest rate and real output. The shapes of the output (GDPR),
total saving (S) and private saving (PSAV) graphs are broadly similar, but it is interesting that
private saving exceeds total saving, particularly between 1973 and 1985. Those years
incorporated the period of massive government expansion and the large public sector deficits
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referred to in Chapter 1, were evidence of the substantial government clissaving which
occurred.
FIGURE 3.2
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One of the fundamental assumptions underlying financial liberalisation theory is that
the real interest rate exerts a positive effect on savings. As described in sub-section 3.1.1, the
evidence that there is any significant positive effect of interest rates on saving is weak. The
hypothesis tested in this sub-section is that the real interest rate and the level of real income
determine the level of real domestic saving in Jamaica.
In addition, Shaw's (1973) financial deepening hypothesis that the increase of financial
relative to non-financial wealth has a positive effect on real saving, is tested. The ratio of
liquid liabilities to GDP, (LLY), is used to measure the size of the fmancial system and the
extent to which financial deepening is taking place. However, Gupta (1987) suggests that while
the sign on the coefficient may indicate whether or not the financial deepening hypothesis holds,
given the complexities of the financial and real economy, the size of the coefficient is
meaningless in trying to determine the magnitude of the responsiveness of saving to financial
deepening.
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The surprise variable (PSURP), is also included in order to test its effect on saving.
The results of estimating the static model are as follows'6:
S -18.34 + 0.29 (GDPR) + 0.12 (r) - 28.62 (LLY)
	
(3.5)
(-1.45) (2.50)	 (1.34)	 (-1.59)
+4.28 (er) + 0.31 (PSURP)
(2.11)	 (1.34)



















where: (S) is real total domestic saving in millions of Jamaica dollars; (GDPR) is real gross
domestic product, (r) is the real interest rate , and (LLY) is the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP
and represents the financial deepening variable.
The results indicate that savings are determined by income, in keeping with Keynesian
analysis. The (GDPR) coefficient is positive and statistically significant, and a one million
dollar rise in real GDP increases savings by 290 thousand dollars. The propensity to save out
of income seems to be a stable relationship as indicated by the Chow tests on the static equation
(3.5). In addition, the rate of interest has no significant effect on total savings. This is not
incompatible with our fmding in the previous sub-section that the real interest rate has a
positive and significant effect on financial saving, which is a subset of total saving. Higher real
interest rates can lead to increased financial saving if savers substitute domestic financial for
non-financial assets or for assets held abroad. Alternatively, savers might increase their
holdings of fmancial assets held in the banking system for financial assets held in the informal
financial sector. Higher interest rates might give rise to substitution among different kinds of
assets rather than generating higher overall savings.
16 A dynamic model with the lagged dependent variable was not well-determined and failed some of the
diagnostics.
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The coefficient on the fmancial deepening variable (LLY), is negative and insignificant.
This suggests that Shaw's (973) hypothesis that fmancial deepening increases saving, does
not hold for Jamaica. In addition, Inflationary surprises do not affect saving significantly.
A similar effect of the real interest rate (r) on private saving is obtained from the
following equation:
PSAV = -6.04 + 0.23 (GDPR) - 0.1.2 (r) + 24.01 (LLY)
	
(3.6)
(0.70) (3.10)	 (-1.94)	 (1.92)
-0.59 (er) + 0.39 (PSURP)
(0.43)	 (2.36)





















where (PSAV) represents real private sector savings and the other variables are as before. Like
total savings, private savings are driven by real gross domestic product (GDPR), the coefficient
of which is positive and significant. As with total saving, the rate of interest (r) and fmancial
deepening (LLY) have no significant effect on private savings at the 5% confidence level.
However, (LLY) only just fails the test of statistical significance, and at the less stringent 10%
confidence level, financial deepening does have a significant effect on private savings. The
growth of monetary assets relative to income does seem to encourage private savings (when the
weaker test is applied). In addition, the positive effect of the uncertainty variable (PSURP) on
private savings in equation (3.6), combined with the negative effect on fmancial savings in
equation (3.3), suggests that uncertainty encourages private savings in real assets to restore
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Real domestic investment (IR) experienced a rising trend during the years of steady
economic growth, 1960-1972. Thereafter investment declined and remained relatively depressed
for a decade and a half before recovering in the late 1980s. This is shown on Figure 3.3 along
with real private sector credit (PCREDR) which supplies resources for investment in fmancial
liberalisation analysis, and lagged changes in output (GDPRLA) which stimulate investment in
Keynesian analysis. Both (PCREDR) and (GDPRLA) seem to move in the same direction as
investment over the period.
FIGURE 3.3
Investment, Interest, Credit & Lagged
Output
In this sub-section the hypothesis of the financial liberalisation school that the real
interest rate has a positive effect on real investment, is examined. In addition, the alternative
Keynesian hypothesis that investment is largely determined by demand rather than supply (i.e.
saving), is also tested. In order to test the second hypothesis, the lagged change in real output,
ie the lagged accelerator (GDPRLA)' 7 is included in the regression equation for investment, as
an explanatory variable. The lagged accelerator is used on the assumption that it takes
investors some time to adjust the capital stock to the new level of demand. If investment in
Jamaica is demand sensitive, the coefficient on gdpla is expected to be positive and significant.
" GDPRLA = GDPR 1 - GDPR2
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With regard to the first hypothesis of a positive correlation between the real interest
rate and investment, there are two purported effects. The first one is the positive effect of the
interest rate on the availability of credit, via fmancial saving. The higher the real deposit rate
of interest, the greater the amount of saving and the greater the amount of credit available for
investment. This in turn reduces the price of credit, lowers the market clearing rate of interest,
and increases investment.
The second effect depends on the level of the real interest rate in relation to its
equilibrium level (in a Classical sense). The real interest rate is positively correlated with
investment if the former is below its equilibrium level, since investment is constrained by
saving. Raising the real rate of interest increases the quantity of saving and investment.IZ
However, if the interest rate lies above its equilibrium level, the rate of return on investment
becomes less attractive than the yield on financial assets. Investment is then negatively
correlated with the interest rate, and lowering the rate would then elicit more investment.
The overall effect of the real interest rate on investment is tested in stages. Our earlier
equation (3.3) showed that the real deposit interest rate has a positive and significant effect on
fmancial saving. Financial saving is the change in the stock of liabilities (net of Ml) that
largely comprise the counterpart to credit in the financial system's balance sheet. Therefore,
fmancial saving in turn is expected to have a positive effect on credit availability. This is
tested by regressing the change in the stock of real credit (DPCREDR) on financial saving. We
also test the financial liberalisation contention that a higher reserve requirement taxes the
banking system and reduces the availability of credit to the private sector. The regression
results are as follows:
DPCREDR = -15.65 - 0.50 (PCREDR)..1 + 0.43 (FSR) + 0.30 (GDPR)	 (3.7)
(-2.90) (-4.89)	 (3.45)	 (4.97)
-0.32 (GDEFR) - 113.07 (RR) - 0.09 (PSURP)
(-3.28)	 (-0.74)	 (-1.31)
lower the rate, the smaller the amount of saving and the higher the market clearing loan rate of interest.
Blejer and Khan (1984) and Fry (1988) argue that the real deposit rate could then act as an inverse proxy for the
real loan interest rate and should have a positive impact on investment.
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where (DPCREDR) is the change in real private sector credit (PCREDR), (GDEFR) is the real
government deficit and the other variables are as before. As expected, financial savings (FSR)
have a positive and significant effect on the change in real credit to the private sector. Required
reserves (rr) have no significant effect on changes in private credit. Required reserves do not
seem to tax the banking system as argued by fmancial liberalisation theory and in particular,
banks may be able to create credit irrespective of the level of the reserve requirement (see
Asimakopoulos 1986, Davidson 1986 and Thirlwall 1989). Demand conditions embodied in
real gross domestic product (GDPR) have a significant positive impact on private credit, while
the coefficient on private credit lagged one period (PCREDR)..1 indicates that 50 per cent of the
adjustment to long-run equilibrium takes place within one year. The real government deficit
(GDEFR) has a significant negative effect on private credit possibly because the government
may compete with the private sector for fmancial resources. Chapter Four analyses in greater
detail the role of the public deficit and the possible crowding out of private credit and private
investment by the public sector.
Having found a significant positive relationship between fmancial savings and real
credit changes, investment is then regressed on real credit to the private sector, the real interest
rate, and the lagged accelerator. The objective is to test the extent to which investment is
determined by the availability of credit, the price of credit with the real deposit interest rate
acting as an inverse proxy for the loan rate, and demand conditions represented by the lagged
accelerator. The results are as follows:
IR 2.54 + 0.36 (IR) 1 - 0.15(r) + 0.54(PCREDR) - 0.05(pcpi)
	
(3.8)




















z2 (1) =	 0.45
2(4)	 =	 4.53
S.E. 4.50
where: (IR) is real gross domestic investment in millions of Jamaica dollars; (GDPRLA) is the
lagged accelerator; (pcpi) is the inflation rate and the other variables are as before.
The results show that the availability of real credit to the private sector (PCREDR) has
a significant positive effect on real investment (IR). On the other hand, the real interest rate
has a negative and significant effect on investment, holding constant the supply of credit (which
is positively related to the interest rate). Relating this result to the classical argument discussed
earlier, either the rate of interest has been consistently above its equilibrium level, or saving is
not determined by the real interest rate. Equation (3.5) above found that the interest rate is not
significant in the determination of saving. With regard to investment, a rise of one per cent in
the rate of interest in equation (3.8), reduces investment by J$0. 150 million. Higher real
interest rates in Jamaica deter investment by raising the cost of capital and reducing the
willingness of economic agents to invest by lowering expected yields.
In addition, the results show that the lagged accelerator (GDPRLA) has a significant
positive effect on investment. Supply conditions have a significant impact on investment via
the availability of credit, but it is demand conditions via the lagged accelerator that have the
most significant positive impact on investment. A one million dollar increase in the lagged flow
of income leads to an increase in investment of five hundred and sixty thousand Jamaica
dollars, ceteris paribus. Inflation does not seem to have any significant effect on investment.
The effect of inflation on investment and growth is examined in greater detail in Chapter Four.
The negative effect of the real interest rate on investment does not support McKinnon's
Complementarity Hypothesis that money and capital are complementary. According to that
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hypothesis, money balances have to be accumulated (via saving) to finance investment, because
of the lumpiness of investment. Therefore the real interest rate should have a positive impact
on both money and capital. Our results indicate that the real interest rate exerts a positive
effect on fmancial saving, but a negative effect on investment, so that money and capital in
Jamaica are substitutes not complements.
3.2.3.1 Financial Liberalisation and the Productivity of Investment
Our fmdings above do not support the fmancial liberalisation hypothesis that higher
interest rates stimulate investment. On the contrary, as demonstrated by the result in equation
(3.8), raising the interest rate has a negative effect on investment in Jamaica for the reasons
cited above. However, the question of whether or not financial liberalisation improves the
quality of investment remains to be tested. The work of McKinnon(1973), Shaw(1973) and
Galbis(1977) suggests that raising the interest rate to its equilibrium level in their models has
the effect of weeding out investment projects with lower returns, thereby ensuring that those
with higher returns receive fmancing. Raising the real interest rate to its competitive free
market level improves the average efficiency of investment in financial liberalisation models.
Fry (1979) finds a negative relationship between the real deposit interest rate and the
incremental capital-output ratio (iocr) for Turkey for the period 195 0-1977, which suggests
that raising the real interest rate improves the output-capital ratio and therefore the efficiency
of investment. The incremental output capital ratio is used as a proxy for the average efficiency
of investment to which it is assumed to be monotonically related. Fry (1995) obtains a similar
relationship between interest rates and investment productivity for 10 Asian countries over the
period 1961-1988, as does the Asian Development Bank 19 for a sample of 11 Asian countries.
This sub-section tests the hypothesis that raising the real interest rate improves the
productivity of investment in Jamaica. In addition, Fry(1995) argues that fmancial
intermediaries may allocate funds more efficiently than other allocative mechanisms, so that the
development of the financial sector or fmancial deepening may also improve the efficiency of
investment.The assumption is that financial intermediaries are good at channelling investible
funds to the most efficient investors and to projects with superior returns. The effect of
financial deepening on the productivity of investment is also tested in this sub-section, by
19 reported in Fry (1995)
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reviewed in Chapter 2, that credit markets in developing countries are quite heterogenous and
banks may not possess adequate knowledge about particular projects or investors they appraise
for fmancing. Consequently, they may be unable to allocate investible funds efficiently. It
would seem, at least for Jamaica, that fmancial deepening does not improve the productivity of
investment. On the other hand, the coefficient on real growth (gdprg) is positive and significant,
which supports Leibenstein's 20 contention that growth improves the productivity of investment.
In short, investment productivity in Jamaica does not seem to be determined by fmancial
variables (the rate of interest and the fmancial deepening rartio), but the evidence suggests that
it is significantly and positively influenced by the real growth rate.
3.2.4 The Determinants of Economic Growth
In this sub-section, an endogenous saving model adapted from McKinnon's (1973)
Virtuous Circle model is used to examine the determinants of economic growth. The adapted
model follows Warman (1993) and Warman and Thirlwall (1994), which in turn make use of
McKinnon's model of interdependence between saving and growth.
In McKinnon's model, not only does saving influence growth, but growth influences
saving in a virtuous circle. McKinnon emphasises the importance of the financial system in
enabling growth to influence saving. He calls this the Portfolio Effect:
"a healthy fmancial system seems necessary for 'reverse causation' (for growth to
influence saving) to be a significant economic phenomenon even though it is difficult to
quantify econometrically" (McKinnon 1973, p.129).




where Y is total real output and K is the stock of physical capital. Labour does not enter
explicitly as a separate constraint on production, as it is assumed that technical change is
sufficiently "labour augmenting" to maintain equilibrium. The output/capital ratio s is
therefore assumed to be constant. Saving S, is a fixed proportion of real income (sY) and Is
equal to investment I. Therefore:
20 Op.Cit
dY dk




dt = sY = S
	
(3.10)
where t is time and s is the propensity to save out of income. Differentiating (3.9) with respect
to time and substituting into (3.10) gives the equilibrium growth equation:
g=cs	 (3.12)	 -
The rate of growth g, is the product of the marginal output/capital ratio a and the marginal
propensity to save s. The propensity to save is in turn determined by g, the growth rate of
output, and p, various interacting variables (such as the real return on holding money) which
influence the willingness of economic agents to hold fmancial and other assets in a 1tconvenient1'
ratio to current income:
S = s(g, p)
	
(3.13)
where 0 <s < 1 and ds/dg> 0.




For our purposes, the real rate of interest may be uncoupled from the composite variable p, so
that equations (3.13) and (3.14) become respectively:
s s(g, r, p)
	
(3.15)
g = crs(g, r, p)	 (3.16).
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The growth rate "now depends on the portfolio effect of .growth itself operating on intended
savings" (McKinnon, op.cit. p.126) 21 . The virtuous circle describing the two-way interaction
between growth and saving is represented by the following partial derivatives:
) 0 and	 ) 0	 -	 (3.17), (3.18)
ds	 dg
Economic agents keep their portfolios in balance by holding stocks of liquid monetary
assets which have a "convenience" yield, in a balanced relationship with current income. In
order to satisfy this condition, higher growth rates require higher savings rates. The Portfolio
Effect, i.e. the effect of growth on the propensity to save, is influenced positively by the state of
development of the financial system. The more developed it is, including the existence of
positive real deposit interest rates, the more attractive is the inducement to hold financial assets
relative to income, and the higher the propensity to save, s. Equilibrium growth is attained
when the actual growth rate generates desired saving sufficient to support the investment
necessary for that rate of growth. To prevent explosive growth in the model and to ensure a
stable equilibrium, the portfolio effect of growth on saving	 is constrained to be less than
dg
unity or less than the capital/output ratio (1/cr).
The variable p in equation (3.15) can be further expanded to include the rate of growth
of real exports x, and the ratio of foreign savings to GDP, (fsy):
S = s(g, r, x, fsy, p)
	
(3.19)
The growth rate of both exports and foreign saving can be expected to relieve the
foreign exchange and saving constraints on growth experienced by many developing countries
(McKinnon 1973, Papanek 1973, Thirlwall 1982, and Thirlwall and Hussain (1982). The
reduced form growth equation to be estimated with the expanded number of variables, makes






where PS is private saving, s the propensity to save from equation (3.19), and Y is real income.
Substituting s from equation (3.19) gives
PS = (a i g + a 2 x + a3r + a4 fsy + a5 p)Y	 (3.21)
Since Y = C + I + X - M from the national accounts identity 22 and Saving S equals Y - C,
S=I+(X-M)=PS+GS=PS+(T-G)	 (3.22)
where GS is government saving, T represents government revenue and G government
expenditure. From equation (3.22)
PS=I+(X-M)-(T-G)	 (3.23)
I=PS+(M-X)+(T-G)	 (3.24)
That is, private saving, foreign saving and government saving comprise the sources of finance
for investment. Substituting (3.20) into (3.24) gives:
I=sY+(M-X)+(T-G)	 (3.25)




Substituting (3.25) into (3.26) gives:
-=g=ci[sY+(M—X)+(T—G)] 	 (3.27)
22 where C and I are aggregate consumption and investment respectively, and X and M represent exports
and imports respectively.	 --
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g 5.49 + 0.10 (x) -0.02 (r) + 0.38 (gs) + 0.31 (fsy) - 0.24 (ppred)
	
(3.35)
(4.82) (2.39)	 (-0.25)	 (3.71)	 (2.46)	 (-2.87)















where: (g) is the rate of growth of real output in percentage terms; (x) is the rate of growth of
real exports; (gs) is the ratio of government saving to GDP; (fsy) is the foreign saving ratio
approximated by the negative of the balance of payments current account balance over GDP; r
is the real deposit rate of interest; and ppred is the predicted inflation rate.
All the variables apart from the real interest rate are significant and have the expected
signs. The rate of growth of exports is positive and significant, reflecting its importance in
fmancing imports of intermediate and capital goods used as inputs in domestic production. In
addition, Thiriwall (11982) and Thiriwall and Hussain (1982) have shown that a virtuous circle
can exist between exports and growth as investment in export industries increases both
productivity and diversification and leads to a rise in the income elasticity of demand for
exports.
Some researchers (McKinnnon 1973, Warman 1993), have found that foreign saving
exerts a much stronger influence on growth than domestic saving. The impact of both foreign
and government saving on growth in Jamaica is positive and significant, but the results indicate
that the impact of the latter is stronger. An adverse effect on growth can be expected if there is
significant dis-saving by the government. Chapter Four analyses the effect of the government
deficit (or negative savings) on growth in greater detail.
The coefficient on the real interest rate is negative and insignificant, and does not
support the financial liberalisation hypothesis that higher real interest rates stimulate growth.
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McKrnnon's Portfolio Effect of growth on the propensity to save is tested below. The
coefficients of equation (3.21) on the propensity to save are calculated using equations (3.30)
to (3.34). The incremental capital/output ratio is obtained from equation (3.8), amended by the
replacement of the lagged accelerator by the change in output. The results and diagnostic tests
are summarised as follows:
IR = -0.01 + 0.49 (IR).. 1 - 0.12(r) + 11.24 (DGDPR) + 0.46 (PCREDR)	 (3.36)
(-0.01)	 (4.03)	 (-2.42)	 (5.12)	 (3.54)
+ 0.10 (PSURP)
(0.81)
R2 = 0.90, R 2 = 0.88,	 F(s,24) = 41.88,	 S.E. = 3.69
Durbin-h -0.25,	 n =	 30
Serial Correlation	 (1) =	 0.11
Functional Form	 f(1) =	 3.82
Normality	 f(2) =	 2.33
Heteroscedasticity	 f (1) =	 2.16
Chow (Stability) 	 f(4) =	 2.89
where (DGDPR) is the change in real output and the other variables are as before. The model is
well determined and satisfies the diagnostic tests as indicated above. The estimated capital
productivity ratio c is 0.09.
From equation (3.35), 13 i = 0.10, 32 = - 0.02, t3 = 0.38, I4 = 0.31 and 15 = - 0.24.
Using equations (3.30) to (3.34), the estimated coefficients of equation (3.21) are therefore:
& =----—=8.48O	 (3.36)
ci /33
a 2 ='=0.263	 (3.37)
,83
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cx =	 = —0.053	 (3.38)
/33
cx =	 = 0.816	 (3.39)
/33
& =	 = —0.632	 (3.40)
/33
Substituting the above results into equation (3.21) gives the equation for the propensity to save:
s = 8.480 (g) + 0.263 (x) - 0.053 (r) + 0.816 (fsy) - 0.632 (ppred) 	 (3.41)
The results indicate that there may be a Portfolio Effect of growth on the propensity to save in
Jamaica, since the coefficient on g is positive. This is consistent with our earlier finding that
saving is positively related to output and is therefore demand determined. The rate of interest
does not have a positive effect on the saving rate, this being in keeping with our previous
findings. However, the rates of growth of exports and foreign saving have positive effects on
the saving rate, while expected inflation has a negative effect. The absence of a positive
relationship between the interest rate and savings therefore seems to unequivocally confirm our
earlier findings. There is some instability in the other coefficients when viewed from the point
of view of McKinnon's model 24, and care must be taken in interpreting their magnitudes.
However, the coefficient on growth is particularly strong and the sign is consistent with earlier
fmdings that saving is demand determined. Only the coefficients on predicted inflation and the
interest rate in equation (3.41) satisfy McKinnon's stability condition that they must not exceed
the value of the capital/output ratio.
3.3	 Summary and Conclusions
Several hypotheses underlying the various models of financial liberalisation were tested
in this chapter, using data on the economy of Jamaica for the period 1960-1992. In the course
of the analysis the determinants of real saving, financial saving, investment and economic
24 where the coefficients are constrained to be less than one or c to
prevent explosive growth in the model
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1977, McKinnon 1973, Shaw 1973), that financial variables such as the real rate of interest
and the financial deepening ratio improve the productivity of investment. Instead, the empirical
evidence supports Leibenstein's (1966) argument that the real growth rate has a positive effect
on the productivity of investment.
Additionally, McKinnon's (1973) Complementarity Hypothesis that money and capital
are complementary since money balances have to be accumulated to finance investment, is not
supported by the evidence. In the case of Jamaica the real interest rate has a positive effect on
financial saving but a negative effect on investment. Money and capital are substitutes rather
than being complementary to one another.
The rate of economic growth in Jamaica is found to be positively related to the rate of
growth of exports and the ratio of foreign savings to GDP. Exports and foreign saving reduce
the foreign exchange constraint on growth, with the former possibly having the additional
benefit of increasing productivity and diversity in the export sector. Public sector saving had
the highest (positive) impact on growth, implying that the poor growth performance experienced
by Jamaica during the 1970s and 1980s, was strongly influenced by the large government
deficits, wasteful expenditure and public sector inefficiency of the period.
The rate of interest is not significant in determining growth, while there is some
evidence that McKrnnon's (positive) Portfolio Effect of growth on the propensity to save holds
for Jamaica. These findings are consistent with the earlier one that the real interest rate is
insignificant in determining saving and that saving is demand determined. The inflation
surprise factor or uncertainty was found to have had a negative effect on financial saving (with
economic agents probably requiring more money for transactions), but seemed to increase
private saving, perhaps via the acquisition of real assets in preference to financial assets as
hedges against uncertainty.
In general, our empirical findings appear to support the approach of the government to
economic policy between 1960 and 1972 when foreign savings and exports were encouraged.
Real growth rates were high, and both savings and investment rose rapidly.
Between 1973 and 1980 a new government adopted inward looking policies: import
substitution, national ownership and self-reliance. Foreign saving declined markedly,
government saving rates fell drastically and export performance became erratic, As a result real
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growth rates were zero or negative throughout the decade, and saving and investment fell
sharply. These results are consistent with our findings that the real growth rate is strongly and
positively influenced by government saving, exports and capital inflows.
Given our empirical results, attempts under various IMF supported programs during the
1980's to stimulate growth by raising the real interest rate, appear to have been ill-conceived.
Such attempts contributed to the economic stagnation experienced by Jamaica during that
period. The issue of financial liberalisation is still topical in the 1990's. However, policy
makers in Jamaica may well be frustrated in their efforts to implement a program of financial
liberalisation in the future, if the structural and institutional features of Jamaica's economy are
not taken into account,
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CHAPTER lv
Inflation, Interest Rates and Growth
4.1	 Introduction
This chapter examines the role of inflation in financial liberalisation models and its impact on
financial variables, the government deficit and economic growth. In addition, the efilict on growth of
public and private investment and their respective productivities, as well as the issue of the crowding out of
private investment by public investment, are considered. These effects are examined in the context of
public and private sector responses to inflationary pressures.
Section 4.1.1 examines the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on inflation in financial
liberalisation models, focusing on the impact of real interest rates on inflation, inflation on real growth, and
the government deficit on growth. Section 4.1.1 deals with the question of public and private sector
productivity and the financial crowding out of private by public investment. Section 4.1.2 of this
introduction identifies explicitly the various hypotheses to be tested in this chapter, while section 4.2
examines the empirical evidence for Jamaica. The first part of section 4.2 (i.e. 4.2.1) examines the link
between inflation and the real interest rate, and the effect of inflation on financial savings and total credit
availability. Section 4.2.2 considers the effect of inflation on the government deficit and private sector
credit, while section 4.2.3 analyses the impact of inflation on investment and economic growth. The issues
of public and private investment productivity and the effect of the former on the latter are analysed in
section 4.2.4. The chapter summary and conclusions are presented in section 4.3.
4.1.1 Inflation in Financial Liberalisation Models
In the models of Kapur (1976, 1983) and Mathieson (1979, 1980) reviewed in Chapter (2),
financial liberalisation lowers inflation by raising the demand for money relative to the money supply.
Inflation is determined by the difference in the growth rates of money supply and money demand, with
excess money supply growth being inflationary. High interest rates raise the demand for money (broadly
defined) and dampen inflation.
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The financial liberalisation models identify monetary expansion (or excess money supply) as the
main cause of inflatioh. In contrast, structuralist/post-Keynesian inflation theory views the money supply
as a propagator of inflation rather than its prime cause. Inflation is generated by changes in relative prices
and cost-push factors engendered by institutional rigidities in the agricultural, government, foreign and
financial sectors. Those rigidities are themselves maniflistations of distributional conflicts between the
public and private sectors and the struggle for income shares between unions, firms and other classes
(Taylor, 1983, 1991, 1992). Such conflicts result in demands for higher money wages, rising producer
margins, larger budget deficits and exchange rate dopreciation. It is the resulting changes in production
costs and relative prices that induce changes in the level of aggregate demand and the general price level,'
via the money supply which necessarily adapts to the demands placed upon it (see Rousseas 1986, Palley
1991 and Howeils 1995). In general, the observed positive relationship between the money supply and
inflation found for many countries, does not mean that excess money causes inflation. Money is simply a
mechanism through which other factors work.
One's view of the causes of inflation matters because of the implications for economic policy. In
effect, the structuralist/post-Keynesian approach sees the fundamental cause of inflation as the pressure of
economic growth on an immature institutional/economic structure. Therefore, restrictive monetary and
fiscal policies will have no lasting effect on inflation without structural change to facilitate smooth
economic growth.
Fry's (1995) model of inflation is typical of the financial liberalisation models (eg those of Kapur2
and Mathieson3), in that inflation is determined as the dirence between the growth rates of money supply
and money demand, Money market equilibrium is expressed as:
M=Md	(4.1)
'Relative price changes (ie imbalances in sub-markets) may cause general inflation because the inflationaiy effects
of excess demand may exceed the deflationary effects of an equivalent amount of excess supply (Thirlwall, 1974).
Prices in markets with excess supply may be affected by non-linearities in a dowmrd direction, while overall
inflation is determined by price and market conditions in the most buoyant economic sectors. (Rajapakse, 1994).










where M5 is the nominal money supPly broadly defined, Md is nominal money demand, P is the price level,
N is the population and m is the Per capita real money demand (M'/p)/N. Expressing equation (4.2) in
first difference logarithmic form gives:
A log(M s) = A log(P) + A log(N) + A log(md)	 (4.3)
which upon re-arranging gives:
A log (M s / N) - A log (md)	 (44)
where it is the rate of inflation.
Fry argues that the prevalence of auction markets in developing countries ensures the money
market clears and that the equilibrium condition holds in the short run 4. Fr? contends that inflation can be
explained by the rate of change of nominal money supply and the determinants of the rate of change of real
money demand, providing the money market clears within the time period under consideration. In
addition, he argues that changes in the money supply can be treated as exogenous provided that any
feedback from inflation to money supply growth occurs with a lag. This allows him to treat equation (4.4)
as a causal relationship, with the inflation rate (it) being the dependent variable. In practice, the
inefficiency of markets including auction markets in developing countries gives no guarantee that the
money market will clear in the short run. Also, as argued by the structuralists/post-Keynesians (see
above), the money supply may not be exogenous.
The demand for real money is specified as a function of a price variable and a budget constraint.
The former is represented by the real interest rate (d ire)6 and the latter by per capita or expected real
income (yp). Fry specifies the long-nm or desired money demand flmction as:
4 i.e. for models based on annual data.
5 0p. Cit.
6 where d is the nomismi deposit interest rate and x is the expected rate of inflation.
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m = CY ea,re)
*	 b	
(4.5)
where m* is the desired level of real money balances and a, b, and c are constants. The short-run or actual
money demand function allows for a lagged adjustment to the determinants of desired money holdings:
log(m") = log(m1...1 ) + 0 [log(m*) - log(m_ 1 )]
	
(4.6)
Equation (4,6) implies that some fraction (B) of the gap between desired money balances and money
balances held in the previous time period is eliminated in the current time period. Combining equations
(4.5) and (4.6) and expressing the result in first difference logarithmic form gives:
A log (m") = b A log (yr) + 0a(d-,) + (1-0) Alog (mti) (4.7)
Letting 
ye 
represent the growth rate of per capita 7 permanent income D log (yp), and substituting
equation (4.7) into equation (4.4) gives:
= A log(M3 / N) - Ob ye - &th(d - e) - (1-0) A log(m t i)	 (4.8)
Equation (4.8) incorporates a stock adjustment lag for real money balances, log (M s/N). In
addition, it includes similar sources of dynamic adjustment embodied in the Kapur 8 and Mathieson8
models, ie adaptive expectations of inflation and permanent income growth, and an expectations-
augmented Phillips curve. 9 Adaptive expectations of inflation and per capita income growth are,
respectively:
7 Expected income growth is expressed in per capita terms. Flowever, aggregate domestic or national income can
beuseci
8 0p. Cit.
9 1t should be noted however, that Kapur's dynamic mechanism is partially based on money market disequilibrium
(at least initially), while Mathieson's assumes immediate and sustained money market equilibrium
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Fry'° goes on to argue that higher real interest rates increase the availability of credit for
investment and generate higher economic growth. This argument neglects the possibility that greater
financial savings engendered by higher interest rates might come at the expense of non-financial savings.
As Chapter 3 has shown, high real interest rates do not in themselves lead to higher overall savings or
higher economic growth in Jamaica. Fry'° expects a positive relationship between the real rate of interest
(RI)) and short-run growth (YG) in his growth equation:
YG = a 20 + a 21 YGNA + a 22 (, 
- e) + a 23 RD	 (4.12)
where (it - lte) is the difference between actual and expected inflation, and (YGNA) is long-run growth (to
which short-run growth is positively related).
The relationship between inflation and growth is more complex. Fry" argues that there are two
opposing processes at work. On the one band, if actual inflation exceeds expected inflation, entrepreneurs
interpret the diftrence to mean that real demand for their products has risen. They then respond by raising
capacity utilisation in the short run and increasing investment to raise capacity in the long run. The higher
is (it - ,te), the better the investment outlook and the higher the rate of economic growth.
On the other hand, expected inflation affects growth through the real deposit rate of interest (dite).
As domestic credit is the primary asset backing the monetary liabilities of the banking system, the demand
for real money determines to a large extent the supply of real credit. Inflation in previous periods causes
expected inflation to rise, the real interest rate to fall, and financial savings to decline. As a result real
domestic credit declines, squeezing both working and fixed capital and ultimately lowering the growth rate
of output. In addition, inflation widens the gap between the government's revenue and expenditure, and the
ensuing growth in the fiscal deficit is typically financed by greater reliance on seignorage or the inflation
tax. Seignorage is extracted as the government increases its proportion of credit from the banking system




reducing the overall availability of credit and secondly by the effect of higher public sector borrowing on
the private sector. The inflation tax rises as more money than the public wishes to hold is created'2.
The overall efibet of inflation on growth depends on the relative strengths of the two efibets
described above: the reaction of entrepreneurs to the gap between inflation and expected inflation (iv -
and the ects of expected inflation on the real interest rate (d - lte), credit availability and crowding out of
private bank borrowing by government borrowing. Considering equations (4.11) and (4.12) together, Fry
argues that monetary expansion (MNG) leads to a rise in inflation (equation 4.11), which is in turn
associated with a higher rate of economic growth [it - it' and YG in equation (4.12)]. The relationship
between (iv - iv') and (YG) is the short-run expectations augmented Phillips curve trade-off. hi the long-
run where it' it, inflation has a negative effect on growth via the real deposit interest rate (d - iVe), if (d) is
held constant and below its equilibrium level. The contention is that in a financially repressed economy the
long-run Phillips curve produces a negative relationship between inflation and growth.
The empirical evidence on the relationship between inflation and growth is mixed. Van
Wijnbergen's (1982) time series study of Korea between 1966 and 1979 shows an initial negative
relationship between inflation and growth. In a study using panel data for twenty-seven developing
countries across latin America, Africa, Asia and the Pacific Basin (plus Greece and Portugal), Fry (1995)
finds a significant negative relationship between inflation and growth for the period 1960-1988. Langoni
and Kogut (1977) also find a negative relationship for Brazil for the years between 1962 and 1975.
On the other hand, Langoni and Kogul 13 find a positive relationship between growth and inflation
for Brazil, over the period 1957-1961. In two studies on Turkey, Fry (1980 and 1995) also finds a
positive and significant relationship between inflation and growth for the periods 1950-1977 and 195 1-
1985 respectively. The work of Thirlwall and Barton (1971) and Thirlwall (1974) on various countries,
seems to suggest that low rates of inflation might be positively related to growth, while high rates (perhaps
in excess often per cent) 14might be negatively related to growth. Sarel (1996), Bruno and Easterly (1995),
and Stanners (1993) also find that inflation and growth may be related in a non-linear manner. High
' 2 The contention explicit or implicit in the work of Fry, Kapur and Mathieson (Op. Cit) that inflation
affects government income and the public sector deficit, and that the latter has a direct impact on credit.
growth and presumably the money supply is curious. The argument is remarkably close to the
structuralist/post-Keynesian view of the inflation process and money creation reviewed earlier.
' 3 0p. Cit.
14 See Ghatak (1981).
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inflation might discourage voluntary savings and have an adverse effect on the structure of investment
favourable to growth. Also, if the structuralist view of the world is valid, it is the underlying structural
characteristics of economies that give rise to both inflation and growth. Inflation itself does net "cause" or
"retard" growth, so that both a positive and negative relationship between the two might be observed for
the same economy at different times, depending on what is happening to fundamental economic and social
structures. Inflation might well be a necessary by-product of the growth process.
Returning to the argument that inflation-induced government deficits might crowd out private
bank borrowing and retard growth, financial liberalisation models implicitly assume that government loans
from the banking system are consumed rather than invested, or that public sector investment is less
productive than private sector investment. If the productivity of the former is greater than that of the latter,
then a rise in the proportion of bank credit to the public sector at the expense of the private sector might
stimulate growth. Khan and Reinhart's (1990) approach to analysing the productivity of public and
private sector investment is examined in the next sub-section.
4.1.1.1 The Productivity of Public and Private Sector Investment
Productivity in the context of aggregate investment refers to the effectiveness with which
investment leads to increases in output (marginal productivity of capital), or the output generated by one
unit of capital (average productivity). Productivity is the relationship between inputs (e.g of capital) and
output (e.g GDP or aggregate income), and is related to the broader and more complex concept of
efficiency which refers to the best utilisation of resources in the production process.
This sub-section develops the framework within which the productivity of public and private
investment in relation to output growth, will be measured for Jamaica later on in this chapter. Inteipring
the relationship between public and private investment on the one hand and growth on the other has to be
done with care because of the possible influence of public investment on private investment, This effect
must be taken into account in measunng and evaluating the productivity of private investment relative to
that of public investment.
The World Bank and International Monetary Fund have generally taken it for granted that public
investment is constrained by bureaucracy and political considerations and is therefore less productive than
private investment (see for example, World Bank, 1989). Both institutions consistently encourage their
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member countries to privatise public enterprises in order to stimulate growth. There are, however, fliw
studies on the productivity of public and private investment and their effect on growth. Khan and Reinhart
(1990) develop a model to measure the productivity of public and private investment fur twenty-four
developing countries for the period 1970-1979. the model utilises an aggregate production function in
which output (y) is a function of the capital stock (k), the labour force (L) and other variables (Z), with (A)
representing total factor productivity:
y = Ay(K,L,Z)
Equation (4.13) can be written in growth form as:
öy_(	
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The term (a 1 ) is the marginal productivity of capital (which is assumed to be constant across the
countries in the study), (a 2 ) is the elasticity of output with respect to labour, (a 3 ) is the elasticity of
output with respect to the "Other" variables, and (a 0 ) represents the growth in total factor productivity.
The actual incremental output-capital ratio (10CR) is a 1 if a 0 =a 2 a 3 =0, or alternatively the
incrementalcapftal-outputratio(IC0R)is. If a 0 ^0, a2 ^0, and a 3 ^0, then- wouldbethe
net (ICOR), which is an estimate of the (partial) productivity of investment with the variables (L) and (Z)
being held constant.
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Khan and Reinhart then divide aggregate mvestment into its public (Jpbl) and private (IpIv) components:
_____	 _____	 _____	 _____	
AZAy 
= 180 + flu Y(t-1) +182 Y(t-1) + fl3 Ll +184 Z(t_1)	 (4.17)Y(t-1)
If/i 2 > /3 then the marginal productivity of private investment exceeds that of public investment, and
vice versa if' fl >182 Two versions of equation (4.17) are tested. One replaces the "other" variable
term (/34 -Az) with the growth rate of exports (/34 p-), while the other replaces it with the growth
rate of imports (/14 MI))
The estimated marginal productivity of private investment is positive and more significant in both
versions of equation (4.17) (i.e. 0.158 and 0.209) than the estimated marginal productivity of public
investment which turns out to be negative and statistically insignificant (-0.108 and -0.182). Khan and
Reinhart15 conclude that the productivity of public investment is insignificant and that public sector
investment has no significant direct effect on real growth. Sarmad (1990)16 confirms the findings of Khan
and Reinhart for a subset of fifteen developing countries for the same period (1970-79). However, when
the model is tested for the twenty-four countries for the 1980-87 period, the productivity of public
investment is found to be positive, statistically significant and higher than that of private investment (which
is also positive and significant). Sarmad argues that the role of public investment in growth is at least as
important as that of private investment, but that capital projects in earlier years (e.g. the 1970-79 period)
had longer gestation periods and were often more unproductive than later projects.
Khan and Reinhart' 7 caution against interpreting their results too literally, as their model does not
allow for any indirect effects (whether positive or negative) of public investment on private investment.
Public and private investment are complementary if increases in the former stimulate the latter. On the
other hand there may be a substitution effect if an increase in public investment crowds out or reduces
private investment. Both effects might occur at the same time, making the net efibct difficult to predict.
Public and private investment might complement one another because of the positive impact that
public infrastructural projects might have on the profitability and efficiency of private investment, In
15 Op. Cit.
' 6 Reped in Warman (1993)
' 7 Op Cit.
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addition, in the absence of full employment, public investment may increase aggregate demand and
increase the size of the market for private sector output, thereby stimulating private investment, On the
other hand, if public output competes with private output then the latter may be crowded out, paiticularly
at full employment. In addition to physical crowding out, financial crowding out might also occur if
government borrowing from the financial system reduces the availability of credit to the private sector.
A recursive model developed by U. Tun Wai and Wong (1982) measures the net effect of public
on private investment. Private investment (Ipt) is determined in their model by public investment (Ig,), the
change in credit to the private sector (Fp,), and the stock of private sector capital lagged by one period
Ipt = co + ciIG + c2FP + C3KP(t.j) 	 (4.18)
The coefficient (ci) represents the complementary ect of public investment on private investment'8.
Credit to the private sector is defined as total credit' 9 (F,) minus credit to the public sector (Fg,):
Fp = F - Fgt
	 (4.19)
Public sector credit is in turn determined by public investment Igt:
FG = g0 + g1Ig
	
(4.20)
Substituting equation (4.20) into (4.19) andthen (4.19) into (4.18) gives
Ipt k + kjIg + k2F + k3KP(t..l) 	 4.21)
where the public investment coefficient k 1 c1 - c2gl represents the financial crowding out efilict (or lack
thereof),
Note however, that it is somewhat misleading to call this the "complementary effect" as it may be
negative (i.e. private investment might be substituted by public investment. It might be better to refer to it
as the "direct effect". Similarly, the crowding-out effect might best be described as the "indirect financial
effect".
Domestic credit plus net foreign capital inflows.
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The empirical evidence on crowding out is mixed and there is no set pattern. Nor can a reliable
conclusion on the exIstence or otherwise of crowding out be made on a-priori or theoretical grounds. As
(]albis (1979a) has pointed out, it all depends on the institutional structures of particular economies. The
Tun Win and Wong (1982) model is used in section 4.2 to measure the net efict of public investment on
pnvate investment.
4.1.2 , Identjflcation of the Financial Liberalisation Hypotheses on Inflation, Interest Rates, Growth
and Investmentfor Empirical Testing.
This sub-section identifies the various hypotheses, explicit and implicit, to be tested in the next
section. Several issues are examined:
(1) Fry's2° hypothesis that higher real interest rates lower the rate of inflation.
(2) The contention of the financial liberalisation "school" that inflation lowers the amount of credit
available for investment by reducing the amount of financial savings in the banking system.
(3) The hypothesis that inflation leads to a re-distribution of bank credit from the private to the public
sector. The argument is that inflation increases the budget deficit and leads to an increase in
government borrowing from the banking system at the expense of private sector borrowing.
(4) Fiy's21 argument that the difference between actual and expected inflation may have a positive
effect on investment by acting as a signal that demand conditions have improved. Higher inflation
stimulates investment and may generate higher economic growth.
(5) The assumption implicit in the various financial liberalisation models that the productivity of
private investment is higher than that of public investment.
(6) The hypothesis that private sector investment is physically crowded out by public sector
investment,as well as financially crowded out of the credit market by public borrowing, which




The next section examines the empirical evidence for Jamaica.
4.2 JAMAICA: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
4.2.1 Real Interest Rates, Inflation, Financial Savings and Total Credit
The First issue to be examined is Fry's contention that higher real interest rates lead to lower
inflation22 Chart (4.1) shows the rate of inflation (pcpi), the growth rate of the nominal money supply
(mlg), the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate (eg) and the real interest rate (r).
Chart 4.1








Source: IMF Electronic Databank
International Fin. Stats.(IIVIF), 1960-1992
World Tables (World Bank), various years over period 1960 1992
The average rate of inflation between 1960 and 1990 was 12.44 per cent. Inflation during the
years of high economic growth (see Chapter 2) was an average 4.65 per cent per annum, while it rose to
an annual average of 21.8 per cent and 15.07 per cent during the crises years (1973-11980) and the period
22 It should be noted that high inflation may itself lower the real





of intermittent recovery (198 1-1990) respectively. The real interest rate fell from 7.57 per cent in 1963
to 5.6 per cent in 1990. It was mainly positive up to 1972, and thereafter fluctuated widely between
positive 2.85 per cent in 1973 and negative 49.77 per cent in 1979 in response to the monetary and fiscal
policies of the government (see Chapter 1). Neither a positive nor negative relationship between inflation
and the real interest rate is obvious from a visual inspection of chart (4.1).
Fry's (1995) money equilibnum model of inflation, equation (4.11) maybe specified as follows:
pcpi = a0 + a1mlg + a2gdpeg + a3dr + a4eg	 (4.22)
where pcpi is the inflation rate as represented by continuously compounded changes in the consumer puce
index, mig is the growth in the nominal money supply, gclpeg is growth in expected gdp, dr is the change
in the real deposit interest rate, and eg is the percentage change in the nominal bilateral exchange rate
(where e represents Jamaica dollars per US dollar).
Equation (4.22) is similar to equation (4.11) except for the additional explanatory variable (eg),
and except that (4.11) is expressed in per capita terms 24. Also, the narrow definition of the money supple
is used in preference to broader definitions which were statistically insignificant in the equation. It seems
that the link between money as the medium of exchange and inflation is more significant than the role that
broader measures of money as an asset play in influencing inflation in Jamaica. Expected gross domestic
product is obtained by adjusting actual GDP in the previous period by its change over the penod befbre.
(GDP GDP 1 + (GDP 1 - GDP 2). Expectations in this simple adaptive model are based on the
previous year's GDP and the changes in previous year's GDP. The real deposit interest rate used to
calculate (dr), takes account of inflation. The World Bank's (1989)26 fonnula is used:
where id is the nominal deposit interest rate, p is the rate of inflation, and r is the real mterest rzite.
23 Reliable data are unavailable for the period 1960-62,
Equation (4.22) gave better statistical results than its per capita equivalent
25 Currency in the hands of the public plus demand deposits.




_______ Equations : Inflation (PCPI), Financial Savings (FSR) & Tot. Credit Availability (TCREDR)
______ _____	 {1-PCPI	 (2}-PCPI	 {3}-FSR	 {4)-TCREDR
_____	 VbIs.	 t-ratio	 coeff. t-ratio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob.
____ CONST. -0.27 -0.11 0.915 -0.14 -0.05 0.960 -10.3 -1.99 0.060 -22.3 -1.50 0.148
FSR	 1.67 2.59 0.017
_____ GDPR	 0.11 2.52 0.019 0.40 2.73 0.012
____ R	 -0.03 -0.19 0.85 0.78 2.94 0.008
______ INFDIFF	 -0.03 -0.57 0.573
____ GDEFR	 26 6.62 000
_______ RDFF	 0.73 3.07 0.006	 ____
_____ PCPI(t-1) 0.60 4.44 0.000 0.58 3.09 0.005
_____ GDPRLA	 ___
______ DR	 -0.03 -0.39 0.703
_______ MIG	 0.16 2.34 0.029 0.16 2.26 0.033
______ GDPEG 0.06 0.41 0.689 0.07 0.14 0.519
_______ EG	 0.25 4.19 0.000 0.26 4.58 0.000
_____ ERG	 ___
______ R-sqrd	 0.87	 _____ 0.87	 0.40	 0.81
______ R bar-sqd	 0.84 ____	 0.85	 ____ 0.30 _____	 0.78
______ D.W.	 ____________	 1.96 ____	 1.82	 1.79
______ Durbin-h	 -0.170.87	 none	 _____________ ____	 ____
_____ F	 (5,23) 30.55 0.00 (5,24) 32.73 0.00 (4,22) 3.66 0.02 (3,22) 30.5 0.00
______ S.E.	 6.521	 6.407	 3.11	 11.1
______ ______	 L L	
30 ____	 27	 26
_______ ser.corr chi-sq [1]	 0.15 chi-sq [1]	 0.01 chi-sq [1]	 0.21 chi-sq[1]	 0.14
_______ func.forrr chi-sq [1] 	 3.44 chi-sq [1]	 3.65 ctii-sq [1]	 2.20 chi-sq [1]	 1.11
_______ normality chi-sq [21 	 0.97 chi-sq [2]	 0.75 chi-sq [21	 0.32 chi-sq [21	 4.86
_______ heterosc. chi-sq[11 	 1.96 chi-sq[1}	 2.66 chi-sq [1]0.80 chi-sq [1] 	 3.64
______ chow	 ch-sq[417.17 chi-sq [41 8.23 chi-sq [4]1.61 chi-sq [4]2.25
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The regression on equation (4.22) uses Ordinary Least Squares and the results are as follows:
pcpi = -0.27 + 0.60pcpiu) + 0.l6mlg + 0.O6gdpeg - 0.O3dr ^ 0.25eg
(-0.11) (4.44)	 (234)	 (0.41)	 (-0.39) (4.19)	 (4.24)
where the t- values are below the coefficients. The equation satisfies the diagnostic tests for auto-
correlation, functional form, normality, heteroscedasticity and Chow's test of the stability of the
parameters, and the results are summarised as equation { 1 } of Table (4.1). The equation is well
determined. The results indicate that changes in the real interest rate (dr) are not significant in the
determination of inflation in Jamaica. The regression was re-run using the real interest rate (r) instead of
(dr), with similar results (see equation {2} of Table (4.1)). The hypothesis that higher real interest rates
reduce inflation is not supported in the case of Jamaica.
In addition, about 40 per cent of the adjustment to long run inflation takes place in one year,
ceteris paribus. This would seem to indicate that the information systems that signal price movements to
economic agents are somewhat slow to take effect or are not accurately perceived. The other main
variables positively associated with inflation (as expected), are changes in the exchange rate of the Jamaica
dollar (eg) and money supply growth (mig). Depreciation of the Jamaica dollar by ten per cent generates
inflation of two and a half per cent, while a ten per cent increase in the money supply is associated with an
increase in inflation of 1.6 per cent, ceteris paribus.
The second issue to be examined is the contention of the financial liberalisation school" that
inflation lowers the total amount of credit available for investment. According to this view, the difference
between inflation and expected inflation has a negative eflct on financial savings by lowering the real
deposit rate of interest. Reduced financial savings give rise to a smaller amount of total bank credit.
Chart (4.2) indicates that in general, inflation (pcpi) moved in a direction opposite to that of real
financial savings (fr) and real bank credit (tcredr) throughout the 1960-92 period, except for the years
1962-1967 when inflation and financial savings were very low and bank credit grew steadily.
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Chart 4.2








Source: IMF Electronic Databank
International Fin. Stats.(IMF), 1960-1992
World Tables (World Bank), various years over period 1960 1992
Equations {3} and {4} of Table (4.1) are used to test the effect of inflation on the total credit of the
banking system. The effect of inflation on financial savings is first tested using equation {3}, followed by
equation {4} which examines the link between financial savings and credit.
Real financial savings27 (FSR) are regressed on the real deposit interest rate 28 (r), real GDP
(GDPR), the interest rate difirential (rdifi) 29 and the difibrence between actual inflation and expected
inflation (INFDIFF). As in Chapter 3, the real interest rate, the interest rate differential and real GDP
(GDPR) are expected to have a positive impact on real financial savings. If the financial liberalisation
contention is correct, inflation is expected to have a negative effect on financial savings. The results are as
follows:
FSR = -10.30 + 0.11 GDPR + 0.78 r + 0.73 rdiff- 0.03 INFDIFF
(-1.99) (2.52)	 (2.94) (3.07)	 (-0.57)	 (4.25)
27 As defined in Chapter 3
28 Poly defined in this chapter and in Chapter 3.
29 M defined in Chapter 3
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where the t-statistics are in brackets beneath the coefficients. The equation is well determined and passes
the various diagnostic tests perfonned upon it, including Chow's test of parameter stability (see Table 4.1).
Holding the influence of other vanables constant, inflation relative to expected inflation seems to
have had a negative but insignificant impact on real financial savings over the period. It seems that
increases in the inflation differential per se do not discourage financial saving in Jamaica, though inflation
volatility or surprise does have a negative effect on financial savings (see Chapter 3). Equation 4.25 was
re-run using inflation instead of the inflation differential, with sinilar results, though the diagnostics were
weaker than those for the above equation when the differential was used. As expected, the real deposit
interest rate (r), the interest rate diflèrential (rdiff) and real GDP (GDPR) are significant positive
determinants of financial savings. This re-enforces similar results obtained in chapter three.
Equation {4) of Table (4.1) measures the effect of financial savings on total real credit (tcredr).
In addition, the influences of real GDP (GDPR) and the real government deficit (GDEFR) on total credit
are examined. All three are expected to be positive (the effect of the government deficit will be examined
in greater detail later on in this section). The results are as follows:
TCREDR = -22.3 + 1.67FSR + 0.4OGDPR + 236GDEFR
(-1.50) (2.59)	 (2.73)	 (6.62)	 (4.26)
All the variables are positive and significant30 . In particular, higher financial savings give rise to more
credit. However, given the insignificant effect of inflation on financial ssavings in equation (4.25), the
financial liberalisation hypothesis that inflation relative to expected inflation reduces total credit
availability, is not borne out for Jamaica.
4.2.2 The Government Deficit and Private Sector Credit
The third hypothesis to be examined is that inflation widens the budget deficit and leads to higher
government borrowing from the banking system at the expense of private sector borrowing. Government
biggest positive influence on total credit is the government deficit. The higher the deficit, the larger is the
total amount of bank credit in the economy. The role of the government has important implications for private


















expenditure outpaces revenue when there is high inflation, and governments often finance growing deficits
by printing money or by borrowing from the banking system. Here we examine whether bank credit to
Jamaica's private sector is reduced in the process.
Chart 4.3
inflation, gov.deflcit, priv. bank credit, gov. bank credit
Sources: IMF Electronic Databank; Manchester Univ.
International Fin. Stats.(IMF), 1960-1992
Chart (4.3) gives a visual impression of the movement of inflation (PCPI), the government deficit
(GDEFR) and credit to the government (GCREDR), which seems to move m roughly the same direction.
Credit to the private sector (PCREDR) moves in the opposite direction, particularly during the crisis years
(1973-1980), and the period of intermittent recovery (1981-1990).
Table (4.2) summarises the equations used to test the third hypothesis described above, and
presents the respective regression results. In equation {5} of the table, inflation (PCPI) and the lagged
change in real GDP (GDPRLA) are used as explanatory variables for the real government deficit
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Equations: Gov't Deficit (GDEFR), Bank Credit to Gov't (GCREDR), Bank Credit to Gov'tJTot. Credit
(GCREDRT), Bank Cred. to Priv. Sector (PCREDR), Bank Cred. to Priv. Sector/Tot. Credit (PCREDRT)
_____ {5) - GDEFR 	 {6} - GCREDR {7} - GCREDRT {8} - PCREDR	 9) - PCREDRT
Vbs.	 coeff. t-ralio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob. coefi. t-ratio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob.
CONST. 5.46 2.95 0.008 -6.35 -1.62 0.119 0.02 0.55 0.586 -14.1 -3.82 0.001 0.32 2.39 0.026
FSR	 0.25 0.86	 0.4 1.38 2.31 0.030 0.01 1.60 0.123 0.46 3.85 0.001 0.00 -0.37 0.715
GDPR	 ____	 ____	 0.26 4.57 0.000 0.003 2.71 0.013
GDEFR	 ____	 2.53 8.79 0.000 0.03 10.26 0.000 -0.25 -4.00 0.001 -0.02 -5.57 0.000
PCPI	 0.46 4.48 0.000
GDPRLA -0.72 -3.79 0.001 	 ____
PCREDR -1)	 ____	 0.54 5.12 0.000
PCREDRT (t1 ) 	 ____	 0.37 4.57 0.000
R-sqrd	 0.71	 0.77	 0.82	 0.96	 0.92
Rbar-sqd ____ 0.67 ____	 0.75	 0.81	 0.95	 0.91
D.W.	 1.56	 1.77	 1.49	 ______________ ______________
Durbin-h _____	 _____ _______________ _________ ____ _____ -0.69 _____ 	 0.06
F_____ (3,21)17.13 0.00 (2,23)3873 0.00 (2,23) 54.14000 (4,21)117.7 0.00 (4,21) 64.37 0.00




setcorr ctii-sq [11	 0.88 chi-sq [1]	 0.18 Gui-sq [1]	 1.09 chi-sq [11	 0.96 chi-sq[1]	 0.33
func.forn chi-sq [1]	 0.86 chi-sq [1]	 0.87 chi-sq [1]	 0.74 chi-sq[1]	 0.71 chi-sq[1]2.21
normality chi-sq[2] 	 4.01 ctii-sq [2]	 0.95 chi-sq [2]	 0.26 chi-sq [2]	 2.12 ctii-sq [2]	 1.00
heterosc. chi-sq [1]	 0.03 chi-sq [1]	 3.77 chi-sq [1]	 1.20 chi-sq [1]1.31 chi-sq[1]	 0.04
chow	 chi-sq[4]2.62 chi-sq[4]23.84 chi-sq[4]8.76 chi-sq[4] 	 3.18 chi-sq14]6.57
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(GDEFR)31 . The GDP variable is expected to be negatively related to the government deficit, since
increases in real GDP can be expected to increase tax revenue and lower the deficit. The results are as
follows:
GDEFR = 6.34 + O.42PCPL - O.69GDPRLA
(4.13) (4.65)	 (-3.72)	 (4.26)
Both explanatory variables are statistically significant and have the expected signs. In addition, the
equation passes all the diagnostic tests summarised in Table (4.2). The effect of the government deficit on
bank credit to the government (GCREDR) is then tested in equation {6} of Table (4.2). The real financial
savings variable (FSR) is also used as an additional explanatory variable, since bank credit to the
government can be expected to be positively affected by the availability of financial savings. The results
are:




Once again both explanatory variables are statistically significant and in particular the government deficit
has a strong positive impact on government borrowing from the financial system. Considering equations
(4.26) and (4.27) together, a 10 per cent rise in inflation is associated with an 11 per cent rise in
government borrowing from the financial system.
In addition, the effect of the government deficit on the propoition of credit to the government out
of total credit (GCREDR'I), is tested in equation {7}, Table (4.2). A ten per cent increase in the
government deficit increases the ratio of government to total bank credit by 0.3 per cent. In effect, a 10
per cent rise in inflation (from equation 4.26), increases the share of a credit going to the government by
0.1 per cent. This must imply that the share of credit to the private sector is reduced by an equivalent
amount. It does seem that inflation in Jamaica widens the budget deficit and increases bank credit to the
govermnent at the expense of the private sector. However, this is tested more directly in equations {81 and
{9} of Table (4.2).
31 The revenue and expenditure of the consolidated central government are used to calculate the nominal
government deficit which is then deflated by the consumer price index to obtain the real deficit,
130
It should be noted that the Chow test of parameter instability indicates that the coefficients in
equation {6} of Table (4.2) are unstable. In particular, government borrowing from the financial system
in Jamaica does not appear to be a stable fimction of the government deficit. Other fctors such as
political considerations and the credit worthiness of the government might well play an important role in
the desire of the government to borrow on the one hand, and the desire of the banks to lend on the other.
Therefore the magnitudes of the coefficients obtained from equation {5} may not be very reliable, despite
the reliability of the underlying long-nm relationship (i.e the statistical significance and the positive or
negative sign). If we consider equation {7}, Chow's test indicates that the parameters are stable.
Therefore we can be reasonably confident in the veracity of our above result that a 10 per cent rise in
inflation from equation (4.26), increases the proportion of government credit by about 0.1 per cent
considering equation {7}. However, we cannot have the same degree of confidence in our earlier finding
that a 10 per cent rise in inflation leads to a rise of 11 per cent in government borrowing in absolute terms
(using equation {6} ratherthan {7}).
We now examine the effect of the government deficit on bank credit to the private sector
(PCREDR) more directly in equation {8} of Table 4.2):
PCREDR = -14.1 + 0.54PCREDR(t1)+ 0.46FSR + 0.26GDPR - 0.25GDEFR
(-3.82) (5.12)	 (3.85)	 (4.57)	 (-4.00)	 (4.28)
where (PCREDR) is real bank credit to the private sector, and the other variables are as before. The
equation is well determined and satisfies the diagnostic tests, including that of parameter stability. As
expected, real financial savings (FSR) and real GDP (GDPR) have a positive and significant efict on
private sector credit (PCREDR). Iii addition, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is positive
and significant, indicating that some private borrowing finances capital or project-related needs for periods
in excess of one year. Also, if the private sector in Jamaica is efficient in its use of financial resources and
its ventures are profitable, credit in subsequent periods might well be more forthcoming.
The government deficit (GDEFR) has a statistically significant negative efibet on private sector
bank credit (PCREDR). A 10 per cent increase in the deficit reduces private sector credit by 2.5 per cent.
In addition, equation {9} of Table (4.2) which is well-determined and satisfies all the tests carried out on
it, shows that the government deficit reduces the proportion of credit to the private sector (PCREDRT). A
10 per cent rise in the deficit reduces the ratio of private to total credit by 0.2 per cent. Considering
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equations (4.26) and {9} in Table (4.2) together, a 10 per cent rise in inflation reduces private sector credit
by 0.08 per cent. This is close to our previous conclusion from equations (4.26) and {7} that the same rise
in the inflation rate increased the proportion of government credit by 0.1 per cent. The slightly lower
figure of 0.08 per cent is pediaps more accurate, given the superiority of equation (9) from the point of
view of satisfying the stability tests. In general, the hypothesis that inflation widens the government deficit
and crowds out private sector borrowing from the banking system seems to be borne out for Jamaica
However, the effect, though statistically significant, is small and care should be taken not to overstate its
importance given the limitations of the data for Jamaica (see the Introductory Chapter of this dissertation).
The Data Appendix at the end of this chapter shows the amount of bank credit to the private sector and
the government over the three decades.
4.2.3 Inflation, Investment and Growth.
The fourth hypothesis to be tested is Fry's (1995) contention that inflation may stimulate
investment and economic growth. According to this argument, a rise in the inflation rate relative to
expected inflation provides a signal to businesses that demand conditions are improving. Businesses
respond by utilising spare capacity and subsequently expanding capacity. Both investment and economic
growth are thereby stimulated.
In order to test this hypothesis, we first make use of the investment equation (3.8) used in Chapter
3. The variable (INFDIFF), equal to the difference between actual inflation and expected inflation (7t1te)32
is added as an explanatory variable. The results are summarised as equation (10) in Table (4,3) and are
as follows:
JR = 2.61 + O.371R(t .l) - 0.07R - O.O9JNFDIFF + O.52PCREDR + 0.58GDPRLA
(0.88) (2.50)	 (-0.87) (-0.86)	 (3.30)	 (3.10)	 (4.29)
where (LR) is real domestic investment, and the other variables are the same as before. The equation
satisfies the stability and other criteria and is well-determined (see equation (10), Table 4.3). The lagged
dependent variable (IR (t.l)), the lagged accelerator (GDPRLA) and (PCREDR) are all significant and have
the expected signs. As can be seen, inflation relative to expected inflation (INFDIFF) has a negative but
32 The measure of expected inflation is the same as the one used earlier in this chapter.
Table 4.3
Equations : Real Investment (IR) & Real GDP Growth (GDPRG)
_______ _______	 (10) - IR	 (11) - IR	 {12} - GDPRG	 (13)-_GDPRG
________ VbIs.	 coeff. I-ratio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob.
________ CONST. 2.61 0.88 0.389 2.54 0.85 0.405 5.60 5.82 0.000 5.37 5.80 0.000
_______ R	 -0.07 -0.87 0.39 -0.15 -2.06 0.050 0.08 1.87 0077 0.09 1.41 0.175
________ INFDIFF -0.09 -0.86 0.396	 ____	 -0.84 -0.01 0.991
_______ PCREDF 0.52 3.30 0.003 0.54 3.48 0.002 	 ____
_______ PCPI	 -0.05 -0.71 0.483 -0.06 -0.75 0.461
_______ GDEFY	 -35.0 -3.23 0.004 -40.0 -4.36 0.000
_______ IR(t-1)	 0.37 2.50 0.020 0.36 2.44 0.023
_______ GDPRLA 0.58 3.10 0.005 0.56 2.96 0.007
_______ IRG	 ____	 0.10 3.79 0.001 0.10 3.79 0.001
_______ R-sqrd	 0.85	 0.85	 0.79 _____	 0.78
_______ R bar-sqd 	 0.82	 0.81	 0.74	 0.74
______ D.W.	 _____________	 _________	 1.44	 1.39
_______ Durbin-h	 0.33	 0.55	 _______________ _______________
_______ F	 (5,24) 26.82 0.00 (5,24) 26.51 0.00 (4,19) 17.60 0.00 (4,19) 17.0 0.00






______ ser.corr chi-sq [1]	 0.20 chi-sq [1]	 0.02 chi-sq [1]	 1.95 chi-sq [1]2.35
_______ func.forn' chi-sq[1]0.24 chi-sq[1]0.38 chi-sq[1]0.30 chi-sq[1]0.17
______ normality chi-sq [2] 	 1.01 chi-sq [2]	 0.69 cbi-sq [2]	 0.70 chi-sq [2]	 0.80
______ heterosc. chi-sq [1] 	 0.33 chi-sq [1]	 0.45 chi-sq [1]	 0.64 chi-sq [1]0.01
______ chow	 chi-sq[4]2.76 chi-sq[4]4.53 chi-sq[4]0.73 chi-sq[4]1.01
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statistically insignificant effect on real investment. The same result is obtained when the variable
(INFDIFF) is replaced by inflation (PCPJ) in equation { 11 } of Table 4.3.
Both equations { 1 0} and { 11) were tested for the sub-periods 1960-72, when inflation was an
average 4.65 per cent per annum, and for the over-lapping sub-period 1970-90 when average annual
inflation was 16.70 per cent, Inflation turns out to be positively related to investment during the years of
low inflation (1960-72), and negatively related to investment during the high inflation period (1970-90).
However, these effects are not statistically significant. Nevertheless they are not without interest, given the
view that low inflation is a necessaiy aspect of growth and indeed promotes it, while high inflation
(pethaps in excess of 10 per cent) may have a negative effect on investment and growth (see Tun Wai
1959, Dorrance 1966, Thirlwall 1974, Ghatak 1981).
Inflation in Jamaica has been high and volatile over the three decades covered by this study except
during the years of high growth (1960-1972), and its overall relationship with investment is found to be
negative. However, that relationship is found to be insignificant and Frs (1995) argument that inflation
stnnulates investment does not hold for Jamaica over the period.
Equations 10} and {11} also confirm the conclusip of Chapter Three that the real rate of
interest has no positive effect on investment, but instead has a significant negative effect. The real rate of
interest is an important cost factor for businesses desirous of investing. The higher the cost, the lower the
demand for investment. High interest rates may increase financial savings but they do not seem to increase
investment in Jamaica. Money and capital do not seem to be complementaiy.
Equations {12} and {13} examine more directly, the second part of Fry's hypothesis that inflation
may stimulate real growth. The results of equation 12} are:
GDPRG = 5.60 + 0.08R - 0.O6PCPI - 35.0 GDEFY + 0.10 IRG
(5.82) (1.87) (-0.75) (-3.23) 	 (3.79)	 (430)
33 inflation between 1960 and 1972 inclusive, was below 6.7 per cent in every year (and 3 per cent or less in 6 of
the 12 years considered),except 1970 when the removal of domestic price controls and high inflation in Jamaica's
main trading partners resulted in double digit inflation of 14.7 per cent However, in order to measure the effects
of high inflation on investment, our second sub-period starts in 1970, overlapping with the first one which ends in
1972.
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where (GDPRG) is real GDP growth, (GDEFY) is the ratio of the government deficit to GDP, (IRG)
represents the growth rate of real investment, and the other variables are the same as before. Consistent
with the effect of inflation on investment, inflation has a negative but statistically insignificant efilict on
economic growth in Jamaica. Equation {13} in which inflation relative to expected inflation is used
(INFDIFF = ,t - its), gives a similar result. Both equations also confirm our conclusions in Chapter Three
that the real rate of interest (R) has no significant effect on real growth, and that the government deficit
(GDEFRY) has a negative effect on growth. This finding is important in view of our earlier results in
equations (8) and (9) of Table (42). If higher government deficits are financed at the expense of the
private sector (equations (8) and (9) Table 4.2), yet higher government deficits have a negative eflbct on
economic growth, then the conclusion that public sector investment is less efficient than private sector
investment, is inescapable. In addition, it is one thing to find that the public sector crowds out the private
sector from the available pool of credit. It is quite another thing to then argue that private sector
investment is also reduced, because the private sector may successfully obtain finance from other non-
bank sources (eg. own savings, foreign creditors, the primary or secondary stock market, etc). Therefore it
is necessary to test whether or not public sector investment itself has any effect on private sector
investment.
The next sub-section examines the fifth and sixth hypotheses of the financial liberalisation school
listed above, that private sector investment is more productive than public sector investment, and that
increases in the latter lead to decreases in the former.
4.2.3.1 The Productivity of Public and Private Investment.
This sub-section examines the productivity of public and private investment using the Khan and
Reinhart (1990) model, and the efilict of public on private investment using the model of Tun Win and
Wong (1982), Starting with the aggregate production function of Khan and Reinhart and holding labour,






where (a) is the productivity of capital, (K) is the real capital stock and GDPR is as before.
Disaggregating capital into its public and private components and distinguishing between the productivity
of each component for the purpose of subsequent testing, gives:
GDPR = a1 KPRIVR + a2KPUBR
	
(4.32)
where (KPRIVR) and (KPUBR) are the stocks of private and public sector capital respectively, while (a1)
and (a2) represent the corresponding capital productivities.Difirentiating (4.32) with respect to time
gives:







which can be expressed for the purpose of estimation as:
DGDPR = a1IPRIVR + a2IPUBR
	
(4.34)
where (DGDPR) is the change in real GDP, (IPRIVR) is real private investment (i.e. the change in real
private capital stock over time) and IPUB represents real public sector investment (the change in the real
public capital stock through time).
Equation (4.34) is estimated with an intercept term so that (a 1) and (a2) reflir only to the marginal
productivity of private and public investment respectively, and not their average productivities (providing
the intercept term is not equal to zero). In addition a non-zero intercept makes the productivity estimates
independent of the level of investment and therefore more reliable. The results of estimating equation
(4.34) are as follows (also summarised as equation {14} of Table 4.4):
DGDPR 0.79 + 0.23 IPRIYR - 030 IIPUIBR




______	 Equations : Change in real gdp (DGDPR), Real Priv. Investment (IPRIVR)
______ _____ ____________ & Real Pdv. Credit (PCREDR)	 ____________
______ ______ {14)-DGDPR	 (15) - IPRIVR	 (16) - IPRIVR	 (17) - PCREDR
______ VbIs.	 iTio	 TT io	 ?T fio	 -
______ CONST. 0.79 0.19 0.855 7.20 1.20 0.248 -30.4 -1.66 0.119 -43.1 -3.21 0.005
_______ R	 -0.16 -2.17 0.047 -0.04 -0.56 0.583 0.19 318 0.005
_______ IPRJVR 0.23 2.46 0.023
_______ PUBR	 -0.30 -1.28 0.217 -1.37 -4.54 0.000 -1.93 -5.28 0.000 -0.9 -2.88 0.010
______ PCREDF	 0.70 2.67 0.018
_______ TCREDR	 -0.20 -2.38 0.031
_______ GDPR	 ____	 0.68 3.29 0.005
_____ IPRIVR(t.)	 0.29 1.97 0.067 0.18 0.04 0.317
______ GDPRLA	 0.37 1.36 0.193
_______ GDPR(t-1)	 0.73 5.37 0.000
_______ R-sqrd	 0.48	 0.89 _____	 0.89	 0.67
_______ R bar-sqd	 0.43	 0.86	 0.86	 0.62
______ D.W.	 1.78	 ____________ ____________	 1.68
_______ Durbin-h _______________	 -0.07 0.94	 -0.25 0.80 _______________
_______ F	 (2,19) 8.94 0.00 (5,15) 25.54 0.00 (5,15) 25.56 0.00 (3,18) 12.4 0.00
______ S.E.	 4.007	 4.47	 4.47	 4.38
______ n	 22	 ____ 21 ____	 21	
L 
22
_______ ser.corr chi-sq [1] 	 0.24 chi-sq [1]	 0.07 chi-sq [1]	 0.29 chi-sq [1]	 0.15
_______ func.forrr chi-sq[1]1.51 chi-sq [1] 	 3.18 chi-sq[1]1.41 chi-sq [1]0.01
_______ normality chi-sq[2]0.73 chi-sq[2]1.35 chi-sq[2]0.58 chi-sq[2]0.21
_______ heterosc. chi-sq11]1.38 chi-sq 11] 0.41 chi-sq[1]0.37 chi-sq[1] 	 0.03
_______ chow	 chi-sq [4]	 9.47 chi-sq [4]	 2.47 chi-sq [4]	 2.52 chi-sq [4]	 7.53
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where the equation is well determined and satisfies the various tests applied to it. The productivity of
private investment is positive and significant, while that of public investment is negative but statistically
insignificant35.
However Khan and Reinhait36 caution against reading too much into the magnitude of the
productivity estimates, given the possibility of feedback effects of public investment on private investment.
In addition, Thirlwall (1989) points out that since changes in output are attributed only to changes in
capital with labour, total productivity and other factors held constant, the investment productivity
estimates (orIOCR's)willbetoohigh. Withthese caveats in mind, it seems onthe face ofitthat atm
percentage point increase in private investment allows output increases to accelerate by 2.3 percentage
points. Public investment has no significant effect on changes in real output in Jamaica over the three
decades covered by this study.
The net efibct of public investment on private investment is now considered, using the approach of
Tun Wai and Wong (1982), reviewed in section (4.1). The net effect comprises the direct real effect which
public investment has on private investment, as well as the indirect financial effect via the credit market.
The real private investment (IPRJVR) function used is similar to the total investment function of Chapter
3, but with the lagged dependent variable adjusted accordingly and real public investment (IPUBR) added
as an explanatory variable.
IPRIVR = a + alIPRWR l) + a2IPUBR + a3r + a4PCREDR + a5GDPRLA	 (436)
where the coefficient (a2) on public investment (IPUBR) measures the direct effect of public on private
investment which may be either positive or negative. It may be positive it; for example, government
projects of an infrastmctural nature facilitate private sector development and therefore complement private
ventures. On the other hand, it may be negative if output produced in the government sector competes
with private sector enterprise. There may be a real substitution or crowding-out effect of public for private
investment, or a real complementary effect (where both move in the same direction), depending on the
activities of the government and the response of the private sector.
Equation (4.35) comes from the definitional equation (4.33). The supply effects of Public Investment are
not expected to be instantaneous.
36	 Cit.
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In order to measure the indirect substitution or crowding-out efibet, (GCREDR) is assumed to be
a positive function of public investment. This is a reasonable assumption to make and it is also consistent
with equation {6} of Table (4.2), in which public sector credit is positively related to the government
deficit37 . Credit to the private sector (PCREDR) is then stated as the difirence between total credit
(TCREDR) and credit to the public sector (GCREDR). These relationships are summarised in equations
(4.37) and (4.38):
GCREDR = b0 ^ b1 IPUBR	 (4.37)
PCREDR = TCREDR - GCREDR	 (438)
substituting (4.37) into (4.38) and (4.38) into (4,36) gives:
IPRIVR = aj + alIPR1VR( 1) + a2IPUBR + a3r
+ a4TCREDR - b0 - b1IPIIBR) + a5GDPRLA	 (439)
which can be rearranged to give:
LPRIVR = (a0 -a0bo) + alIPR1VR{ 1) + (a2 - a0b1)IPUBR
+ a3r + a0TCREDR + a5GDPRLA	 (4.40)
The following reduced-form equation is then obtained:
IPRIVR = Co + c1IPR1VR(t..l) + c2IPUI3R + c3r + c4TCREDR+ c5GDPRLA	 (4.41)
where:






See also Warman (1993)
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The real public investment variable (IPUBR) in equation (4.41) measures the net effect of public
investment on private, investment, including both the direct effect of equation (4.36) and the indirect effect
via the financial system. Financial crowding out occurs if c 2 in equation (4.41) is less than a 2 in equation
(4.36). The financial crowding out effect38 works via the reduction of credit to the private sector as a
result of higher public sector investment. The reduction in private credit can be expected to have an
adverse impact on private investment. If c2 is less than a2 and a2 is negative, then financial crowding out
strengthens real crowding out. However, if c2 is negative but a2 is positive, then financial crowding out
offsets real complementarity. It is really an empirical matter.
The estimation results for equation (4.36) which measures the direct real effect of public on
private investment (not taking indirect financial efibcts into account), are as follows:
IPR1VR = 7.20 + 0.29IPR1VR{t1) - 1.37IPIJBR - 0.16R
(1.20) (1.97)	 (-4.54)	 (-2.17)
+ O.7OPCREDR + O.37GDPRLA
(2.67)	 (1.36)	 (4.42)
where IPR1VR is real private investment in millions of Jamaica dollars, IPUBR is real public investment
(J$ millions), R is the real interest rate in percentage terms, PCREDR is real bank credit to the private
sector in millions of Jamaica dollars, and GDPRLA is the lagged accelerator as before. The equation is
well determined and satisfies the usual diagnostic tests (see equation { 15 }, Table 4.4).
As expected, credit to the private sector has a positive and significant effect on private investment,
while the rate of interest has a significant negative effect (both results are consistent with the results of
equations {1O} and {11}, Table 4.3). The lagged dependent variable (IPR1VR(t 1)) and the lagged
accelerator (GDPRLA) both turn out to be positive but statistically insignificant, possibly because the
demand side effects are captured by the strong ect of public investment (IPUBR). The coefficient on
public investment is negative and significant - indeed public investment has the strongest impact of all the
variables in the regression. A one million dollar rise in public investment is associated with a reduction in
private investment of J$1.37 million.
38 As distinct from the real crowding out effect of equation (4.36)
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There is significant crowding out of private by public investment in the real sector. The
government of Jamaica became extensively involved in many economic activities that were previously
controlled by the private sector paiticularly after 1972. These include the importation of a wide variety of
basic foodstuffs, the importation and production of building materials, the ownership and management of
hotels and guest houses, and the production of agro-industrial and industrial output. In addition,
inefficiency, waste and corruption seemed to have been endemic for much of the 30 year period under
review (see Chapter 3 and Stone and Wellisz, 1993), and this may have fuither discouraged private sector
activity in areas in which the public sector became involved.
Financial crowding out is measured by the reduced-form equation (4.41), the results of which are 	 -
as follows (also summarised as equation { 16), Table (4.4)):
IPRIVR = -30.39 + O.l8IIPRIVR - 1.93LPUBR - 0.04 R
(-1.66) (0.04)	 (-5.28)	 (-0.56)
-0.2OTCREDR + 0.68GDPR
(-2.38)	 (3.29)	 (4.43)
where total credit (TCREDR) replaces private credit (PCREDR) and real GDP (GDPR), which is found
to give superior results, is used instead of the lagged accelerator. Private mvestment is paitly driven by
real output (GDPR) to which it is positively related. Total real credit (FCREDR) is negatively and
significantly related to real private investment (IPR1VR) in equation (4.43). This is probably because of
the dominant influence of public sector credit in total credit. Increases in the former lead to increases in the
latter, but crowd out private investment (from equation 4.42).
The net effect of public investment (IPUBR) on pnvate investment (IPRWR) - taking into
account the financial effect - is measured by the coefficient on (IPUBR), and is negative and significant. A
one million dollar increase in public investment reduces private investment by $1.93 milhicxi.
Approximately $1.37 million of that amount is attributable to the crowding out of private investment by
public investment in the real sector (from equation (4.42)). The balance of $0.56 million is attributable to
financial crowding out caused by the negative ect of public sector investment on bank credit to the
private sector. Financial crowding out reinforces non-financial crowding out. An alternative way of
verifying the existence of the financial crowding out efilict is to examine directly, the effect of public
investment on private credit and then the effect of private credit on private investment in equation (4.42).
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The following equation is used to measure the effect of real public investment ([PUBR) on real bank credit
to the private sector (PCREDR):
PCREDR = -43.06 - 0.9OIIPIJBR + 0.73GDPR l) + 0.19R
(-3.21) (-2.88)	 (5.37)	 (3.18)	 (4.44)
where all the variables are defined as before and have the expected signs. The equation is well determined
and satisfies the usual tests (see equation {17}, Table 4.4). An increase of one million dollars in public
investment reduces bank credit to the private sector (PCREDR) by J$0.9 million 39 . This reduction in turn
lowers private investment by J$0.70 million from equation (4.42), which is close to our earlier figure of
J$0.56 million. Both methods indicate that a $1.0 million increase in public investment lowers private
investment through a crowding out eflbct in the financial sector, by around J$0.6 million.
Returning to the fifih and sixth financial liberalisation hypotheses which we set out to examine at
the beginning of this sub-section, our finding is that they both hold for Jamaica. Public sector investment
seems to be less productive than private sector investment in Jamaica. This probably reflects the extensive
waste, ineptitude and cormption of the public sector commented on by several writers (e.g. Stone and
Wellisz 1993, Levitt 1991, Brown 1981). In addition, increases in public investment reduce private
investment in both the real and financial sectors. The public sector competes with the private sector for
both real and financial resources.
4.3	 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has examined several hypotheses of the financial liberalisation models (particularly
those of Mathieson40, Kapur41 , and Fry42), and their applicability to Jamaica over the period 1960-1990.
The first hypothesis that high real interest rates lower the inflation rate by raising the demand for money
relative to its supply, was found not to hold for Jamaica. Neither the real interest rate nor changes in it had
any significant impact on inflation.
An increase in public sector investment widens the deficit (GDEFR), which in turn puts a squeeze on





This conclusion has important policy implications for Jamaica. Since 1974 successive
governments have raised the nominal deposit rate in an attempt to dampen inflation, increase financial
savings and support the currency43 . High interest rates have had little effect on inflation, and as Chart
(4.1) and the Data Appendix to this chapter show, real interest rates were strongly negative for the
majority of years since 1974. In view of our conclusion in Chapter 3 and supported in this chapter, high
interest rates may be inimical to investment since they increase business costs. To be successfiul, any
investment-oriented and anti-inflation strategy must surely take into account the ineffectiveness of high
interest rates in curbing high inflation, as well as the damage that they can inflict on investment.
The second hypothesis that the difference between inflation and expected inflation reduces
financial savings (via its negative effect on the real interest rate), which in turn reduces the availability of
credit, does not hold for Jamaica. However, an inescapable aspect of the economic landscape after 1972 is
the rapid expansion of the government sector, and the extensive waste and mismanagement of resources
that ensued. Public sector expansion was not matched by growth in real output, thereby giving rise to
inflationary pressures in the economy working through money supply growth and higher wage demands.
Future policies to curb inflation would need to include measures to contain the size of the public sector
within manageable limits and improve its efficiency, as weli as measures to improve the prevailing
production and trade structures. The restructuring of the agricultural and agro-industrial sectors and
improving the competitiveness of exports would also have to be addressed. Rigidities in the export sector,
working through the exchange rate, might also have exacerbated the inflationary climate,
Inflation is also found to have no significant effect on investment and growth in Jamaica (the
fourth hypothesis tested) although there is some evidence that investment is stimulated at low levels of
inflation and stifled at high levels. However, these effects were not statistically significant. This chapter
also confirms the conclusions of Chapter 3 that the real interest rate has no significant ect on the real
growth rate, but that it does have a significant negative effect on investment by increasing business costs.
This chapter also finds that high inflation in Jamaica widens the government deficit, as revenue
does not keep pace with expenditure when inflation is high. Higher deficits lead to higher borrowing from
the banking system at the expense of private sector borrowing (though this effect was found to be small).
This in itself would not be catastrophic and might even be beneficial, were it not for the additional
43 However, this last objective has come into conflict with the I.M.F sanctioned policy of devaluing the currency.
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conclusion of section (4,2.3.1) that public sector investment reduces private investment, and is less
efficient.
Public sector borrowing to finance high government deficits crowds out private sector borrowing
from the financial system. In addition, not only does public sector investment compete with and reduce
private investment, but the former is less efficient than the latter. It is therefore not surprising that Jamaica
experienced many years of negative economic growth during the 1970's and 1980's precisely when the
government sector was expanding rapidly.
The above conclusions have impoitant policy implications for Jamaica. Appropriate measures to
improve government efficiency, reduce political patronage and manage the selection and implementation of
public sector projects more carefully, might have had a more positive impact on investment and growth. In
addition, the government sector became too large too quickly and its extensive involvement in the retail,
wholesale and service sectors had an adverse efflict on private sector growth. Improving government
efficiency and encouraging private investment are not mutually exclusive objectives. Future policy makers






_______	 gdpr	 gdprg	 ml	 mig	 cpi	 pcpi	 fsr	 r	 e	 er
	
________	 J$m	 %	 J$m	 %	 index	 %	 J$m	 %	 J$/us$	 real (e)
	
1960	 74.06.	 52.20.	 5.63.	 .________ .	 0.71	 3.49
	
1961	 75.82	 2.37	 46.90	 -10.15	 6.00	 6.57	 -1.00	 ._______	 0.71	 3.32
	
1962	 76.52	 0.92	 59.50	 26.87	 6.09	 1.50	 2.91	 ._______	 0.71	 3.30
	
1963	 79.86	 4.36	 58.70	 -1.34	 6.20	 1.81	 2.68	 7.57	 0.71	 3.28
	
1964	 86.62	 8.47	 63.80	 8.69	 6.32194	 1.31	 2.39	 0.71	 3.26
	
1965	 93.53	 7.98	 63.70	 -0.16	 6.49	 2.69	 1.48	 2.44	 0.71	 3.22
	
1966	 97.32	 4.06	 71.30	 11.93	 6.61	 1.85	 2.34	 1.56	 0.71	 3.26
	
1967	 99.33	 2.06	 75.70	 6.17	 6.81	 3.03	 1.60	 .	 3.99	 0.72	 3.30
	
1968	 105.13	 5.83	 94.90	 25.36	 7.21	 5.87	 4.40	 0.30	 0.83	 3.73
	
1969	 112.84	 7.34	 111.10	 17.07	 7.67	 6.38	 3.32	 -3.72	 0.83	 3.70
	
1970	 120.72	 6.98	 126.70	 14.04	 8.80	 14.73	 2.37	 1.11	 0.83	 3.42
	
1971	 125.69	 411	 160.00	 26.28	 9.27	 5.34	 5.55	 -17.09	 0.83	 3.38
	
1972	 135.75	 8.01	 172.60	 7.88	 9.77	 5.39	 5.99	 8.55	 0.77	 3.06
	
1973	 139.84	 3.01	 218.30	 26.48	 11.50	 17.71	 -2.78	 2.85	 0.91	 3.26
	
1974	 132.45	 -28	 258.10	 18.23	 14.62	 27.13	 2.70	 -19.52	 0.91	 2.85
	
1975	 130.70	 -1.32	 322.30	 24.87	 17.16	 17.37	 -4.44	 -27.55	 0.9	 2.65
	
1976	 122.82	 -6.03	 33850	 5.03	 18.84	 9.79	 -0.58	 3.93	 0.91	 2.55
	
1977	 119.84	 -2.43	 474.40	 40.15	 20.95	 11.20	 -4.69	 9.48	 0.91	 2.44
	
1978	 120.55	 0.59	 569.90	 20.13	 28.27	 34.94	 -4.31	 -2.15	 1.41	 3.03
	
1979	 118.26	 -1.89	 629.20	 10.41	 36.48	 29.04	 -2.79	 -49.77	 1.76	 3.27
	
1980	 111.52	 -5.70	 716.50	 13.87	 46.45	 27.33	 -0.68	 -12.85	 1.78	 2.94
	
1981	 114.38	 2.56	 774.60	 8.11	 52.37	 12.74	 6.00	 -14.06	 1.78	 2.88
	
1982	 115.95	 1.38	 876.20	 13.12	 55.79	 6.53	 8.10	 11.45	 1.78	 2.86
	
1983	 118.53	 2.22	 1065.80	 21.64	 62.26	 11.60	 7.14	 12.74	 1.93	 2.88
	
1984	 117.55	 -0.83	 1318.90	 23.75	 79.57	 27.80	 -3.08	 -1.08	 3.94	 4.79
	
1985	 112.03	 -4.69	 1520.00	 15.25	 100.00	 25.68	 2.38	 -22.70	 5.56	 5.56
	
1988	 109.66	 -2.12	 2139.70	 40.77	 115.11	 15.11	 2A8	 -4.53	 5.48	 4.85
	
1987	 117.99	 7.60	 2251.60	 5.23	 122.76	 6.65	 6.57	 12.96	 5.49	 4.72
	
1988	 121.68	 3.12	 3444.70	 52.99	 132.91	 8.27	 9.87	 19.74	 5.49	 4.54
	
1989	 128.85	 5.90	 3152.70	 -8.48	 151.96	 14.33	 1.45	 9.15	 5.74	 4.35
	
1990	 138.98	 7.86	 4015.90	 27.38	 185.33	 21.96	 -2.83	 5.60	 7.18	 4.71
	
1991	 137.20	 -1.28	 7818.00	 94.68	 280.00	 51.08	 -10.44	 -2.19	 12.12.
	





________ tcredr	 peredr	 gcredr	 gdefr	 gdefy	 peredrt	 gcredrt	 ir	 ipubr	 iprivr
	
________	 J$m	 J$m	 Jm	 J$m	 gdeflgdp	 ratio	 ratio	 J$m	 J$m	 J$m -
	
1960	 8.38	 13.96	 -558	 0.85	 0.010	 1.665	 -0.665	 18.47.	 _______
	
1961	 14.87	 14.52	 0.35	 1.80	 0.021	 0.976	 0.024	 17.67.	 _______
	
1962	 16.80	 13.63	 3.17	 2.12	 0.024	 0.811	 0.189	 1708.	 ______
	
1963	 15.76	 12.37	 3.39	 1.89	 0.021	 0.785	 0.215	 16.13.	 _______
	
1964	 20.68	 16.52	 4.16	 2.39	 0.026	 0.799	 0.201	 19.15.	 _______
	
1965	 22.10	 19.58	 2.51	 2.39	 0.024	 0.886	 0.114	 19.88.	 _______
	
- 1966	 22.12	 20.45	 1.66	 2.81	 0.027	 0925	 0.075	 23.00 ________ _______
	
1967	 24.29	 21.47	 2.82	 3.42	 0.031	 0.884	 0.116	 . 25.99	 5.67	 20.12
	
1968	 28.10	 24.06	 4.04	 4.17	 0.037	 0.856	 0.144	 31.90	 6.98	 24.92
	
1969	 34.52	 31.98	 2.54	 2.67	 0.021	 0.926	 0.074	 45.50	 7.17	 38.33
	
1970	 36.16	 31.89	 4.27	 3.60	 0.027	 0.882	 0.118	 41.93	 8.30	 33.64
	
1971	 41.52	 35.44	 6.08	 5.16	 0.037	 0.853	 0.147	 44.44	 9.63	 34.81
	
1972	 54.03	 43.02	 11.01	 6.08	 0.041	 0.796	 0.204	 40.33	 1061	 29.71
	
1973	 53.07	 41.30	 11.77	 7.87	 053	 0.778	 0.222	 47.13	 13.22	 33.91
	
45.62	 38.15	 7.46	 11.48	 0.078	 0.836	 0.164	 35.91	 19.28	 16.63
	
(975	 55.34	 37.85	 17.49	 12.00	 0.079	 0.684	 0.316	 39.04	 20.39	 18.65
	
1976	 63.75	 33.46	 30.30	 22.20	 0.155	 0.525	 0.475	 26.06	 19.35	 6.71
	
1977	 64.34	 26.34	 38.00	 20.44	 0.145	 0.409	 0.591	 17.28	 19.88	 -2.60
	
61.38	 23.45 - 37.93	 22.11	 0.167	 0.382	 0.618	 19.88	 19.14	 0.74
	
1979	 69.26	 21.51	 47.75	 17.98	 0.153	 0.311	 0.689	 22.53	 16.86	 5.67
	
- 1980	 57.04	 19.67	 37.36	 21.23	 0.207	 0.345	 0.655	 16.34	 12.92	 3.42
	
ii	 72.50	 23.69	 48.81	 16.71	 0.165	 0.327	 0.673	 20.57	 12.45	 8.12
	
1982	 82.55	 3033	 52.22	 16.06	 0.153	 0.367	 0.633	 21.96	 12.06	 9.89
	
96.56	 34.29	 62.26	 15.12	 0.135	 0.355	 0.645	 24.99	 12.11	 12.88
	
1984	 8465	 31.35	 53.30	 16.18	 0.138	 0.370	 0.630	 27.20	 9.82	 17.38
	
1985	 64.82	 26.13	 38.69	 20.03	 0.179	 0.403	 0.597	 28.37	 8.74	 19.63
	
1986	 66.00	 27.33	 38.67	 11.30	 0.097	 0.414	 0.586	 22.36	 8.86	 13.50
	
1987	 55.46	 32.95	 22.50.	 .________	 0.594	 0.406	 30.14	 9.47	 20.67
	
ji	 52.71	 42.80	 9.91 ._______ ._______	 0.812	 0.188	 37.60	 13.05	 24.55
	
1989	 50.12	 48.90	 1.22._______ ._______	 0.976	 0.024	 44.03 ._______ _______
	
1990	 39.00	 4724	 -8.25.	 ._______	 1.212	 -0.212	 46.04.	 _______
	
1991	 25.98	 43.26	 -17.29.	 ._______	 1.666	 -0.665	 43.25.	 _______
	




THE EFFECTS OF CAPITAL FLOWS AND FOREIGN DEBT ON SAVINGS,
IN VESTMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
5.1.	 Introduction
Foreign capital flows to developing countries form part of international saving, and are
seen by recipient countries as a source of fmance for economic growth. However, international
saving/gnp ratios fell between 1968 and 1988 (Aghevli et. al., 1990), particularly the saving
ratio of the industrialised countries as a group, which declined from 25 to 20 per cent. Fry
(1995) in part attributes the decline in global saving to rising government deficits in many
countries, the re-unification of Germany, the re-construction of Eastern Europe and deliberate
policies by Japan, Korea and Taiwan to reduce their (balance of payments) current accounts.
Shrinking world savings implies that not all countries can increase their use of foreign capital
inflows to sustain domestic investment in excess of domestic saving. Developing countries as a
whole are faced with reduced availability of foreign savings at a higher cost. Fry (1995)
estimates that real world interest rates have risen from 1.5 per cent during 1970-1980, to 4.8
per cent over the period 1981-1991.
Developing countries have been forced to improve their saving effort (s) or reduce




where s, i, and sf are respectively, ratios of domestic savings, investment and foreign savings
to GDP. The structural adjustment measures adopted usually include efforts to lower the
current account deficit by boosting exports or lowering imports, or both. Reducing investment
and imports is likely to have an adverse effect on economic growth, while increasing exports is
likely to stimulate growth.
Despite shrinking overall savings from the industrialised countries, a change in the
composition of capital inflows might have a beneficial impact on growth. In the aftermath of
the debt crisis of the 1980s, many developing countries sought to encourage foreign direct
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investment as a replacement for foreign borrowing. The accumulation of foreign debt by
developing countries can inhibit growth by placing a repayment burden on domestic savings,
and can also adversely affect a country's credit-worthiness and its access to additional foreign
capital if its indebtedness is too high. On the other hand, foreign direct investment appears to
be more attractive, as it involves a risk-sharing relationship with foreign investors without the
build-up of debt and its growth-inhibiting effects, 1and may also be directed at more profitable
opportunities.
Capital inflows in Jamaica grew steadily during the 1 960s and the first half of the
1970s. Thereafter they behaved erratically as political instability undermined both domestic
confidence and foreign direct investment. At the same time as foreign direct investment became
unpredictable, foreign loans to the public sector increased substantially during the period 1975
to 1989, mainly under 1MF and World Bank programmes. Foreign public debt stood at around
103 million Jamaica dollars in 1970. By 1989 foreign public debt outstanding was 2.9 billion
Jamaica dollars.
This chapter examines the effect of foreign capital flows and foreign debt on savings,
investment and economic growth. In so doing, a brief review of the relevant theoretical and
empirical literature is presented. Sections (5.2) and (5.3) consider the effect of foreign capital
inflows and foreign debt on domestic savings and investment respectively. In addition, the
question raised by Fry (1995) concerning the stabilising or destabilismg effect of foreign
capital inflows (in the sense of improving or worsening the balance of payments), is examined.
Section (5.4) analyses the impact of both foreign capital inflows and capital outflows (including
capital flight), on economic growth. In order to take account of the effect of capital flight and
capital outflows in general on growth, the concept of the net transfer of resources is considered.
In the presence of financial repression capital flight may take place in various ways, such as
through the over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports. Pastor (1990) argues
that capital flight retards growth not only because part of domestic savings is no longer
available for investment, but also because capital flight reduces the amount of foreign exchange
available for imports of intermediate goods.
1 Hower repatriated profits may in time equal or exceed foreign debt service oufflows.
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Section (5.5) examines the empirical evidence regarding the effect of capital flows and
foreign debt on savings, investment and growth in Jamaica. Section 5.6 summarises the main
fmdings and conclUsions of the chapter.
5.2.	 The Effect Of Foreij'n Capital In flows and Forei., Debt On Domestic SavinRs
Two broad views of the effect of foreign capital inflows on domestic savings have been
put forward in the economic literature. The first holds that foreign capital inflows have a
positive and possibly stabilismg impact on domestic savings. Foreign capital inflows are
assumed to be used only for investment, relieving the constraint on domestic savings
experienced by many developing countries. The analysis is often conducted in a dual-gap
framework in which the two resource gaps are the savings and foreign exchange gaps (Chenery,
et al 1966; Thirlwall, 1989).
In the second view, foreign capital inflows may be used in part for consumption and
may lower domestic savings by encouraging consumption. In addition, (Fry, 1995) argues that
the negative effect of foreign capital on domestic savings can be de-stabilising. Savings ratios
can decline significantly and current account 2 deficits widen substantially, even in the presence
of high real interest rates.
The dual-gap model assumes that domestic savings cannot be substituted for foreign
savings. Many developing countries face a foreign currency shortage which cannot be met by
simply transferring domestic savings into foreign currency. In the long run export performance
may need to be improved and import ratios reduced. However, in the short run the foreign
exchange constraint can be overcome by foreign capital inflows.
In addition to the foreign exchange gap, a country may experience a shortage of
domestic savings relative to a given investment ratio required for a particular target rate of





2 .of the balance of payments.
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where g is the growth rate, is the incremental output-capital ratio, and s is the domestic
savings ratio (to GDP).
If the foreign savings ratio to GDP (sO is positive and a: and s do not decline then the
foreign savings ratio becomes an additional stimulant to growth:




If the target growth rate is set at 
g* 
then the required savings ratio is S	 . However, if
actual savings fall short of required savings, then the savings gap has to be fmanced by foreign
savings: s - S sf.
Considering the relationship between imports and growth, the rate of growth may also




where 3 is the incremental output-import ratio and m is the import-GDP ratio. Once again, sf




If actual imports that can be fmanced by exports fall short of the level of imports (m*) required
for the target rate of growth, then: m* - m = sf. In order to achieve the target rate of growth,
foreign savings must relieve either the savings or the foreign exchange constraint.
One of the problems with the above dual-gap analysis is that even though foreign
capital inflows are apparently of the right magnitude to fmance some given growth rate, there
may be an adverse effect on s, c,or m. Such an adverse effect of foreign savings may offset
any positive impact on growth. Alternatively, foreign savings might work in the opposite
direction and have an even more beneficial effect on growth.
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Griffm (1970) argues that some proportion of foreign capital inflows (say a), will be
consumed rather than invested. Consequently, the increase in the growth rate in equation (5.3)
is "(1 - a)fs&', where a is the proportion of foreign savings consumed and is assumed to have
the property 0 < a < 1, The expression (1 - a)fscr, is lower than sfc. Foreign savings still
have a positive effect on growth, but they can have a negative effect on domestic savings.
Griffm argues that high levels of foreign capital inflows to the public sector can cause the
government to lower its savings effort and increase its consumption. In addition, the saving
effort of the private sector may be reduced if finance becomes too easy as a result of substantial
foreign inflows. Also, the availability of foreign savings may allow the government to maintain
an overvalued exchange rate thereby stimulating imports, discouraging exports and reducing
domestic savings.
Griffm also suggests that foreign capital to the public sector is often used for political
projects or for economic infrastructure. Such projects have low output-capital ratios which
may lower the variable cr in equation (5.3), and reduce the impact of foreign savings on growth.
However, Kennedy and Thirlwall (1971) argue that the overall output-capital ratio of the
economy may rise because of the external benefits of infrastructural projects which admittedly
have low output-capital ratios.
Weisskopf (1972) argues that given domestic income, the partial use of foreign savings
for consumption reduces planned domestic savings. He tests the impact of foreign savings on
domestic savings in 17 saving-constrained developing countries for the period 1953-1966. The
following are his results using panel data for the above period across the 17 countries:
S = a + 0.183 (Y) - 0.227 (F) + 0.176 (E)
(6.59)	 (-5.3)	 (4.6)	 (5.6)
where S is domestic savings, Y is GDP, F is foreign savings, E is exports, and the t-statistics
are in brackets. Weisskopf interprets the negative coefficient on F to mean that some
proportion of foreign savings, in this case 22.7 per cent, is being consumed. Foreign capital
reduces domestic savings by roughly the amount of the foreign capital that is used for
consumption. Newlyn (1985) also holds the view that in equations like (5.6) the coefficient on
foreign savings should be interpreted as the marginal propensity to consume out of foreign
savings.
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The view of Griffm (1970) and Weisskopf (1972) that foreign savings have a negative
impact on domestic savings has been challenged on both theoretical and statistical grounds.
Polak (1989) argues for a more dynamic approach since the productive investment of foreign
savings would give rise to an increase in savings over time and to a lesser need for foreign
capital. In addition aid, a component of foreign savings, is often allocated on the basis of need,
the detennination of which makes use of various criteria including domestic savings rates. The
lower the rate the higher the amount of aid that would be forthcoming. Kennedy and Thirlwall
(1971) make a similar point.
A negative relationship between domestic savings and foreign savings may well exist,
but Polak3 maintains that it certainly does not imply any causal link from foreign to domestic
savings. Indeed, for the reasons described in the preceding paragraph the direction of causation
may well be from domestic savings to foreign savings. Bowles (1987) uses Granger causality
tests on data for 20 developing countries for the period 1961-1981, in order to determine the





A	 A-C+yI—I	 +2	 (5.8)
t-1
where	 is the ratio of domestic savings to income, and	 is the foreign exchange ratio. No
correlation between domestic and foreign savings was found in half the countries, while two-
way Granger causality was found in two countries. Domestic savings were found to have a
positive impact on foreign savings in three countries, while foreign savings were found to have
a negative impact on domestic savings in five countries, In general the relationship between
foreign and domestic savings seemed to depend on the circumstances of particular countries.
Op. Cit.
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Fry (1995) argues that foreign savings in the form of foreign loans to the public sector
can either raise or reduce domestic savings depending on the size of the public debt. If
outstanding debt is at a relatively moderate level, an increase will cause domestic real interest
rates to rise moderately to compensate foreign capital owners for a higher perceived risk from
possible default. He contends that moderately higher interest rates stimulate savings4 and have
a negative but small effect on investment and growth. The negative effect is not large enough
to offset the effect on savings. The overall effect is a positive one between debt and savings. A
rise in debt in one period leads to an increase in savings in the next.
Fry5also argues that on the other hand, high levels of public debt have two effects.
Firstly, they cause bigger rises in interest rates and reductions in investment and growth, which
in turn reduce savings (ie shift the savings function). The reduction in savings more than
offsets the rise in quantities saved as represented by the movements along the relevant savings
curve.
Secondly, Fry (1995) argues that savers may perceive that a high and rising foreign
debt ratio may lead to measures, including devaluation, to stimulate exports. The real return on
assets held abroad may then be relatively higher than the return on domestic assets (ceteris
paribus). The result might be capital flight perhaps undertaken via the mechanisms of under-
invoicing of exports and over-invoicing of imports. Measured domestic savings would then be
reduced. As domestic savings are measured by investment less the (negative of the) current
account deficit, capital flight would reduce measured savings.
In general Fry's view is that low levels of debt could lead to a positive correlation
between public sector foreign borrowing and domestic savings, while high outstanding debt
gives rise to a negative correlation. It is the level of outstanding debt that influences the
behaviour of economic agents and gives rise to a positive or negative relationship between debt
and savings. In a panel study of 28 developing countries for the periodl967-1985, Fry (1995)
finds that on average, higher foreign debt increases national savings at debt-GNP ratios below
0.314, while debt ratios above 0.314 reduce national savings.
' We have already found in Chapter 3 that this does not hold for Jamaica.
Op. Cit.
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Given our finding in Chapter Three that the real interest rate has no significant effect
on saving in Jamaica, we would not expect debt to affect savings via the interest rate, as argued
by Fry (1995). However, we found in Chapter Four that high public debt ratios widen the
government deficit, which in turn lowers investment and growth particularly as private
investment is crowded out by public investment which is less efficient than private investment.
Since savings are largely determined by income as found in Chapter Three, lower growth is
inimical to savings. Ultimately then, high public debt ratios built up to fmance high public
deficits, might have an adverse effect on savings.
Chapters three and four also found that high interest rates discourage investment. If
high interest rates are required to compensate foreign creditors for increased loans, domestic
investment might fall. This might in turn lead to lower savings. Thus higher debt might have a
negative effect on domestic savings via its effect on investment. Also, as discussed above, Fry
argues that higher debt might lower measured savings in the presence of capital flight (if such
outflows are effected via under and over invoicing of exports and imports respectively), In
addition, actual savings might decline since capital flight represents lost resources that might
otherwise have been savedlinvested.
The view that foreign savings have a negative impact on domestic savings has also been
challenged on statistical grounds. Polak (11987), Thirlwall (1989) and Chandavarkar (1990),
all argue that the perceived negative relationship between foreign and domestic savings is
unreliable. This is so because of the way in which domestic savings are measured and the link
between domestic and foreign savings in the national accounts.
Returning to identity (1), domestic saving S (where S Y-C = I + X - M from the
national accounts) is equal to investment less foreign savings, where foreign savings is the
negative of the current account deficit:
S = I - SF
	
(1)
Domestic saving remains constant if an increase in foreign saving is fully invested. However, if
some proportion of an increase in foreign saving is consumed, then domestic saving would have
to decline in order to maintain the identity. Thus in a statistical sense, a negative correlation
between foreign savings and domestic savings is inevitable. In effect, at least in terms of how
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they are measured, domestic savings and foreign savings are not independent of one another, In
view of this link several studies have attempted to examine the role of foreign savings, not as an
exogenous determinant of domestic savings, but as an endogenous variable detennined
simultaneously with domestic savings.
Morisset (1989) tests the endogeneity of foreign savings on data for Argentina over the
period 1960-1981. Morisset examines the dependence of domestic savings and foreign savings
separately, on a selection of internal and external factors. The internal factors used were the
rate of growth of the money supply (u), and the public sector deficit (B). They were chosen for
their importance as monetary and fiscal instruments used by the government in its conduct of
economic policy. The external factors were variations in the tenns of trade (1'), and changes in
external interest rates (r*), and were chosen because they seemed to "hit Argentina with the
greatest force" over the period. Ordinary least squares estimation was used and the results are
as follows:
S = 10.13 - 0.0341' - 0.747B + 0.034u + 0.200r
(1.37)	 (2.03)	 (6.15)	 (1.72)
R2 = 0.88,	 D W = 1.67	 (5.9)
where S is gross domestic savings. The results of regressing foreign savings on the same
independent variables are as follows:
F = -1.54 + 0.01221' + 0.674B + 0.0085u + O.150r
(0.07)	 (2.72)	 (2.26)	 (1.90)
R2 = 0.42,	 DW= 1.66	 (5.10)
Morisset finds that the estimated coefficients on the internal factors are all significant.
Fiscal policy affects S negatively and F positively, while monetary policy affects both S and F
positively. The terms of trade do not seem to have any effect on S and F, while changes in the
external interest rate have positive effects on S and F but are not significant at the 5 per cent
level.
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Morisset concludes that both S and F are determined simultaneously by exogenous
monetary and fiscal policies, and that the perceived causal relationship between foreign and
domestic savings had been misrepresented in the past. He also suggests that excluding
significant explanatory variables from equations purporting to explain domestic savings might
give undue weight to the importance of foreign savings. He regresses domestic savings on
foreign savings, with and without other key variables such as the inflation rate, the export
growth rate, the real interest rate, and foreign savings disaggregated into Aid and Foreign
Direct Investment. The inclusion of the additional variables resulted in foreign savings losing
its statistical significance.
Snyder (1990) tests the proposition that both the domestic savings ratio and the aid
ratio are determined by per capita income. He regresses the savings ratio on per capita income
and the aid ratio for fifty low and middle income countries over the period 1960-1983. He in
turn regresses the aid ratio on per capita income and the savings ratio. Snyder does not find
any significant relationship between aid and domestic savings. However, he does fmd that per
capita income has a positive and statistically significant effect on both domestic and foreign
savings. He suggests that the negative correlation between foreign and domestic savings
reported in the economic literature is spurious, and that both those variables are simultaneously
determined by per capita income.
The majority of studies on the role of foreign savings on domestic savings have either
considered aggregate foreign savings or have chosen a single component of foreign capital
inflows, such as foreign loans, foreign direct investment, foreign aid, etc. Foreign savings may
be disaggregated into public sector foreign debt, public sector grants, private direct investment,
private sector loans, and changes in foreign exchange reserves, and they could have varying
effects on savings. The problem of course is that reliable and comprehensive disaggregated
data are not always available for developing countries. Also, the precise reasons underlying the
effects of disaggregated foreign savings variables may be less obvious. For instance Papaneck
(1973) fmds a negative correlation between aid, and foreign private investment and other
foreign inflows on the one hand, and savings on the other in his study on Latin America. Data
unavailability precluded further disaggregation. He argues that the sign on the aid coefficient
may be caused by both aid and savings being co-determined by exogenous factors. However,
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he explains away the negative coefficient on foreign private investment by suggesting that it
may be overestimated. Given GDP, measured savings might be lower.
Fry (1995) tests the simultaneous impact of foreign direct investment and foreign
liabilities on the national savings ratio for a panel of 16 developing countries between 1965 and
1988. The results are as follows:
SNY = - 0.650 (FD1Y) - 0.021 (FLY).. 1 + 0.155 (YG)
(-6.845)	 (-3.651)	 (8.420)





where the t-statistics are in brackets below the coefficients, (SNY) is the national savings ratio,
(FDIY) is the ratio of foreign direct investment to GNP, (FLY) is the ratio of net foreign
liabilities (or net foreign debt) to GNP, (YG) is the growth rate of GNP, and (RW) is a proxy
for the world interest rate. Increases in both the foreign debt and foreign direct investment
ratios reduce the national savings ratio
Fry divides the 16 countries into 5 Pacific Basin countries and a "control" group
comprising the other 11. When the regression is re-run for each group, he finds that foreign
direct investment in the Pacific Basin countries does not have any significant effect on savings.
It is foreign direct investment in the other countries (mainly Latin American) that is
responsible for the strong negative effect for the group as a whole. He further allows the
foreign direct investment ratio to interact with variables representing the black market exchange
premium, the degree of openness of the economy, the investment climate, and the lagged foreign
debt ratio. Fry finds that a poor investment climate and a small degree of openness have a
negative effect on national savings. In such circumstances, an appropriate policy stance would
be to improve domestic confidence and the climate for investment, and induce greater openness
of the economy to competitive external forces.
In the light of the various studies reviewed above, section 5.5.2 examines the question
of whether or not foreign capital inflows have any effect on domestic savings in Jamaica. In
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addition, foreign capital inflows are broken down into public sector inflows comprising
government borrowing and grants, and private inflows comprising foreign direct investment and
private unrequited inflows. The effect of the components of capital inflows on domestic
savings is also tested in section 5.5.2.
5.3	 Foreign Savings, Foreign Debt and Investment
The effects of foreign savings on investment seem to depend on the type of foreign
savings and, some authors maintain, on the recipient sector. Foreign savings in the form of
loans, aid or foreign direct investment have different effects on investment. In addition, as
described earlier in this chapter, the dual-gap framework assumes that foreign savings does not
affect the output-capital ratio. Others argue that the productivity of capital (ie the inverse of
the output-capital ratio) is affected, depending on whether the private or public sector is the
recipient of the foreign savings. Irrespective of the effect of foreign savings on the quantity of
investment, the quality of investment and therefore economic growth may still be affected by
changes in the capital-output ratio.
Massell, et. al. (1972) test the proposition that foreign capital inflows have a positive
effect on capital formation, since they reduce the foreign exchange constraint and permit
imports, including imports of intermediate goods, to increase. Their panel study on 11 Latin
American countries covers the period 1955-1966. The dependent variable is the change in
domestic investment, while the explanatory variables are changes in exports (Ax), net public
capital inflows (AG) and net private capital inflows (AP):
AI = 0.23 + 0.093 (AX) + 0.36 (AG) + 0.38 (AG)..1
(1.38)	 (1.43)	 (1.27)	 (1.39)





Public sector capital inflows are not statistically significant, indicating in the view of Massell
et. at. that public foreign savings are used in long-term projects. Short-run changes in
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investment are not heavily influenced by public foreign savings. On the other hand, there is a
tendency for private foreign savings to go directly into investment.
Fry (1995) argues that foreign debt accumulation and foreign direct investment have
different effects on domestic investment. In its early stages, foreign public debt accumulation
can stimulate investment if the government attempts to raise foreign exchange earnings as debt
service increases. Businesses may perceive the existence of potentially profitable opportunities
in the export sector. In addition, the overall productivity of capital may rise as a result of the
external benefits of infrastructural projects on which foreign public loans are usually spent.
As the stock of debt becomes large, debt accumulation may have a negative effect on
domestic investment. High debt-service obligations may reduce the resources and incentives to
the private sector and curtail their desire to increase investment (Fry, 1995, Krueger 1987).
The possibility of higher taxes in the future to help finance the debt may even reduce current
investment.
Fry tests these conflicting influences of foreign debt accumulation on investment. Both
the government debt and the debt ratio squared are included as explanatory variables in the
following investment equation which employs panel data:
(IKY) = 0.323 (YG) - 0.058 (RW) + 0.035 (TTL)1
(3.065)	 (-1.223)	 (4.429)
+ 0.033 (REXL) + 0102 (DETY) - 0.093 (DETY)
(1.728)	 (2.794)	 (-2.308)
- 0.033 (DCGR) + 0.029 (DCPY) + 0.667 (IK).1
R2 = 0.862	 Q(4) = 13.257	 (5.13)
The sample covers a selection of 28 developing countries with the data spanning the period
1967-1985. (IKY) is the ratio of domestic investment to GNP, (YG) is the rate of growth of
GNP, (RW) is a proxy for the world real interest rate 6, (TTL) is the terms of trade in natural
6 RW is the 6-month LIBOR deposit rate of interest minus US inflation, continuously compoundei
160
logarithms7, (KEXL) is the real bilateral exchange rate with the US dollar, (DCGR) is the ratio
of net domestic credit to government to total domestic credit, and (DCPY) is domestic credit to
the private sector/GNP. The t- statistics are in parentheses beneath the coefficients, and the
Box-Pierce Q statistic indicates the absence of any significant serial correlation.
Fry fmds that the investment ratio is increased by faster growth in real (YG),
improvements in the terms of trade (TTL) in the previous time period, and higher real exchange
rates (REXL) which make imported intermediate goods cheaper. Changes in real domestic
credit to the private sector (DCPY) have a positive but insignificant effect on investment, while
the net government credit ratio (DCGR) reduces investment possibly by crowding out private
investment.
Fry finds that the foreign debt ratio (DETY)2 reduces the investment ratio after
debt/GNP exceeds 0.54 for the reasons described above. When the debt ratio is lower than that
critical value, (DETY) tends to raise the investment ratio, again for the reasons cited above.
Turning now to the role of foreign direct investment, the majority of studies seem to
take it for granted that an increase in private direct foreign investment has a direct impact on
capital formation and automatically increases investment. However, Dooley (1990) points out
that foreign direct investment is a flow-of-funds concept and that a high degree of fungibility
and substitutability is associated with such flows. Consequently, foreign direct investment may
simply substitute some other flow without increasing capital formation.
In addition, there are costs associated with foreign direct investment that may distort
the domestic economy and affect the domestic investment climate. Not only do repatriated
profits increase at higher levels of foreign-owned capital, but the programme of incentives to
reduce the risk to foreign direct capital may have an adverse impact on domestic investment.
In general foreign direct investment may be autonomous by increasing capital
formation, may be accommodating by providing additional balance of payments fmancing, or
neither if it offsets a decline in some other kind of capital flow.8
7 .The export price index/import price index.
S Fry (1995), p.86
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Fry (1995) uses iterative three-stage least squares on panel data to estimate investment
and to test the effects of foreign debt and foreign direct investment on the domestic investment
ratio for 16 developing countries over the period 1965-1988. He finds that both foreign debt
and foreign direct investment have a significant negative effect on domestic investment.
Fry splits his sample into two subsets: one containing five Pacific Basin countries and
the other having the eleven remaining countries. The Pacific Basin countries are Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.
Fry fmds that the significant negative effect of foreign direct investment on domestic
investment can be attributed to the remaining group of eleven countries comprising mainly
Latin American countries. He argues that in many of those countries foreign direct investment
was explicitly used for debt-equity swaps and not to stimulate capital formation. Indeed,
capital formation fell as potential domestic investors took a wait and see attitude to the
privatisation and reform measures that accompanied the debt-equity swaps.
Fry also finds that foreign direct investment stimulates domestic investment, in the
Pacific Basin countries, and argues that foreign direct investment is not a close substitute for
other forms of capital flowing into those economies as found by Rana and Dowling (1990).
The stable investment and macroeconomic climate associated with those countries over the
period may have contributed to the stimulating effect of foreign direct investment on domestic
investment.
Section 5.5.3 considers the empirical evidence on Jamaica, concerning the effect of
foreign capital, its components (particularly foreign direct investment) and the stock of foreign
debt, on domestic investment.
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5.4	 Capital Flight, the Net Transfer of Resources and Economic Growth
As seen in sections 5.1 and 5.2 of this chapter, net foreign savings allow investment to
take place in excess of domestic savings (see equation 5.1). However, the extent to which
investment in turn affects economic growth depends on the magnitude of offsetting factors. In
particular, a decrease in domestic savings, leakages of savings out of the economic system, or a
lowering of the output - capital ratio (see equation 5.3 above), will reduce any stimulating
effect of foreign savings on investment and growth. Earlier sections of this chapter examined
the debate on the question of the effect of foreign capital inflows on savings. The debate on the
effect of foreign savings on the output - capital ratio was also considered. This section
examines the effect of foreign savings on growth, taking into account the role of net outflows of
factor incomes and capital flight.
Whether or not foreign capital inflows have an adverse impact on the saving motives of
domestic economic agents, possible leakages of savings imply a smaller pool of domestic
resources available for investment. "Legal" leakages might include interest payments on
external debt, repatriated profits, and other net factor payments abroad. They may also have
an adverse effect on growth if they become a drain on foreign exchange and hinder imports of
intermediate goods (Pastor, 1990). The greater the stock of external debt or foreign direct
investment accumulated from past capital inflows, the higher will be the outflow of resources
required to service the debt or provide profit income to foreign owners of capital.
Capital flight may also constrain investment and growth by reducing available
resources, including foreign exchange. It is difficult to distinguish between capital flight -
"abnormal" speculative flows - and "normal" movements of international capital. Various
definitions of capital flight give widely differing estimates of its magnitude (Khan and UI
Haque, 1985; Dooley, 1988; Warman, 1993). The precise definition and measurement of
capital flight should not be arrived at "independently of the policy question that inspired
concern with the issue in the first place" (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1990). Alternative measures
of capital flight will be examined later in this section.
Capital flight may be encouraged by an inhospitable domestic investment climate which
in turn may affect business confidence adversely. Political instability often contributes to the
decline in confidence, as do well-intentioned but detrimental economic policies. In the context
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of our discussion on the effect of foreign savings on growth, Fry (1985) argues that savers may
expect the government to devalue a country's currency and take other measures to reduce the
current account in the face of a high and rising foreign debt. A devaluation would raise the real
return on assets held abroad and lower the return on domestic assets, thereby encouraging
capital flight. Looked at in this way, capital flight may be associated with foreign savings in
the form of high and increasing levels of foreign debt.
5.4.1 Foreign Capital Flows, Factor Payments and Economic Growth
It has been suggested in the previous sub-section that any positive effect of net capital
inflows9 on growth may be offset by net outflows of factor incomes. Of particular relevance
are interest payments to service foreign debt and profit remittances to owners of capital. Bacha
(1992) makes use of the concept of "net transfers" which dates back to the 1920's (Keynes,
1929; Ohlin, 1929), to take account of the net factor income flows. Net  transfers (N) are
defmed as the difference between net capital inflows (F)'° and net factor services to abroad (J):
N - F - J.
Bacha 1 ' argues that most developing economies are credit-constrained in the sense that
foreign capital inflows (F) are determined by decisions made abroad. In addition, net factor
income flows (J) depend on the accumulated external debt of the particular country concerned
and on world interest rates. Therefore (J) is also given for most developing countries.
Therefore, net transfers are beyond the control of developing countries and their dependence on
decision makers abroad imposes limitations on the capacity of developing countries to spend,
invest and grow. In assessing the impact of foreign capital inflows on investment and growth,
not only are net transfers (N) the relevant variable, but their effects on investment and growth
are determined by factors exogenous to the economy.
Bacha's approach may be criticised on two grounds. Firstly, although the use of net
transfers instead of net capital inflows seems appropriate, the analysis of (F) is undertaken only
9 .i.e. net of capital oufflows. Net capital inflows are used as our proxy for foreign savings.
'°Where (F) is equivalent to the excess of imports over exports of goods and non-factor services, with an opposite
sign. F includes the change in international reserves of the Central Bank
11 Op. Cit.
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in terms of debt and that of (J) only in terms of interest (and related) income flows. Other
forms of capital inflow (F) are not explicitly analysed: foreign direct investment, aid, etc., nor
are other kinds of factor payment flows such as profit income. The economic behaviour of
owners of capital in the form of foreign direct investment and of factor income in the form of
profits, may well give rise to a different outcome for (N) than if debt and interest income alone
are considered. The implications for investment and growth may also be different.
Secondly, the assumption that foreign capital inflows and net factor income flows are
exogenous is not supported by several studies examined in section 5.3. (Morisset, 1989;
Snyder, 1990; Fry, 1995).
ThirIwall (1994) develops a model of capital imports and growth, which makes use of
the concept of the net transfer of resources. He shows that capital imports stimulate real output
growth if new inflows of foreign capital are greater than the outflow of domestic saving to pay
interest. However, if interest payments are fmanced by new borrowing, foreign capital inflows
always have a positive effect on growth. In addition, ThirIwall 12 also shows that higher growth
of national income occurs if the productivity of capital imports exceeds the rate of interest. His
model is as follows:
0 = V + rD
	
(5.14)
where 0 is domestic output, Y is national income, r is the average rate of interest on foreign
borrowing, and D is external debt. Factor payments abroad represented by rD, make up the
difference between national income and domestic output. Given the interest rate on foreign
borrowing, a change in output can be expressed as:
= AY + rAP	 (5.15)
where A represents a change in output, income or debt. However, by defmition a change in






where is the productivity of capital. Investment is in turn financed by saving out of output
and foreign debt net of that proportion of foreign interest payments that would otherwise have
been saved:
I sO + AD - srD
	
(5.17)
where s is the propensity to save. Substituting equation (5.17) into (5.16) and dividing it by 0




Equation (5.18) shows that as long as capital inflows (AD) exceed that proportion of interest
payments on external loans that would otherwise have been saved (srD), output growth is
greater than that obtainable from domestic savings alone. If interest payments on foreign debt
are financed by more foreign borrowing, (rD = AD), foreign capital inflows will always have a
positive effect on growth (providing s<1 as is the case normally). In practice countries are not
permitted to reschedule their debts indefinitely and borrowing repeatedly to meet interest
payments may result in a loss of credit-worthiness.
Section 5.2 examined the debate surrounding the effect of foreign capital inflows on the
propensity to save and on the productivity of capital (the inverse of the capital-output ratio). If
capital inflows cause either ratio to fall, then the positive effect of capital imports on growth
outlined in equations (5. 14)-(5.18) may be partially or completely offset. Indeed, growth may
even decline if the reductions in cr and s are sufficiently large. Griffm (1970) and Weisskopf
(1972) argue that foreign capital inflows reduce savings, while Kennedy and Thirlwall (1971),
Polak (1989), Chandavarkar (1990) and Thirlwall (1994) argue the opposite and challenge the
findings of Griffm and Weisskopf on both statistical and theoretical grounds. The work of
Boules (1987) , Morisset (1989), Snyder (1990), Fry (1995) and others, suggests that
ultimately the question may be an empirical one which depends on prevailing economic
conditions. With regard to the productivity of capital cr, Griffin 13 argues that foreign capital
inflows reduce c because of the high capital intensity of projects financed by foreign capital.
13 op. Cit.
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Papanek (1973), Kennedy and ThirIwall (1971) and ThirIwall (1994) argue that, despite the
capital intensity of individual projects financed by foreign capital, the productivity of capital
for the economy as a whole is not necessarily adversely affected by capital imports. Indeed, it
may actually rise because of beneficial externalities and an improvement in the availability of
foreign exchange which allows more productive use to be made of capital resources as a whole.
Equation (5 18) shows the circumstances under which foreign capital inflows can
influence growth, taking into account interest payments on the accumulated foreign debt.
Foreign capital inflows on the one hand and factor payments on the other, include foreign debt
and interest payments respectively. Other forms of capital imports (eg FDI'4 and aid) and
factor payments (eg repatriated profits) are not explicit in the model, but may be taken into
account. The model gives important insights into the way in which foreign loans can stimulate
growth and the manner in which factor payments may moderate the positive effects of capital
imports.
Capital flight is not explicitly included in the net transfers concept used by Bacha
(1992) or the model developed by Thirlwall (1994), but it can be easily incorporated, There is
no generally accepted definition of capital flight and several alternative approaches have been
developed to measure its magnitude. It is undoubtedly important in many developing countries
where government policy and economic conditions in general encourage the export of capital to
avoid the risk of holding it in domestic assets. Capital flight reduces the resources available for
investment and growth, and ought to be taken into account in assessing the impact of net
transfers of resources on economic growth. The next sub-section examines the role of capital
flight, while section 5.5 incorporates capital flight In the models used to empirically test the
effect of capital inflows in Jamaica.
5.4.2 Capital Flight, Net Transfers of Resources and Economic Growth
Capital flight occurs "when the expected returns from holding money abroad are higher
or safer than at home" (World Bank, 1985).15 This motive for capital flight is close to the
definition given by Gibson and Tsakalotos (1990), that capital flight is a response on the part
14 oi Direct Investment.
World Development Report, 1985 (World Bank).
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of economic agents to a perceived increase in the risk of holding domestic assets. It is often
associated with a number of factors, including an overvalued exchange rate which lowers the
price of foreign relative to domestic assets.' 6 An overvalued exchange rate may also lead to the
expectation of a devaluation, thereby encouraging speculative capital outflows. A policy
reaction by the government to tighten exchange control may exacerbate the problem. High and
volatile inflation which creates uncertainty and reduces real interest rates may also encourage
capital flight, especially if it is accompanied by repressive fmancial policies that keep real
interest rates negative.
Knowing some of the factors that are often related to and often accompany capital
flight does not make its measurement any easier. Perhaps the view of Gibson and Tsakalotos
(1990) that the appropriate definition and measure of capital flight is probably related to the
policy question being considered, is the most useful approach to take. The question being
considered here is the extent to which capital flight reduces the resources (i.e. savings)
available to a country for investment and growth, and ultimately, what policy measures are
open to the government to tackle the problem. Some alternative measures of capital flight will
be examined below while the precise measure adopted will be dealt with in the next section on
the empirical findings for Jamaica.
Two broad approaches have been developed to measure capital flight: the direct and
indirect approaches. The latter does not distinguish between "abnormal" speculative flows and
flows associated with "normal" international capital movements. The World Bank (1985) uses
the indirect approach, defming capital flight as the sum of gross capital inflows (external debt
plus FDI) and the current account deficit, less increases in official foreign reserves. In effect,
capital inflows in excess of those used to fmance a current account deficit or an increase in
reserves must be held abroad by the private sector and is considered to be capital flight. The
Morgan Guaranty Trust method (Anthony and Hughes, 1992) subtracts the acquisition of short-
term fmancial assets by banks, on the grounds that they cannot be reasonably considered to be
capital flight.
An alternative to the indirect residual approach of the World Bank and Morgan
Guaranty, is the more direct approach taken by Dooley (1988) and Cuddington (1986). They
16 Gibson and Tsakalotos, op. cit.
168
make a distinction between "capital outflows motivated by normal portfolio decisions and those
based on the desire to place assets beyond the control of domestic authorities" (Dooley, 1988).
Dooley defines capital flight as the stock of claims on non-residents that do not generate
receipts of investment income that are recorded in the balance of payments accounts. Capital
flight is measured by the difference between total foreign claims- and that subset of foreign
assets that generate reported income. In addition, Dooley adds the errors and omissions figure
from the balance of payments accounts on the grounds that they represent capital flight, and the
difference between the World Bank's and the country's external debt figure on the assumption
that the' World Bank's figure is more accurate. Cuddington (1986) calculates capital flight by
adding only short-term private capital flows to net errors and omissions. His view is that
capital flight is essentially a short-term phenomenon.
Capital flight can be incorporated into the concept of the net transfer of resources
developed above. The balance of payments equation shows that the deficit on trade and
services (M - X) plus net factor payments (NFP) equal net capital inflows (F): (M - X) + NFP
= F.'7 Allowing for capital flight (KF), the equation shows that net foreign capital inflows
fmance the excess of imports over exports, net factor payments (to) abroad and capital flight:
F (M-X) + NFP + KF. From the point of view of analysing the impact of net capital inflows
on growth, Thirlwall's model (equations 5.14 - 5.18 above) can be amended. Capital flight, not
just net factor payments can be netted out of capital flows.
Equation (5.17) can be re-written as:
1s0+AF-sNFP-sKF	 (5.19)
where total net capital inflows (AF) have replaced the change in debt (AD), total net factor
payments (NFP) have replaced interest payments (rD), and sKF represents that proportion of
capital flight that would otherwise have been available for investment. Substituting equation




' Where F includes the change in international reserves.
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Equation (5.20) shows that as long as total capital inflows (AF) exceed that proportion of net
factor payments (including interest and capital flight that would otherwise have been saved),
output growth is greater than that obtainable from domestic savings alone. The equation also
shows that the positive effect of capital inflows on growth is reduced if capital flight and factor
payments other than interest are taken into account. Once again, if- total capital inflows finance
net factor payments and capital flight, then foreign capital inflows will always have a positive
effect on growth (providing s-<1). It is unlikely, however, that capital flight and net factor
payments will be financed by capital inflows for very long.
Net factor payments (NFP) are the sum of interest payments (rD), profit remittances
(Pf), worker remittances (wf) and other factor payments (OFP), with inflows being netted out
against outflows. If necessary capital flight would have to be net of incoming capital flight,
though this would be extremely difficult to measure and perhaps irrelevant in the context of a
developing country. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of inbound capital flight from other
countries if outbound capital flight is taking place - unless economic agents in other countries
perceive their own countries to be relatively more risky. In testing the model empirically,
foreign capital inflows may also be disaggregated in various ways depending on data
availability and the components that are deemed to be relevant for the particular analysis. For
example, (F) may comprise debt, aid and foreign direct investment (FDI), or a further
breakdown might include categories for long and short-term capital.
There are numerous studies of the effects of foreign interest payments and capital flight
on various aspects of the economies of developing countries. However, there are few empirical
studies of the effect of foreign capital inflows on real growth, that take into account the
offsetting effects of net factor payments and capital flight. Various studies (eg Rana and
Dowling, 1988), examine the effect of a reduction in savings associated with capital inflows on
the growth-inducing impact of foreign capital inflows in developing countries. Where
simultaneous equation models are used to test the impact of both capital imports and savings on
growth, the effect of capital inflows on growth is usually found to be positive but smaller than
would be the case without an offsettmg savings effect (Rana and Dowling, 1988; Gupta and
Islam, 1983).
The next section examines the empirical evidence on the effect of capital inflows on
saving, investment and growth in Jamaica.
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5.5	 Capital Inflows, Foreign Debt, Savings, In vestment And Growth In Jamaica: The
Empirical Evidence
This section examines the effect of capital inflows on savings, investment and growth in
Jamaica. Foreign capital inflows may encourage or discourage savings and as argued in the
previous section, the latter effect may occur if capital inflows stimulate domestic consumption
sufficiently.
The effect of foreign capital inflows on both the quantity and productivity of
investment, is also tested. A positive effect on the quantity of investment may well be offset by
a negative effect on the incremental output-capital ratio (10CR) 18 or alternatively may be
reinforced by a positive effect on the (10CR). Investment is itself an important stimulus to
growth, and the indirect effect of capital inflows on growth via their effect on the level and
productivity of investment is examined.
The direct impact of foreign capital on real growth is also examined, taking into
account the outflow of resources via net factor payments and capital flight. As argued in the
previous section, the net transfer of resources must be considered in examining the effect of
capital inflows on growth.
Capital inflows are disaggregated by class of recipient into private inflows and
government inflows. The former comprises foreign direct investment and other private capital,
less private unrequited transfer payments (to) abroad 19 while the latter is composed of
government loans and grants. The impact of total capital inflows and its components on
savings, investment and growth, is examined.
In addition, the effect of the stock of foreign government debt on savings is tested. Fry
(1995) argues that at low initial levels of debt, more debt could have a positive effect on
savings (see section 5.4), while a negative effect could occur as the stock of debt grows larger.
The effect of debt on investment and growth is also tested. Fry (1995) also argues that foreign
18 The (10CR) = the change in output divided by investment, measures the productivity of investment.
19 See section 5.5,1 for an explanation of the macroeconomic accounting framework.
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indebtedness can be destabilising if it persistently worsens the balance of payments current
account or stabilising if it improves the current account. Rising foreign indebtedness may
improve the current account thereby slowing down the subsequent buildup of foreign debt, if
investment is reduced (raised) by more (less) than savings. Conversely, rising foreign debt is
destabilising if savings contract more than investment, or if investment grows faster than
savings. The stabilising effect of foreign debt on the current account of Jamaica is tested in
this section.
The statistical technique employed is ordinary least squares, and both static and
dynamic specifications of various equations are tested. The dynamic versions capture both
short-run and long-run information on the different relationships being tested. The data set is
for the period 1960-1992, but in most instances the effective period is 1963-1989 because of
the lack of data. Only annual time series data are employed. The data are taken from the
following sources: International Monetary Fund electronic databank(1960-1990); International
Monetary Fund's international financial statistics (1960-1993); World Bank (1976, 1987,
1988/89, 1993); World Bank (1986/87 - 1993/94): United Nations (1960-1981; United Nations
(1982-1993); Government of Jamaica (1960-1992). The following subsection lays the
foundation for the ensuing empirical investigation by setting out the accounting framework used
to measure the various macroeconomic variables. All variables are measured in real terms by
deflating them by their appropriate price indexes.
5.5.1 The Macro-Economic Accounting Framework
A standard Macro-economic relationship views the current account surplus of the




where S is national saving, I is domestic investment and CA is the balance of payments current
account surplus. The current account surplus is itself (identically) equal to the negative of the
capital account including the change in reserves:
CA - (KI + A Res)	 (5.22)
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where KI is capital inflows (net of capital outflows), and ARes equals the net change in reserve
assets. A positive sign on ARes represents a depletion of reserves to fmance for example, a
current deficit. Capital inflows and the change in reserves may be lumped together as capital
and reserve inflows (KRI) which finance the current account. Equation (5.21) and identity
(5.22) together show that foreign capital allows investment to take place in excess of domestic
savings:







where KRI represents foreign capital inflows or foreign savings. Equation (5.23b) is the same
as equation (5.1).




M - X + NFP + KF KR! 	 (5.24b)
where X, M, and NFP represent exports of goods and non-factor services, imports of goods and
non-factor services , and net factor payments2° respectively, all in real terms. Public
unrequited transfers (or external grants to the government) are included in capital inflows KRI
in order to measure their impact on savings, investment and growth (see below) 21 . Capital
flight (KF) could have been included on the right-hand side of the identity, but it is preferable
to show it as a leakage from the current account. The advantage gained from doing so is that
identity (5 .24b) can then be interpreted as follows: capital inflows KM fmance the excess of
imports over exports of goods and non-factor services, net factor payments, and capital flight.
20 Income payments abroad by owners of labour, capital, etc. less income receipts from abroad by the factors
of production.
21 In addition, for present purposes private unrequited transfer payments (to) abroad (PUT) are included in
the measurement of KRI but with a negative sign. In the case of Jamaica (PUT) represents a net inflow of
private unrequited transfers (ie. A negative outflow), justifying its inclusion in KRI rather than the left-hand
side of the identity.
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Capital inflows (KR!) are explicitly calculated from the balance of payments accounts,
and comprise capital inflows to the government (GKI) and private capital inflows (PKI).
Private capital inflows are in turn composed of foreign direct investment (FDI) and other
capital flows to the private sector (PKBAL), less private unrequited transfer payments (to)
abroad (PUT). Capital inflows to the government comprise borrowing from abroad (GVB) and
foreign grants to the government (GGR) 22. Since KRI, M, X, and NFP are explicitly
calculated, and all entries on the balance of payments account are included, capital flight (KF)
is the residual. One consequence - and shortcoming - of this approach is that capital flight and
net errors and omissions are indistinguishable. In effect the residual is treated as (net) capital
flight. This method is similar to that used by the World Bank (1985), and is employed in the
absence of reliable data on Jamaica to enable the use of a more direct approach to the
estimation of capital flight (see Dooley (1988), Cuddington (1986and section 5.4.2).
Identity (5.24) gives rise to three other defmitions used in subsequent sections. They
provide a measure of the net transfer of resources in the extended version of Thirlwall's (1994)
model presented in section 5.4.2:
KFKRI+X-M-NFP	 (5.25)
NTRKRI-NFPM-X+KF	 (5.26)
NTRK KR! - NFP - KF M - X	 (5.27)
where (NTR) represents the net transfer of resources without counting capital flight (KF), and
(NTRK) is the net transfer of resources with capital flight.
The next three sub-sections (5.5.2, 5.5.3 and 5.5.4) test the effect of capital inflows on
savings, investment and growth respectively, making use of the definitions developed in this
22 The absence of more detailed information for the period of the study prevented further disaggregation into
long-term and short-term capital inflows. Some assumptions could have been made based oii the nature of
the inflow - eg. FDI may have been assumed to be long-term capital. In general, however, such an approach
seemed unreliable without more detailed information.
174
sub-section. The models in the sub-section on capital inflows and growth (5.5.4) are tested
using the extended Thirlwall (1994) model of section 5.4.2.
5.5.2 Capital Inflows, Foreign Debt and Savings
Equation (5.23b)
S + KR! = I
	
(5.28)
shows that foreign capital KRI may finance investment in excess of national savings. However,
if some foreign capital is used to fmance consumption and encourages domestic consumption at
the expense of savings, then S could decline. Indeed, if capital inflows are not fully utilised for
investment then S in (5.28) above must decline. According to Weisskopf (1972), the decline in
savings is an approximate measure of the extent to which foreign capital is being consumed.
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Figure 5.1 shows the levels of saving, investment and capital inflows (KR!) over the
three decades of our study. Savings fell consistently short of investment over the entire period,
with the gap being financed by capital inflows. The issue to be examined is whether or not
capital inflows themselves had a negative, positive, or neutral impact on savings and therefore
influenced the magnitude of the savings gap (S - I). In the light of the theoretical literature
reviewed, a negative relationship would be expected if some proportion of foreign capital were
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consumed, while a positive relationship would imply that the confidence of domestic savers was
buoyed by foreign capital inflows (a kind of demonstration effect).
The equations summarised in table (5.1) test the effect of real capital inflows (KRI) and
the ratio of the stock of real external government and government guaranteed debt to gdp
(DXY) on saving(S). Following the Keynesian proposition, real gross domestic product
(GDPR) is expected to be an important determinant of savings as it was in Chapter Three, and
is included as an explanatory variable. The real bilateral exchange rate between Jamaica
dollars and US dollars23 (ER) is also included as an explanatory variable on the grounds that
exchange rate changes may well have had an important bearing on business confidence and
saving decisions. A rise in the real exchange rate might stimulate savings by improving the
current account or alternatively by lowering domestic prices relative to foreign prices. On the
other hand a rising real exchange rate caused by persistent devaluations might lead to savings
apathy, and have a negative effect on S. The real interest rate (r) is included to test its effect
on savings 24. Estimation is by Ordinary Least Squares and the regression results of equation
{ 1) from Table 5.1 are as follows with the t - statistics in brackets below the coefficients:
S -1134 + 0.21 (GDPR) - 0.09 (KRI) - 19.84 (DXY) + 0.08 (R) + 2.99 (ER)
(-1.32) (3.27)	 (-0.59)	 (-4.93)
	
(0.53)	 (2.32)
R2 0.71,	 = 0.64,	 D.W. = 1.61,	 F(s,21) = 10.08
SE = 4.11,	 n =27
	
(5.29)
The Durbin-Watson statistic lies in the indeterminate region, but other diagnostic tests
(2 and F tests) point to the absence of serial correlation. In addition, the criteria for
TABLE 5.1
as J$ per US$, multiplied by the US price index divided by the Jamaica price index.
24 Saving(S) is defined as Investment(1) minus capital inflows KR1 from equations (5.23a). Alternatively, S




Savings Models: S, DS
_____	 {1}-S	 (2)-S	 (3)-S	 (4)-S	 (5)-DS
VbIs.	 coeff. t-ratio prob. äoeff. t-ratio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob. coeff. iTio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob.
CONST -11.3 -1.32 0.202 -10.8 -1.43 0.170 -28.5 -2.94 0.010 -8.94 -1.12 0.276 -6.24 -0.71 0.489
GDPR	 0.21 3.27 0.004 0.25 4.26 0.000 0.26 5.18 0.000 0.19 3.07 0.006
KRI	 -0.09 -0.59 0.562
GKI	 -0.37 -1.90 0.073
GVB	 0.14 0.44 0.669
GGR	 -3.64 -2.90 0.010
PKI	 0.09 0.62 0.545
FDI	 ____	 0.10 0.61 0.549
PUT	 ____	 -0.65 -2.30 0.035
PKBAL	 ____	 -0.33 -1.64 0.121
RESCH	 ____	 -0.50 -1.39 0.180 -0.17 -0.50 0.624
DXY	 -19.8 -4.93 0.000 -11.4 -2.18 0.042 -23.0 -2.87 0.011 -20.9 -5.44 0.000
R	 0.08 0.53 0.601 0.11 0.85 0.405 0.18 1.40 0.180 0.08 0.52 D.606
ER	 2.99 2.32 0.031 1.08 0.82 0.425 6.19 2.26 0.038 2.76 2.20 0.039
NTRK	 ____	 0.003 0.02 0.987
S(t-1)	 ____	 ____	 -0.95 -3.20 0.006
DGDPR	 ____	 ____	 0.58 2.16 0.048
GDPR(t-1)	 ____	 ____	 0.19 1.94 0.073
DKRI____	 ____
KRI(t-1)	 ____	 ____
DGKI	 ____	 ____	 -0.17 -0.74 0.470
GKI (t-1)	 ____	 ____	 -0.33 -0.65 0.526
DPKI	 ____	 ____	 0.11 0.46 0.655
PKI (t-1)	 ____	 . ____	 024 1.11 0.285
DXYC	 ____	 ____	 -2.89 -0.28 0.787
DXY(t-1) ____	 ____	 ____	 -1.15 -0.08 0.940
RG___	 ___	 ___	 0.12 1.060208
ERG____	 ____	 ____	 -0.05 -0.49 0.630
R0.71	 ____ 0.79 ____ ____ 0.88	 0.7	 0.69
R	 0.64	 ____ 0.72 ____	 0.81	 0.63	 0.44
D.W.	 1.61	 ____ 2.15 ____	 2.36	 1.71	 2.33
F	 (5,21) 10.08	 (7,19) 10.51	 (10,1611.89	 (5,21) 9.85	 (11,14 2.81
S.E.	 4.11	 3.61	 2.99	 4.14	 4.04
n___	 27	 __ 27	 27	 27	
26 r
ser.corr chi-sq [1J	 0.73 chi-sq [1]	 0.24 chi-sq Eli	 1.13 chi-sq[1]	 0.22 chi-sq [1]	 3.03
func.fm . chi-sq [1]	 0.30 chi-sq[1]	 2.83 chi-sq [11	 3.31 chi-sq [1]	 0.69 chi-sq[1]	 0.3
normal. chi-sq [21	 0.76 chi-sq [2]	 0.81 chi-sq [2]	 1.74 chi-sq [21	 0.58 thi-sq [21	 1.56
heteros. chi-sq [1]	 2.00 chi-sq [1]	 0.02 chi-sq [1]	 3.09 chi-sq[11	 2.45 chi-sq [1J	 0.77
chow	 chi-sq [4]	 7.26 chi-sqj [4]	 3.00 chi-sqj [4] J 4.21 chi-sq [4] I 6.76 chi-sq [4}	 6.03
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functional form, normality and heteroscedasticity are satisfied. The parameters are found to be
stable using Chow's stability test, and the equation in general is well determined.
Real output (GDPR) has the expected positive sign and is significant at the 5 per cent
level. The results suggest that on average, a J$1 million increase in real GDP leads to an
increase in savings of J$2 10,000. The Keynesian savings function in which savings are
strongly influenced by real output, is supported.
Foreign capital inflows have no statistically significant effect on savings. There is no
evidence that foreign capital inflows fmanced consumption to any significant degree over
the period. A preliminary conclusion is that foreign savings fmanced the excess of investment
over national savings depicted in Figure 5.1.
Fry (1995) argues that if a positive relationship between foreign debt and savings
exists, it may be because, in keeping with the modem Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis (Fry
1995), higher government debt might raise savings if households expect higher government
expenditure and taxation in the future to pay for the increased debt. The private sector would
increase its savings in order to be in a better position to meet the higher taxation in the future,
Additionally, the current level of government saving would not be reduced by its future
contingent liability. Fry's suggestion that at low levels of foreign debt, increases in the debt
may encourage savings, does not seem to hold for Jamaica over the sample period. However,
the ratio of the stock of external government debt to GDP (DXY) does seem to have a strong
negative impact on savings in Jamaica. Equation (5.29) was estimated for different sub-
periods, particularly for periods covering the I 960s and the first half of the 1 970s when debt
was relataively low. A positive relationship between debt and savings was never found. There
was generally a negative but insignificant relationship between foreign debt and savings for the
early years of the 1960s and early 1970s.
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overall, particularly during the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s. As Figure 5.2
indicates, foreign government debt grew slowly between 1963 and 1973, more rapidly between
1973 and 1977, and sharply between 1977 and 1985. The huge escalation in debt between
1977 and 1985 is associated with IMF and World Bank borrowing (see Chapter One). Severe
demand management policies instituted by a new political regime resulted in a fall in foreign
debt after 1985.
Higher debt levels affect domestic confidence adversely and may result in capital flight
(e.g. via the over and under invoicing of imports and exports respectively). As savings are
measured as the sum of investment and the current account surplus, capital flight may reduce
measured (if not actual) savings. Table 5.2 shows that the rapid increases in foreign debt
between 1975 and 1985 are associated with a decline in savings. Savings improved
significantly after 1985 as external debt was reduced.
The insignificance of the real domestic interest rate (r) as a determinant of savings
supports the findings of Chapter Three. The real bi-lateral exchange rate (ER) exerts a
significant and positive influence on savings. A rise in (ER) represents a depreciation of the
exchange rate which ceteris paribus raises the price of imports relative to exports. Depending
on the relative elasticities of demand for imports and exports, a depreciation can improve or
worsen the current account. Import and export elasticities are examined in Chapter Six, but for
present purposes it would seem that exchange rate depreciation stimulated savings, while
25 Both as a ratio of GDP and in absolute terms.
Table 5.2
______ ______ S	 I______ (X-M)	 DX	 DXY(%) E	 ER
________	 1963 15.1429 14.2857	 0.8572	 7.1935	 7.9785	 0.7143	 3.2835
_______	 1964 15.8823 17.7941	 -1.9118	 8.4494	 9.0662	 0.7143	 3.255
_______	 1965 15.6302 18.9706 -3.3404 10.0154 	 10.22	 0.7143	 3.2248
_______	 1966 15.8248 21.4084	 -5.5836 10.8321	 10.362	 0.7143	 3.2635
_______	 1967 14.5137	 23.6 -9.0863 11.5125	 10.523	 0.7242	 3.2967
_______	 1968 16.6672 29.4872	 -12.82 12.2053	 10.732	 0.8333	 3.7331
_______	 1969 27.4815 39.6591 -12.1776 12.9205 	 9.9799	 0.8333	 3.7048
_______	 1970 25.9197 38.0412 -12.1215 11.7273 	 8.813	 0.8333	 3.4184
_______	 1971 28.2023 40.3922 -12.1899 11.8662	 8.5803	 0.8328	 3.3779
_______	 1972 23.0362 37.1698 -14.1336 13.0604 	 8.8673	 0.7675	 3.0559
_______	 1973 26.5926	 44.065 -17.4724 15.4174	 10.308	 0.9091	 3.2649
_______	 1974 26.7428 32.2086 -5.4658 18.6252	 12.612	 0.9091	 2.8479
_______	 1975 16.7244 33.6683 -16.9439 22.2436 	 14.675	 0.9091	 2.6489
_______	 1976 11.4503 22.3182 -10.8679 23.5669 	 16.432	 0.9091	 2.5526
_______	 1977 12.8818 14.6559	 -1.7741	 23.136	 16.375	 0.9091	 2.4431
_______	 1978 16.9437 18.0707	 -1.127 41.9243	 31.614	 1.4133	 3.0296
_______	 1979 15.1965 22.6446 -7.4481 37.7385	 32.068	 1.7648	 3.2655
_______	 1980	 9.2678 17.7336 -8.4658 34.3294	 33.409	 1.7814	 2.9377
_______	 1981	 10.3959 23.2112 -12.8153	 37.088	 36.599	 1.7814	 2.8743
_______	 1982 10.0815 24.2095 -14.128 45.4185	 43.189	 1.7814	 2.8642
_______	 1983 14.4915 26.3729 -11.8814 75.1879	 66.941	 1.9322	 2.8738
_______	 1984	 5.5629 27.1518 -21.5889 105.7874	 89.95	 3.9428	 4.7867
________	 1985	 8.7704	 28.37 -1 9.5996 104.044	 92.872	 5.5586	 5.5586
________	 1986 22.1441 21.9064	 0.2377 19.3285	 16.008	 5.4778	 4.8492
_______	 1987	 23.518 27.9879 -4.4699 20.6403	 15.237	 5.4867	 4.7242
________	 1988 29.7511 32.7308 -2.9797 20.3363	 13.907	 5.4886	 4.5384
________	 1989 22.6163 38.4983 -15.882 .	 .________	 5.7446	 4.3549
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currency appreciation had the opposite effect. This may have been associated with the possible
impetus given to exports and discouragement of imports when the exchange rate depreciated
(especially over the period 1984-1989 compared to the 1974-1983 period), and the
discouragement of net exports during the years when the rate was over-valued 26 (see Table 5.2).
In equation {2} of table (5.1), capital inflows are disaggregated into private capital
inflows (PKI) and inflows to the government sector (GKI). 27 Equation {2} passes all the
diagnostic tests as shown on Table (5.1), including that for parameter stability, and it is well-
determined with an adjusted R 2 of 0.64. Once again, neither component affects savings
significantly, (GDPR) has a strong positive impact on savings, and the external debt ratio
(DXY) has a significant negative impact. Equation (3} further disaggregates private capital
inflows (PKI) into foreign direct investment (FDI), private unrequited transfers (PUT), and a
miscellaneous category for "other" private capital (PKBAL). Capital inflows to the
government are broken down into government borrowing (GVB) and receipts of grants (GGR).
The resulting estimation is as follows:
S = - 28.5 + 0.26 GDPR + 0.14 GVB - 3.64 GGR
(-2.94)	 (5.18)	 (0.44)	 (-2.90)
+ 0.10 FDI + - 0.65 PUT - 0.33 PKBAL - 0.17 RESCH
(0.61)	 (-2.30)	 (-1.64)	 (-0.50)
-23.0 DXY + 0.18 R + 619 ER
(-2.87)	 (1.40)	 (2.26)	 (5.30)
where the components of private foreign capital (PKI) and public foreign capital (GKI) are as
described above, while the other variables are as defmed earlier. Just as total foreign capital
inflows (KR!), private capital inflows (PKI) and public sector capital inflows (GKI) have no
significant effect on domestic savings, the components of (PKI) and GKI) that give rise to quid-
pro-quos also have no significant effect. However, grants to the government (GGR) and grants
26 Generally 1974-1983. The 1963-73 period was one of relative exchange rate stability while the 1984-
1989 period saw a relative decline in the real exchange rate.
27 In addition the variable RESCH represents capital "inflows" from the depletion of the country's foreign
reserves.
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to the private sector (PUT) both seem to have statistically significant negative effects on
domestic savings.
The magnitude of grants to the government of Jamaica tends to be small and not
necessarily tied to capital projects. There is therefore greater flexibility in their use, and in
practice such resources often end up being consumed rather than invested. In the case of
private unrequited transfers from abroad they are by their very nature as gifts (of capital),
liable to be used substantially for consumption purposes rather than invested. It is not
surprising that both public sector (GGR) and private sector (PUT) grants are partially
consumed and have a statistically significant negative effect on savings, It may also be the case
that both public and private grants lower the domestic savings effort in a way that foreign
borrowing does not, since the latter has to be repaid. As with equation { 1) of Table (5.1), the
real exchange rate (ER) has a significant positive effect on domestic savings, while the real
interest rate (r) has no significant effect on savings (this is consistent with the finding of
Chapter Three). The external debt/GDP ratio continues to have a significant negative effect on
savings, although the magnitude of the effect in all the savings equations seems implausibly
high.
The dynamic equation {5) in table (5.1), attempts to isolate the short and long-run
factors affecting savings. The change in savings (DS) is regressed on savings in the previous
period and on both the changes in (PKI) and (GKI) as well as (PKI) and GKI) lagged one
period. The short-run changes in savings (DS) are not significantly affected by short or long-
run capital inflows (private or government), or by external debt. However, short-run changes
in real output (DGDPR) have a positive effect on short-run changes in savings (DS). The
significance of the explanatory variable S(l) suggests that 95 per cent of the adjustment to
long-run equilibrium takes place within one year.
In general, apart from external grants to the public and private sectors, foreign capital
inflows are invested rather than consumed in Jamaica and have no significant effect on savings.
However, high external government debt seems to be a strong deterrent to saving, perhaps
because it affects private sector confidence. The policy implication is that the government
should keep its debt under control if saving is not to be discouraged. Further, foreign savings
should be encouraged as they do not affect national savings adversely, but debt creating foreign
savings should be discouraged. Other forms such as foreign direct investment (FDI) do not
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lead to debt accumulation and the possibility of future negative effects of high debt on savings
(including the loss of savings through future debt repayments). In addition, the strong
relationship between real gdp and saving implies that the main impetus to savings lies in raising
real output and income. However, the real issue for economic growth is investment and the
extent to which savings (both domestic and foreign) are invested productively. It is to the
impact of foreign savings on investment that we now turn.
5.5.3 Capital Inflows, Foreign Debt and Investment.
This sub-section examines the effect of aggregated and disaggregated foreign capital
inflows and external government debt on the level of domestic investment in Jamaica. The
analysis of the previous two sub-sections would seem to suggest that a positive relationship
between foreign capital inflows and investment can be expected. There was no evidence to
suggest that foreign savings on the whole fmanced consumption. However, given the fmding of
section 5.5.2 that foreign savings received by the government in the form of grants partially
financed consumption, a weak link between investment and grants can be expected.
In addition, this sub-section analyses the empirical evidence on the effect of external
debt on investment and the effect of capital inflows and external debt on the productivity of
investment in Jamaica. The literature reviewed in sections 5,2 and 5.3 suggests that the
answers to these questions are essentially empirical in nature. However, they may have far
reaching implications for economic policy and for economic performance. Finally, this sub-
section examines in the context of the empirical evidence on Jamaica, Fry's (1995) argument
that external debt may have a destabilising effect by worsening the balance of payments current
account.
Estimation is by Ordinary Least Squares on time series data. Table (5.3) summarises
the results of four investment models in which investment (IR) or the change in investment (DI)
are the dependent variables.
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Investment Models: I, Dl, 10CR
______	 {6}-IR	 {7)-IR	 8)-IR	 {9}-DI	 {1O}-IOCR
Vbls.	 coeff. t-ratio prob. coeff t-ratio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob.
CONST. 11.91 1.72 0.103 13.24 2.12 0.052 -2.65 -0.19 0.854 11.11 3.05 0.009 -0.03 -1.24 0.228
GDPRLA 0.61 2.66 0.016 0.35 1.43 0.173 0.31 0.90 0.383
KRI	 0.85 5.07 0.000	 -0.01 -1.36 0.188
NTRK____
GKJ	 ____	 0.48 2.18 0.045
GVB	 ____	 1.14 1.95 0.073
GGR	 ____	 -1.16 -0.46 0.652
PKI	 1.19 5.70 0.000
FD(	 ____	 1.23 4.08 0.001
PUT	 ____	 -0.54 -1.07 0.303
PKBAL	 ____	 0.93 3.05 0.009 ____
RESCH	 0.85 1.94 0.072 1.03 1.94 0.075
DXY	 -24.1 -3.78 0.001 -18.5 -2.90 0.011 -30.1 -2.17 0.049 	 0.08 1.56 0.135
CREDR	 0.09 1.17 0.257 0.15 2.04 0.059 0.15 1.68 0.116
R	 -0.22 -1.17 0.257 -0.19 -1.13 0.276 0.06 0.26 0.801
ER	 1.12 0.73 0.477 -0.43 -0.27 0.792 4.98 1.05 0.312	 ____
PSURP	 0.20 1.49 0.153 0.34 2.57 0.021 	 ____	 ____	 -0.01 -1.50 0.150
GDPRG	 0.04 17.18 0.000
(t-1)	 -0.59 -3.73 0.002 ____
DGDPRLA	 0.34 1.45 0.169 ____
GDPRLA(t-1)	 0.22 0.72 0.485 ____
KRIY___
KR (t-1)	 ____
DGKI	 ____	 0.55 3.40 0.004
GKI (t-1)	 ____	 0.39 1.01 0.328 ____
DPKI	 ____	 0.55 3.05 0.009
PKI (t-1)	 ____	 0.65 2.41 0.030
D)(YC	 ____	 -5.95 -0.82 0.425
DXY (t-1)	 ____	 ____	 -7.65 -0.78 0.451
P(t-i) _L__
R0.77	 _____ 0.84 ____	 0.83	 0.78	 _____ 0.95 _____
R____ 0.68 _____ _____ 0.74 ____	 0.68	 0.64	 0.94
D.W.	 1.31	 2.30	 1.79	 2.38	 1.68
F	 (7,17) 8.19	 (9,15) 8.79	 (11,125.71	 (9,14) 5.62 ____ (4,21) 94.1
S.E.	 4.61	 4.10	 4.57	 3.43	 0.05
n__ Li	 LL LL LI ______
ser.corr chi-sq [1]	 2.83 chi-sq[1]	 1.15 cln-sq [1]	 0.42 chi-sq [1]	 2.51 chi-sq [1]	 0.78
func.fm. chi-sq [1]	 0.01 chi-sq [1]	 1.26 chi-sq [1]	 2.99 chi-sq [1]	 1.10 chi-sq [1]	 2.60
normal. ctii-sq [2] 	 0.97 chi-sq [2]	 1.04 chi-sq [2J	 1.18 chi-sq [2]	 0.41 chi-sq [2]	 2.48
heterosc. chi-sq [1]0.27 chi-sq[110.61 chi-sq[1]1.61 chi-sq[1]0.61 chi-sq [1] 	 2.57
chow	 chispi1 6.78 chi-sq [4] 	 3.79 chisq  [4]	 1.87 chi-sq [4]	 2.77 ch-sq E4]	 0.33
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Equation {6} of Table 5.3 is presented below with the t-statistics below the coefficients of the
variables:
IR = 11.91 + 0.61 (GDPRLA) + 0.85 (KR!) - 24.08 (DXY)
(1.72)	 (2.66)	 (5.07)	 (-3.78)
+ 0.09 (CREDR) - 0.22 (r) + 1.12 (ER) + 0.20 (PSURP)
(1.17)	 (-1.17)	 (0.73)	 (1.49)
R2 = 0.77,	 R2 = 0.68,	 D.W = 1.31,	 F(7, 17) = 8.19,
SE=4.61,	 n=25	 (5.31)
where (IR) is real domestic investment, 28 (CREDR) is real domestic credit from the banking
system, (PSURP) represents inflation surprise and the other variables are as before. The
equation satisfies the various diagnostic tests inclding that of parameter stability (see equation
{6}, Table 5.3). The lagged accelerator (GDPRLA) 29 is highly significant and has the expected
positive sign predicted by a "Keynesian" investment function. Investment is influenced by
previous changes in demand. Aggregate foreign capital inflows (KRI) have a positive and
significant effect, while the external debt/output ratio (DXY) has a negative and significant
effect on real investment. Domestic credit from the banking system (CREDR), the real interest
rate (r), and the real exchange rate (ER) have the expected signs but are statistically
insignificant.
Equations {6}, 7} and {8} of Table (5.3) all show that investment is deterred by
increases in the external debt/gdp ratio. The private sector is likely to be knowledgable about
the build-up of external debt. Higher debt may bring expectations of higher taxes in the future
to pay for the debt. In addition, an unmanageable level of debt often has the effect of
discouraging private capital inflows. Low levels of private capital inflows are associated with
the high debt years (see Chart 5.2). For all the above reasons, the private sector may be
unwilling to commit resources to investment when debt stocks grow, while the government is
28 IR = gross fixed capital formation plus the change in business inventoiy.
29 GDPRLA = GDPRt.l - GDPRt..2, where GDPR is real gross domestic product.
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constrained in its ability to do so by having to meet heavy debt repayments. Equation (7) of
Table (5.3) is summarised as follows:
IR 13.24 + 0.35 (GDPRLA) + 0.48 (GM) + 1.19 (PM)
(2.12) (1.43)	 (2.18)	 (5.70)
+ 0.85 (RESCH) - 18.5 (DXV) + 0.15 (CREDR) - 0.19 (r)
	
(1.94)	 (-2.90)	 (2.04)	 (-1.13)





where the variables are as defined earlier. Equation {8} of Table (5.3) is summarised as
follows:
I = -2.65 + 0.31 (GDPRLA) + 1.14 (GVB) + 1.16 (GGR)
(-0.19)	 (0.90)	 (1.95)	 (-0.46)
+ 1.23 (FDI) - 0.54 (PUT) + 0.93 (PKBAL) + 1.03 (RESCH)
(4.08)	 (-1.07)	 (3.05)	 (1.94)
-30.1 (DXY) + 0.15 (CREDR) + 0.06 (R) + 4.98 (ER)
(-2.17)	 (1.68)	 (0.26)	 (1.05)	 (5.33)
where the variables are as before. Equations (5.32) and (5.33) provide increasingly
disaggregted measures of capital inflows and their effect on domestic investment in Jamaica.
Foreign capital inflows are disaggregated into public sector inflows (GKI) and private sector
inflows (PKI) in equation (5.32). In equation (5.33) the variable (GKI) is further disaggregated
into government borrowing (GVB) and government grants (GGR), while (PKI) is broken down
into foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign grants to the private sector (PUT) and other
private capital inflows (PKBAL). Both equations (5.32) and (5.33) satisfy the criteria for
parameter stability, normality, functional form, and the absence of serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity. The equations have fairly high adjusted R2 's and are well determined, as is
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equation {9} of Table (5,3) which shows the short-run change in investment (DI) and their
determinants.
Aggregate capital inflows (KRI) in equation (5.31) as well as foreign savings going to
both the private and government sectors separately (PKI and GKI respectively in equation
(5.32)) are positive and significant in explaining domestic investment. The effect of private
capital inflows (PKI) is particularly strong, and equation (5.32) shows that it is foreign direct
investment (FDI) and capital received by the banks, fmancial sector and other miscellaneous
sectors (PKBAL) that are the significant factors. Although foreign capital inflows to the
public sector (GKI) are significant deterimants of investment (equation 5.32), its components
(GVB and GGR) are not separately significant in equation (5.33) (possibly because they offset
one another in the more disaggregated equation (5.33)). As expected, private unrequited
transfers (PUT) and financing out of reserves (RESCH) are not significant determinants of
investment30 . In addition, the dynamic equation {9} of Table 5.3 shows that both short-run
changes in private capital inflows (DPKI) and long-run inflows (PKI 1) are significant in
stimulating short-run changes in investment (DI). Short-run changes in government inflows
(DGKI) - probably government borrowing rather than grants - are also significant in
determining short-run changes in investment (DI), but long-run government inflows (GKI1) are
not.
The policy implications of the above results are that the government should give
incentives to foreign capital, particularly foreign direct investment (FDI) if it wishes to
stimulate investment. Foreign direct investment provides external resources in partnership with
domestic resources and has the additional advantage of not building up debt directly. One
factor that has to be taken into account though, is the possibility of the future repatriation of
profits from successful ventures, which represent an outflow of capital. However, this is not a
disadvantage, for if the venture is unprofitable then the outflows will be minimal or non-.
existent and if it is profitable then economic activity would have been generated anyway.
In addition, the fmdmgs above suggest that judicious borrowing and utilisation of
capital by the government stimulates investment, provided that the build up of debt is
30 This is consistent with the result in section 5.5.2 that private unrequited transfers are partially consumed.
Indeed, it is argued in that sub-section that they are likely to be mainly consumed rather than invested.
Reserves are generally used purely as a financing item for the BOP and not as a source of funds for
investment.
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manageable and does not outweigh the positive effects of borrowing. Most government
borrowing is project related and is used to build up the economic and social infrastructure.
However, adequate debt management is essential if the positive effects are not to be negated.
Fry's (1995) argument that external debt can be destabilising in the sense of a
deteriorating balance of payments current account that has no inherent self-correcting
mechanism, can now be examined. From equation (5.21),
S-ICA
where CA is the current account surplus of the balance of payments. Fry (1995) argues that
the current account will deteriorate and become unstable if the external debt to GDP ratio
(DXY) lowers saving more than it lowers investment or increases investment by more than it
increases saving. Our finding for Jamaica from equations {1}, {2}, {3} and (4) of Table 5.1
is that (DXY) has a significant negative effect on savings, In addition, equations (6), {7} and
(8) of Table 5.3 show that (DXY) reduces investment significantly. Examining the
coefficients on (DXY) in the comparable equations for investment and savings, 3 ' consistently
shows that the external debt/gdp ratio (DXY) lowers investment by more than it lowers savings.
Consequently, external debt is not inherently destabilising for Jamaica as far as the balance of
payments account is concerned. Although it would seem that higher debt by itself does not
generate a persistent deterioration in the balance of payments, it may be inimical to growth via
its negative effect on investment. This will be examined in the next sub-section.
In addition to the positive effect of foreign capital inflows on investment, its impact on
the productivity of investment needs to be considered. Returning for a moment to the Harrod-
Domar growth equation (equation 5.3) of section (5.2)
g = c(s+s1'),
l Capital inflows appear in an increasingly disaggregated form in successive equations for both
savings and investment. Equation (1) on savings is comparable with equation (6) on investment,
both of which use aggregate capital inflows (KRI), (2) is comparable with (7) in which KM has
been disaggregated into (UKI) and (PKI), and (3) is comparable with (8).
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a decline in the incremental output/capital ratio (cr), or equivalently a fall in the productivity of
investment will have an adverse effect on growth (g), ceteris paribus. Equation { 10} of table
5.3 shows the effect of foreign capital inflows (KR!) and the externaol debt ratio (DXY) on the
productivity of investment (10CR) 32 in Jamaica. In addition, Leibenstein's33 contention that
economic growth itself may raise productivity (see Chapter Three), is again tested by the
inclusion of the real growth rate (gdprg) as an explanatory variable.
Both foreign capital inflows (KR!) and the foreign debt ratio (DXY) have no significant
effect on the productivity of investment. On the other hand, the real growth rate (gdprg) has a
highly significant positive effect on investment productivity, again supporting Leibenstein's33
view and our fmdmgs in Chapter Three. Financial variables, whether domestic or foreign, do
not seem to have any significant effect on the productivity of investment in Jamaica, while the
rate of economic growth has a positive and significant effect as analysed in Chapter Three.
5.5.4 Capital Inflows, Capital Outflows, Foreign Debt and Economic Growth
Capital inflows allow domestic investment to take place in excess of national savings. The
evidence on Jamaica suggests that a positive association exists between foreign capital inflows
and investment, which might in turn be expected to stimulate economic growth. However, the
ultimate effect of foreign capital on growth depends on three additional effects that it might
have. Firstly, on its effect on savings. In the case of Jamaica capital inflows were found in
Section 5.5.2 to have no significant effect on savings, which does not point to any significant
effect on growth via savings.
Secondly, if foreign capital inflows are more than offset by capital outflows (net factor
payments abroad, and capital flight), then (net) capital inflows might have a negative effect on
growth, as predicted by equation (5.20). It is therefore necessary to take into account both the
inflows and outflows of capital (ie. the net transfer of resources, NTRK) when considering the
effect of foreign capital on the real growth rate.
32 10CR is the incremental output - capital ratio.
Op. Cit.
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Thirdly, the effect of capital inflows and outflows on the productivity of investment (cs)
must be taken into account. The Harrod-Domar model used as a point of departure in the
discussion on theDual-Gap model in this chapter, assumes that (cr) is constant. However,
Griffm argues that significant amounts of foreign capital are used by governments for
infrastructural projects which are often substantial or on "politically" motivated projects, both
of which tend to have low investment productivities. The implication is that the average
productivity of investment for the economy as a whole is lowered.
This section examines the effect of the net transfer of resources (NTRK) on real
economic growth in Jamaica, taking into account the inflow of capital (KRI) and the outflow of
resources made up of net factor payments abroad (NFP) and capital flight (KF). The impact of
foreign debt on growth is also tested.




Re-arranging (5.34) gives the expression for the net transfer of resources taking into account
(NFP) and (KF). The net transfer of resources with capital flight (equation 5.27) is also equal
to (and fmances) the current account deficit (M - X):
NTRK=KRI-NFP-KF=M-X.
The effect of (NTRK) on real growth can now be considered in the context of the
extended Thirlwall model (equation 5.20) developed in section 5.4.2:
AO r	 KRJ—s(NFTP+KF)
-= cu S +
0	 L	 0
A0
where	 represents the real growth rate. Letting gn stand for -, the actual rate of growth
0	 0





____ Z	 W	 G	 GN	 GK	 GNG GKG I-S	 PRODI
____ ____ _____ _____ _____ _____ GN-G GK-G _____ _____
1963 0.58275 0.87645 ._______ ._______ ._______ ._______ ._______ -0.8572 _______
1964 3.7361 0.38163 6.9664 8.4658 8.7726 	 1.4993	 1.8062	 1.9118 37.9929
1965	 4.7117 0.71913	 6.0887 7.9796	 8.2042	 1.8909	 2.1155	 3.3404 36.4341
1966	 5.3632 2.0514	 2.882	 4.057 4.2323	 1.1751	 1.3503	 5.5836 17.7244
1967 6.9538	 1.9973	 1.244 2.0646 2.0113	 0.8206 0.76725	 9.0863 8.5144
1968 12.6943	 1.8778	 3.1157	 5.8338	 5.8397	 2.7181	 2.724	 12.82 19.6522
1969 12.2166	 1.6843	 4.7363	 7.3365	 7.132 2.6002 2.3958 12.1776 19.4475
1970 13.0379	 1.3945 4.4479 6.9839 6.9246	 2.536 2.4766 12.1215 20.7162
1971 13.1667	 1.2276	 2.758	 4.1125 4.1657	 1.3545	 1.4077 12.1899 12.2912
1972 14.9812	 1.7227 4.5965 8.0107 7.9295 3.4142	 3.333 14.1336 27.0876
1973 18.3624	 1.6747	 1.7619 3.0074	 3.0895	 1.2455	 1.3276 17.4724	 9.2652
1974 6.6034	 0.7531 -4.6284	 -5.28 -5.9015 -0.65163 -1.2732	 5.4658 -22.9237
1975 16.4518	 1.5292 -0.66528 -1.3216 -1.3805 -0.65631 -0.71526 16.9439 -5.1992
1976 10.6025 0.34798 -3.2939	 -6.033 -6.4441	 -2.739 -3.1502 10.8679 -35.3313
1977	 1.3876 0.94219 -2.1858 -2.4264 -2.5811 -0.24067 -0.39532 	 1.7741 -20.3338
1978	 0.6659	 1.1519 0.55108 0.59121 0.61021 0.04013 0.05912	 1.127	 3.9207
1979	 8.9033	 1.948	 -1.295 -1.8931 -2.2197 -0.59816 -0.92469	 7.4481 -10.0779
1980	 9.6112 2.2551 -3.1613	 -5.704 -7.2089 -2.5427 -4.0476	 8.4658 -38.0396
1981 16.1333	 1.4158	 1.1185	 2.5613	 3.0066	 1.4428	 1.8881 12.8153 12.3057
1982	 17.553	 1.3101 0.56516	 1.3758	 1.6226 0.81067	 1.0574	 14.128	 6.4999
1983 13.7201	 1.2627	 1.1946 2.2224 2.4297	 1.0278	 1.2351 11.8814	 9.7706
1984 21.7838	 3.7826 -0.1937 -0.93659 -1.0839 -0.74289 -0.89024 21.5889 -4.0885
1985 24.6018	 3.5136 -1.4861 -4.5865 -6.2499 -3.1005 -4.7639 19.5996 -18.9824
1986 2.7416 2.2233	 5.349 5.5873 6.5483 0.23822 	 1.1993 -0.2377 28.5734
1987 6.9494 2.3846 5.0084 6.3381	 6.9962 1.3297 1.9878 4.4699 26.7876
1988 15.5857	 3.0834	 1.0681	 1.189	 1.7383 0.12094 0.67022 2.9797 4.5694
1989 23.0513 2.7299 3.0999 5.5707 6.6336 2.4708 3.5337 	 15.882 18.4177
Average 11.1908 1.71263 _______ _______ ______ _______ _______ _______ _______
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KR!> s(NFTP + KF) 	 (5.35)
that is, if capital inflows exceed that proportion of outflows that would otherwise have been
saved, and if the productivity of investment is not reduced. Capital inflows have already been
found to have no significant effect on savings or on investment productivity in Jamaica over the
period. If condition (5.35) is met (ceteris paribus), actual growth (gn) can be expected to
exceed the growth rate consistent with domestic savings alone(g). In addition, under those
circumstances, gn would be expected to be lower than the growth rate (gk) given by capital
inflows without taking account of capital outflows, that is, gk > gn > g.
On the other hand, given the productivity of investment and no effect on (s),if s(NFP +
KF) > KR!, then g can be expected to exceed gn and gk to exceed g: gk > g> gn. The precise
outcome is an empirical issue for the particular country concerned, to which we now turn.
Considering first of all the Harrod growth model (g cs), the propensity to save (s) out
of GDP is obtained from the regression equation {1} in Table 5.1. Holding the influence of
other variables constant, s = 0.21. Also, the productivity of investment (r) from equation 3.36
of Chapter 3, was found to be 0.09. The average growth rate (g) without capital flows, is
therefore 1.89 per cent. The growth rate (g) can now be compared with the actual average
growth rate gn. The difference (Z) between KR! and [s(NFTP + KF)} is positive (see Table
5.4), and section 5.5.2 found that capital inflows have a positive and significant effect on
investment, which in turn can be expected to be positively related to growth. The actual average
growth rate (gn) turns out to be 2.12, which is higher than the growth rate (g) associated with
domestic savings alone. The positive net inward transfer of resources has a positive effect on
real growth. Another way of testing this is demonstrated below.
Positive net inflows [Z = KR! - s(NFP + KF)J can be expected to have a positive effect on the
difference between the actual growth rate and the Harrod growth rate (gil - g). These
relationships are tested in the following equation:
















x2 (1) = 1.86
x2 (1) = 0.60
2 (2) - 1.94
x2 (1) = 0.38
2(4)_.. 5.30
where gng = gn - g, (Z) represents capital inflows net/of/outflows and PRODI is the
incremental output-capital ratio in percentage terms. Net  transfers (Z) have a positive and
significant effect on the difference between actual growth (including capital flows) and growth
financed by domestic savings alone. As expected, the foreign debt ratio has a negative effect on
the growth rate differential.
The effect of the productivity of investment on the growth rate differential is also tested
directly and found to have a significant positive impact. The higher the productivity of
investment, the higher the growth attributable to the net inflow of resources. However, Granger
Causality tests carried out on the relationship between investment productivity and the growth
rate differential, indicate that there is a strong two-way relationship. The growth rate
attributable to foreign capital influences investment productivity in a positive way, and vice-
versa.
In order to calculate the growth rate (gk) consistent with capital inflows (KRI) without
the adjustment for outflows, the foreign savings ratio to GDP (sk) is obtained by regressing
capital inflows (KR!) on real GDP (GDPR):
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KR! = -20.88 + 0.26 (GDPR) - 0.46 (PSURP) - 12.82 DU77





R = 0.40;	 D.W. = -1.60;
SE = 5.72
	






x2 (1) = 0.45
X2(1)-030
X 2 (2) = 1.60
x2 (1) = 0.51
x2 (4) = 7.96
where (DU77) is a dummy variable representing the jolt given to investor confidence caused by
the abandonment in 1977, of the first IMF loan to Jamaica negotiated the same year. The other
variables are as before and the equation is well determined. The ratio of foreign savings to real
GDP is 0.26, the coefficient on (GDPR). Growth with domestic and foreign savings alone can
be expressed as:
gk = cs(s + sk)	 (5.39)
where the foreign savings to GDP ratio (sk) is 0.26. The growth rate (gk) works out to be 4.2
per cent, which does not take into account the loss of growth from the outflow of resources,
s(NFTP +KF).
The main results of this sub-section are that the net inflow of foreign resources has a
significant positive effect on real growth (but no significant effect on productivity), and that the
outflow of resources (including capital flight) has a negative effect on growth. In addition, the
accumulation of foreign debt has an adverse effect on growth, due perhaps to its effect on
investor confidence. Also, there seems to be a positive two-way relationship between foreign
capital induced growth and investment productivity.
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5.6	 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter analysed the effect of foreign capital and the stock of foreign debt on domestic
savings, investment and growth in Jamaica. According to the literature surveyed in the early part of
the chapter, if capital inflows are partly consumed they will have a negative impact on domestic
saving. However, if they are wholly invested they will have a positive impact on savings. In
addition, the stock of debt could have a positive effect on savings at lower levels of debt and a
negative effect at higher levels. Also, rising foreign indebtedness could have a stabilising effect on
the balance of payments by improving the current account, if investment is reduced (raised) by more
(less) than saving. On the other hand, foreign debt might be destabilising if savings decline more
than investment or investment grows faster than saving.
Our findings for Jamaica indicate that foreign capital inflows have no significant effect on
saving. Similarly, the main components of capital inflows to the public sector (government
borrowing, GVI3) and the private sector (foreign direct investment FDI, and private borrowing
PKBAL) have no significant effect on saving. This implies that foreign capital inflows are used by
and large for investment not consumption purposes, as supported by the strong positive relationship
between capital inflows and investment when tested directly. The policy implication is that the
Authorities should encourage capital inflows with appropriate policies if higher investment is a
macroeconomic goal. In particular, special attention should be given to foreign direct investment and
private borrowing which were found to have strongly positive effects on investment.
The stock of outstanding foreign debt is found to have a significant negative effect on
saving, investment and growth, although its impact on the balance of payments is not found to be
destabilising. The government would be well advised to generate public sector savings for capital
programmes and to lower its stock of foreign debt.
Although capital inflows were found to have a significant positive effect on the quantity of
investment, they were found not to have any significant effect on the productivity of investment. The
productivity of investment in Jamaica seems to be determined by real variables - in particular the
real growth rate - and not by financial variables. Net foreign inflows of resources were found to have
a significant positive impact on growth, while the outflow of resources were found to have a negative
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effect. In addition, high foreign debt seems to be inimical to growth. Capital outflows in Jamaica
include savings which might otherwise be invested and possibly the loss/flight of human capital, with
some of the most productive leaving first (but this was not tested). While capital inflows stimulated
growth, capital outflows (including capital flight) had an adverse effect on growth. A more
favourable and stable social and political domestic climate and a more hospitable economic
environment, would have to be maintained to attract foreign capital and discourage capital flight, in
order that higher and sustained economic growth might be achieved.
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CHAPTER 6
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CONSTRAINT
6.1	 Introduction
The balance of payments has important implications for real economic growth for three
main reasons. 1 Firstly, a prolonged deterioration in the current account resulting from
excessive imports relative to exports, will have an adverse effect on domestic employment and
output. For example, if domestic activity is reduced by import penetration, growth can be
adversely affected.
Secondly, in the long run real growth cannot exceed that rate consistent with balance of
payments equilibrium on current account. Thirdly, although growing deficits can be fmanced
by high interest rates in the short run, high interest rates discourage investment on which
growth ultimately depends.' Therefore in the long run prolonged deficits can only be inimical to
growth.
This chapter examines the extent to which real economic growth in Jamaica was
constrained by the balance of payments during the 1960-1992 period. There are two basic
approaches in the economic literature to the question of what determines real growth and why
growth rates differ among countries. The first is the supply - oriented and Neoclassical
approach. In the supply side theories, output and the growth of output are determined by
resource endowment and the productivity of factors of production. Output is essentially supply
determined, and allocative and producer efficiency along with flexible prices ensure the
efficient utilisation of resources at full employment.
The supply oriented approach is based on the aggregate production function, which in
turn is taken from, and is assumed to be of the same form as, the individual production
functions for goods and for industries at the micro level. Severe doubts have been expressed
about the validity of assuming that aggregate production functions are necessarily of the same
'Mc.Combie and Thiriwall (1994).
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form as the mclividual functions from which they are assumed to be derived (Blaug p. 470
1985),
Nevertheless, whether or not these models assume one or more sectors, they all argue
that growth can be attributed to some combination of: (1) increases in the use of the factors of
production (land, labour, capital); (2) increases in the productivity of individual factors and (3)
improvements in total factor productivity (as a result of, for example, increasing returns to
scale, the transfer of factors between sectors and technical progress). The sources of growth
are then determined by calculating (1) and obtaining the contribution of total factor
productivity as a residual. In effect, the measurement of total factor productivity seems to be a
"measure of our ignorance" of the sources of growth in the Neoclassical approach.
The secànd basic approach to the determination of real growth, the demand oriented
approach, rejects both the underlying Neoclassical assumptions described above and the
validity of the aggregate production function. The aggregate production function is not simply
the sum of the micro production functions of the economy, nor is it valid to separate out the
contribution of the various factors of production to growth. "Explaining" real economic growth
in terms of the growth of the factors of production and productivity does not shed light on why
they have grown in the first place. The demand oriented approach is Keynesian in spirit and
explains growth in terms of the growth of demand, to which supply, within limits, adapts. Real
economic growth is determined by demand and in particular by the relaxation or tightening of
constraints on demand. The major constraint on demand in an open economy is likely to be the
balance of payments. The economy of Jamaica is highly open, with imports and exports each
being around seventy per cent of GDP in 1992 (see Chapter 1).
This chapter examines Thirlwall's (1979) and Thirlwall and Hussain's (1982) balance
of payments constrained growth model and its applicability to Jamaica over the period 1961-
1992. Section 6.2 describes the balance of payments constrained growth model and empirical
tests of the model. Section 6.3 provides a critique of the model by various authors, while
section 6.4 tests the model empirically for Jamaica. Finally, section 6.5 summarises the main
conclusions of the chapter.
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6.2	 The Balance of Payments Constraint on Growth
6.2.1 The Bask Model and the Extended Model
Thirlwall's (1979) model of balance-of-payments constrained growth is a demand-
oriented one that seeks to explain real growth in terms of the extent of the constraints placed
upon it by the balance of payments. Balance of payments difficulties can become a constraint
on demand which could in turn have an adverse effect on growth, which may then worsen the
balance of payments in a vicious circle. McCombie and Thirlwall (1994, p. 233) write:
"If a country gets into balance-of-payments difficulties as it expands demand
before the short-term capacity growth is reached, then demand must be
curtailed; supply is never fully utilised; investment is discouraged;
technological progress is slowed down, and a country's goods compared with
foreign goods become less desirable so worsening the balance of payments still
further, and so on. A vicious circle is started. By contrast, if a country is able
to expand demand up to the level of existing productive capacity, without
balance-of-payments difficulties arising, the pressure of demand upon capacity
may well raise the capacity growth rate."
If demand can be expanded up to existing productive capacity without getting into balance of
payments difficulties, the pressure of demand may stimulate growth. This may occur through
various mechanisms: investment may be stimulated, the capital stock increased, and
technological progress brought about; factors of production may move from low to high
productivity sectors; people outside the work force (at home or abroad) may be drawn into it,
thereby expanding labour supply, and domestic resources may be made more productive by
imports.
Thirlwall's 2 hypothesis is that a country's long run growth rate is determined by the
ratio of its rate of growth of exports to its income elasticity of demand for imports, if balance
of payments equilibrium is to be maintained. In other words, the real growth rate cannot
exceed in the long run, that rate that is consistent with balance of payments equilibrium on
2	 Cit.
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current account. According to the model, the actual growth rate will approximate the balance-
of-payments constrained growth rate predicted by the model, given certain assumptions. The
derivation of the model now follows [see Thiriwall (1979), Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) and
McCombie & Thirlwall (1994)].
Balance of payments equilibrium on current account measured in units of domestic




where X and M are the quantities of exports and imports respectively, Pd is the average price of
exports in domestic currency, P 1is the average price of imports in foreign currency, and E is the
nominal exchange rate (ie. the domestic price of foreign currency). The left and right hand
sides of the expression measure the values of total exports and imports respectively, both in
domestic currency.
The condition for balance-of-payments equilibrium for an economy growing through
time is that the rates of growth in the values of exports and imports are equal:
pd +x= pf +m+e	 (6.2)
where the lower-case letters represent continuous rates of change of the variables. Returning to
equation 6.1, the volume of exports (X) demanded may be expressed as a multiplicative
function of: the price of exports (Pd) relative to the foreign price of goods competitive with
exports measured in the domestic currency (P fE), and the level of world income (Z):
\¼PfE)
	 (6.3)
where b is a constant, i is the price elasticity of demand for exports, and is the income
elasticity of demand for exports. In addition the following conditions apply: (i<O) and (8>0).






Similarly, the volume of imports demanded in equation (6.1) may be expressed as a
multiplicative function of: the ratio of the price of imports measured in domestic currency (PfE)
to the price of import substitutes (Pd), and domestic income Y:
where a is a constant, iy is the price elasticity of demand for imports, and it is the income
elasticity of demand for imports. The following conditions are assumed: (qi<0) and (ir>O). The
rate of growth of imports is:
(6.6)
Substituting equations (6.4) and (6.6) into (6.2) and solving for the rate of growth of
domestic income gives:
( 1++ w)( pd- pf-e)+
YB =	 (6.7)
where YB is the rate of growth of domestic income consistent with balance of payments
equilibrium. The prediction of the model is that YB will approximate the actual growth rate y
(i.e. y = YB) in the long nm.
The calculation of YB from equation (6.7) requires the estimation of parameters and the
collection of substantial amounts of data that might not be readily available, particularly for
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developing countries. If relative prices are assumed to be stable in the long run, equation (6.7)
becomes:
x
YB = 	 = -	 (6.8)
it
that is, the balance of payments equilibrium growth rate YB is equal to the rate of growth of the
volume of exports divided by the income elasticity of demand for imports. The growth rule
implied by the model is that in the long run the actual growth rate will approximate to xht.
Thirlwall (1982) demonstrates that this dynamic result corresponds to the Harrod foreign trade
multiplier which Harrod (1933) had asserted was a major determinant of industrial growth,
while at the same time being a mechanism for maintaining balance of payments equilibrium.
The simple model was extended by Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) to incorporate capital
flows. The inclusion of capital flows reflects the more realistic situation where the current
account is not in balance and has to be offset by capital flows. This is particularly true of
developing countries, which can sometimes sustain current account deficits for quite a long time
by having them fmanced by capital inflows (and debt write-offs). If the current account is
initially in disequilibrium, the balance of payments equation may be written as:
	
PdX + F = P1ME
	
(6.9)
where F measures nominal capital inflows (if F>O) or outflows (if F<O). The other symbols are
the same as before. The rates of change give:
O (pd+ x) + (1-O)f = p + m +	 e	 (6.10)
where e and (1-0) are the shares of exports and capital flows as a proportion of total receipts
respectively. 3 Substituting equations (6.4) and (6.6) into equation (6.10) gives the balance-of-
payments constrained growth rate starting from an initial position of disequilibrium:
0 = PdX/R and (1-0)= F/k where R= total receipts from abroad= PX+F. In effect 0 and (1-8) represent the
respective proportions of the import bill financed by export earnings and capital flows.
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There are several implications of both the simple model without capital flows and the
extended model embodying capital flows that offset current account disequilibria. 4 We return
for a moment to the simple model of equation (6.7), which assumes balance of payments
equilibrium and which does not assume that relative prices are fixed (as does equation (6.8))




As before, the signs of the parameters are: (<O), (iy<O), fr >O) and (ir>O). Equation (6.12)
implies that:
(1) domestic relative to foreign inflation (Pd-pf) will lower the rate of growth
required to maintain balance of payments equilibrium if the absolute value of the sum of the
price elasticities of demand for exports and imports exceeds unity: I	 I >1.
(2) If the absolute value of the sum of the price elasticities of demand for exports
and imports exceeds unity, a sustained currency depreciation (i.e. e>O, since e measures the
home price of foreign currency), will improve the growth rate consistent with balance-of-
payments equilibrium. This is the Marshall-Lerner condition.
(3) Increases in world income (z), will improve the balance-of-payments
equilibrium growth rate y. The extent of the improvement depends on the income elasticity of
demand for exports (E).
(4) The higher the income elasticity of demand for imports (it), the lower the
growth rate consistent with balance-of-payments equilibrium.
The disequilibrium model incorporates capital flows and is summarised in equation (6.11)
above:
4 McCombie & Thirlwall (1994).
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(Gi7 + W)(Pd - e - p1) + (Pd - e - Pf) + Ot + (1- o)(f - Pd)=
Relative price changes affect balance-of-payments constrained growth via their effect on the
volume of imports and exports given the price elasticities (the first term on the right hand side
of equation 6.11 above), and also directly (the second term on the right). The effect of changes
in the growth of world income and the rate of growth of capital flows are embodied in the third
and fourth terms respectively. Assuming stable relative prices in the long run, equation (6.11)
becomes:
*	 Oz + (1-0) (f-Pd)
Y B -
	 (6.13)
Starting from an initial disequilibrium on the current account, the balance-of-payments
constrained growth rate is determined by the effect of exogenous income growth abroad on
export growth (the first term in 6.13), and the growth of real capital flows (the second term), all
divided by the income elasticity of demand for imports. The terms in the numerator are
weighted by their respective shares of total receipts [(9) and (1-9)]. Given the absence of
information on sz for all countries, Thiriwall and Hussain 5 assume that	 z = x. In so doing,
they incorporate "into the analysis from the start any volume changes in exports from relative
price movements" (Thiriwall and Hussain, 1982, p.5O3). Equation (6.13) becomes:
* - Ox+ (1-0) (f-Pd)
Y B -
	 (6.14)
The difference between the growth rate predicted by equation (6.14) and the actual
growth rate, will reflect the influence of the pure terms of trade effect on real growth and their
effect via the growth in import volumes. The extended model which incorporates current
account balance of payments disequilibrium and makes allowance for capital flows, is
50p. Cit.
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consistent with the simple equilibrium model. With an initial equilibrium and no capital flows,
0=1 and (1-e)=O, equation (6.14) reduces to:
x
YB	 -	 (6.15)
which is the same as equation (6.8) of the simple model.
Starting with current account disequilibrium (ie. deficit) but with zero growth in
nominal capital inflows, real income growth must decline to lower import growth below the rate







and the reduction in the growth rate will be
** = (i-c) (Pd + x)
YB - YB	 (6.17)
if
If the growth rate of capital flows to finance an initial deficit is positive, the required growth of
capital inflows that would keep real income growth from falling below its level without initial
disequilibrium, can be obtained by setting equation (6.14) equal to (6.17) and solving for the
growth of capital flows (f). This gives:
f=pd+x	 (6.18)
That is, the required rate of growth of capital flows is equal to the rate of growth of export
earnings (or equivalently, it is equal to the rate of growth of the current account deficit). If
there is an initial balance-of-payments disequilibrium, the above results taken together imply
that the simple Harrod rule for predicting the growth rate, y = xbt, will under-predict if the
growth of capital inflows exceeds the growth rate of export earnings. On the other hand, the
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Harrod rule will over-predict if the growth rate of capital inflows is less than the rate of growth
of export earnings. The extent of under-prediction on over-prediction is obtained by
subtracting equatioh (6.14) from equation (6.8):
** = (1-o)(pd+x-f)
YB - YB	 (6.19)
The Balance of Payments Constrained Growth Model is a long-run growth model.
According to the model, in the long run countries can only grow faster than that rate which
maintains equilibrium on the current account of the balance of payments, if they are
accumulating deficits. In such a case the deficit would have to be financed by capital inflows.
On the other hand, in the long run economies can only grow more slowly than the balance of
payments equilibrium growth rate if they are accumulating surpluses (or exporting capital).
The model is not meant to be applied to the short or medium term.
6.2.2 Empirical Evidence on the Basic and Extended Models.
Four basic tests of the Balance of Payments Constrained Growth model have been
suggested in the economic literature (see McCombie and ThirIwall 1997, and McCombie and
Thirlwall 1994). The first is a rank correlation test across countries, between the growth rate
predicted by the simple model and actual growth. Thiriwall's (1979) study of 18 advanced
countries for the period 1953-1976 and 12 advanced countries for the period 1951-1973, finds
high values for the Spearman rank correlation coefficient of 0.764 and 0.8916 for the respective
data sets. However, the rank correlation coefficient has been criticised by McGregor and
Swales (1989) as not showing how closely the model predicts actual growth. They consider the
use of a non-parametric test by Thirlwall to be a significant weakness.
A second test which does not measure how closely the model predicts actual growth, is
to take the average deviation in absolute terms, of actual growth from the predicted growth
rate. The average deviation is typically less than one percentage point in most of the studies
including Bairam and Dempster's (1991) study of 11 Asian countries between 1961 and 1985,
and Atesoglu's (1993) study of the USA in which the average deviation over 21 years is 0.38
6 The coefficient is typically over 0.7 in most studies.
Seven of the 11 countries had average deviations less than one percentage point.
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percentage points. 8 However, although the second test is superior to the first, it still suffers
from the disadvantage of not being a parametric test.
A third test which is parametric, is to regress the actual growth rate on the balance of
payments constrained rate to detennine whether the regression coefficient is significantly
different from unity. If it is not, then the model will be a good prediction of the actual growth
rate. However, this test has three shortcomings. Firstly, if an incomplete sample of countries
is taken in which deficits and surpluses do not cancel out, then the results may be biased. 9 It is
on these grounds that McCombie (1989) criticises this test performed by McGregor and Swales
(1989) on Thiriwall's (1979) data. Using (OLS) regression analysis, McGregor and Swales'°
find that the coefficients are significantly different from untiy and erroneously reject the model.
The second shortcoming of the test is that serious outliers 1 ' may produce a regression
coefficient substantially different from unity and wrongly lead to a rejection of the model for
countries as a whole. The third shortcoming is that the elasticity of demand for imports (it)
which is used in the model and is estimated from an import demand function with domestic
income and relative prices as explanatory variables, has a related standard error. McCombie
and Thirlwall (1997) point out that it would be better to regress the predicted growth rate on
the actual growth rate instead of the other way around, but that this would not deal effectively
with the first two shortcomings.
A fourth test which does not suffer from any of the above objections is to estimate for
each country separately, the income elasticity of demand for imports (lr*) that would make
predicted growth (gi,) equal to actual growth (g). If this extimate (lt*) does not differ
significantly from the estimated income elasticity of demand for imports (it) obtained from the
time series regression for the country, then (gb) and (g) will not be significantly different from
one another. The Dynamic Harrod Trade Multiplier is supported in most of the studies that
make use of this test.
8 See below for more detail on Atesoglu's study.
i.e. predicted growth might systematically exceed actual growth or vice versa, simply because of the
imbalance between deficits and surpluses across the sample of countries.
10 Op. Cit.
e.g. that of Japan for which balance of payments constrained growth has significantly exceeded actual
growth since the war.
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Thiriwall and Hussam (1982) test the extended model on a number of developing
countries for varying periods between 1951 and 1978. In general, Thirlwall and Hussain 12 find
that the extended model incorporating capital flows predicts actual growth better than the
simple model. The mean absolute error of the actual growth rate from the rate predicted by the
extended model is 1.55 percentage points compared to 2.01 percentage points for the simple
model.
On average, the real terms of trade seemed to have constrained real growth by about 0.6
per cent per annum, while capital inflows seemed on average to have enabled the countries to
grow 0.05 per cent faster than the rate predicted by the simple model. The authors conclude
that the results indicate that the model's growth predictions approximate the growth experience
of the countries studied, and therefore provide a useful starting point for analysing their growth
performance.
Bairam (1988) tests the simple model on a sample of 19 developed countries for the
period 1970-85, and on 15 developing countries for various periods between 1961 and 1985
(Bairam, 1990). Bairam (1988) fmds that the predicted growth rate y* = xhr approximates the
actual growth rate y. However, when 
y* 
sz/ir is used, the model over-predicts actual growth
because of the unreliability of estimates of e (the income elasticity of demand for exports).
Bairam (1990) finds that the simple model accurately predicts the growth rates of nine
out of the fifteen countries in the study' 3 (y = x seems to perform slightly better than
y* = ez/ir). Four of the remaining six countries are oil exporters and Bairam (op. cit.) finds that
the model does not predict the growth rates of those countries accurately probably because
those economies are not demand constrained, but rather are supply constrained by internal
labour and capital bottlenecks. Bairam and Dempster (1991) also find emphatic support for the
dynamic Harrod growth rule in their study of 11 Asian countries for various periods between
1961 and 1985. In addition, they fmd that relative price changes are insignificant for growth
but that differences in income elasticities might be important in explaining the different growth
rates of the countries in the study.
12 Op. cit.
' 3 Bairam uses the maximum likelihood technique and the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure to correct for
autocorrelation.
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Atesoglu (1993) uses two-stage least squares to test the simple model on the United
States for overlapping 16 year periods between 1955 and 1970, and again between 1975 and
1990. The model gives a fairly accurate prediction of growth over the period, with the average
predicted rate being 3.10 per cent compared to the actual average of 3.37 per cent. It is
interesting that the model "works" for the USA, which is not normally considered to be a highly
open economy. Given the accuracy of the simple model, Atesoglu concludes that not only do
relative price changes seem to play an unimportant role in determining balance-of-payments
performance, but that it is real output rather than relative prices that adjusts to disequilibrium
in the balance of payments. Atesoglu tests the extended model on Canada for the period 196 1-
91 and fmds that capital flows are unimportant. The dynamic Harrod trade multiplier is valid
overall, although relative price changes seem to be significant for the 1977-9 1 sub-period, with
export growth being significant over the 196 1-76 sub-period.
6.3	 Critiques of the Balance of Payments Constrained Growth Models.
The balance-of-payments constrained growth model has been criticised on theoretical
grounds by McGregor and Swales (1985, 1986, 1991), Crafts (1988, 1990) and Krugman
(1989). McGregor and Swales 14 are critical of the model in several respects. Firstly, they argue
that the import and export functions are too aggregative and do not incorporate non-price
competitive factors. International trade is determined not just by relative prices and income,
but also by non-price factors such as product characteristics, consumer demand for variety,
economies of scale, etc. Their point is, in their own words, that non-price competition "does
not appear in the demand function, nor anywhere else in the analysis" (1985, p.20, emphasis
added). Thirlwall (1986) and McCombie (1989) correctly argue that, although non-price
competitive factors are not explicitly included in the import and export functions, they are
implicit in the income elasticities of demand for exports and imports. Differences in income
elasticities of demand between countries capture differences in the nature and characteristics of
the goods produced and exported by the various countries. The model is, indeed, highly
aggregative, but this in itself does not invalidate its conclusions or its usefulness (or otherwise)
as an approximate measure or predictor of economic growth.
14	 Cit.
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Secondly, McGregor and Swales' 5 are critical of the assumption that relative prices are
fixed in the long run. In particular, they contend that Thiriwall invokes the classical "law of
one price" to support the assumption of sticky prices. If the "law of one price" holds, then, they
claim, the demand functions become perfectly elastic and the model cannot then be interpreted
as a demand-constrained model of economic growth. Economic growth could only be supply-
constrained in a world that obeys the law of one price.
If the model in general and the stability of relative prices in particular depend on the
assumption of the law of one price, then the model would indeed be incompatible with the
notion of constrained demand (McCombie, 1989). However, the long-run stability of relative
prices in no way depends on the law of one price. Thirlwall (1986) admits that his use of the
term "law of one price" was unfortunate, as it was used in a loose sense to refer to sticky
relative prices engendered by oligopolistic or even highly competitive markets. In addition, the
tendency of domestic price changes to mirror exchange rate changes in many countries, help to
make relative prices (measured in a common currency) sticky. As Thiriwall (1979) points out,
several studies (eg Wilson, 1976, Ball 1977) suggest that long-run relative prices measured in a
common currency are stable. Ultimately this is an empirical question for any particular country
or group of countries.
The third major criticism of the model by McGregor and Swales 16 is that the equation
for balance-of-payments constrained growth (equation 6.8) above: y = x/it) can be derived from
an open economy neoclassical model. Such a model would assume that the "law of one price"
holds, with the implication that growth is supply-constrained rather than demand-constrained.
In such a model prices, not income, adjust to changing market conditions, and export growth is
endogenous to supply conditions and does not depend on world income or the income elasticity
of demand for exports. The direction of causation in equation (6.8) is reversed: x yit.
This is not simply a question of manipulating the equation (6.8). Reversing the
direction of causation represents a fundamental change in one's view of how the macro-




the Keynesian approach of the balance-of-payments constrained growth model. It seems more
reasonable to suppose that export growth is exogenously determined and that demand
conditions (particularly foreign demand in an open economy) have a decisive impact on real
domestic growth. This does not mean that supply conditions including the availability of
factors, are unimportant in the growth process. On the contrary, the characteristics of goods
themselves determine the income elasticities of demand for traded and non-traded goods, but
this is not the same as the neoclassical production function approach to growth. The Keynesian
view that the growth of supply responds to demand is more plausible in explaining why it is
that the factors of production grow in the first place.
Krugman (1989) finds that the real growth of a country is indeed directly related to the
income elasticity of demand for its exports, and inversely related to the income elasticity of
demand for its imports. This finding is, in effect, Thirlwall's 17 balance-of-payments constrained
(equilibrium) model. However, Krugman contends that it is growth that determines the
elasticities and not the other way around. He explicitly rejects the notion of demand
constraining growth via the balance-of-payments, arguing instead that faster growth stimulates
exports thereby raising the "apparent" income elasticity of demand for exports relative to that
for imports. Krugman's 18 model is one in which factor supplies and total factor productivity
determine growth, which in turn determines the apparent export and import elasticities. The
problem is that this is not an explanation of growth, the trade elasticities or the balance of
payments. Higher growth accompanied by growing exports will automatically raise the income
elasticity of demand for exports (ceteris paribus). However, this in no way explains why a
country that grows faster necessarily exports more, or what causes the growth of factors of
production (which Krugman contends is the driving force of growth), to occur in the first place.
Crafts (1988, 1990) uses Balassa's (1979) approach to argue that it is incorrect to use
the actual income elasticity of demand for exports to determine whether or not a country (in
particular the UK between 1951 and 1973) is balance of payments constrained. He argues that
the correct elasticity to use is the one that would have maintained a constant share for the UK
in world trade. On that basis, equilibrium growth would have been nearly three times (at 7.1




of-payments constrained. As McCombie and Thiriwall (1994) argue, Crafts is inconsistent in
that he uses the constant-market-share approach to calculate the export elasticity, but not the
import elasticity, for which he relies on conventional estimates. More importantly, Crafts
approach only implies that if the UK was able to maintain its world market share, exports
would have grown faster and economic growth would have been higher. This has nothing to do
with whether or not the UK was in fact balance of payments constrained - or indeed supply
constrained - over the period. The fact is that the UK's market share was not maintained (for
whatever reason), and that the extent of non-price competitiveness or lack of it is reflected in
the actual elasticities. The UK is where it is because of actual conditions (of constrained
demand!).
The balance of payments equilibrium condition expressed in equation (6.1) or (6.9),
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In principle, exports are composed of goods, services, factor income and transfers, while
imports comprise goods, services, factor payments and transfers. 19 In practice, on account of
the difficulty of obtaining estimates of price indices (and thereby calculating quantities), for all
but the goods items, exports and imports generally include only goods.
Consequently, any difference between the actual growth rate and the rate predicted by
the simple model (xhr or EzIlt), will be a measure not only of the effects of changes in relative
prices and the growth in capital flows, but also of the effect of omitting a subset of the current
account. 2° In countries where exports or imports of services, factor payments or transfers are
significant, the prediction "error" of the model could be larger. Using the entire current account
would imply that any difference between actual and predicted growth would be attributable
only to the effect of relative price changes and capital growth for the simple model.
19 For present purposes capital ifight can be included in capital flows instead of imports (see the discussion in
Chapter 4).
20 In other words the demand functions for all items may differ from those using a subset of the current
account for which explicit price indexes are available.
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Similarly; for the extended model represented by equations (6.13) and (6 14), any
difference between actual and predicted growth will be a measure not only of changes in
relative prices, but also of the effect of omitting the current account variables.
However, in practice the use of all the current account variables may still not result in a
more accurate prediction of the growth rate. In practice real current account credits and debits
might be obtained by deflating nominal values by some general price index such as the implicit
gdp deflator or the consumer price index. The quantities thereby obtained would be
approximations, as would the associated income elasticities. Whether or not the inaccuracies
inherent in attempting to employ all the current account variables outweigh the benefit from
including them is an empirical question. There is no guaranteed payoff in terms of improved
predictive power.
6.4	 Economic Growth and the Balance of Payments Constraint in Jamaica: The
Empirical Evidence.
6.4.1 Introduction
This section examines the empirical evidence on balance of payments constrained
growth in Jamaica. The fundamental question to be answered is whether or not Thirlwall's21
proposition that the Harrod trade multiplier accurately predicts the long-run growth rate, holds
for Jamaica. Both versions of the basic model (YB = x/ir and YB = uzim) are tested, while two
versions of the disequilibrium model (incorporating capital flows) are examined. The different
versions are compared to determine which one gives the closest prediction of the actual growth
rate.
In addition, several other issues are examined as follows:
(i) The importance of pure terms of trade effects.
(ii) The importance of overall relative price changes to economc growth. The work of
Thirlwall22 and others reviewed in section 6,2.2 suggests that the role of relative price changes




(iii) The importance of relative price movements other than pure terms of trade effects.
In particular, the effect of relative price movements on import volumes working through the
price elasticity of demand for imports. The significance of elasticity changes for growth is
considered.
(iv) The question of whether in the context of the model, economic growth is driven by
export growth or by external capital growth in Jamaica.
(v) Whether or not using the entire current account of the balance of payments gives a
better prediction of growth than using merchandise imports and exports.
(vi) With regard to the accuracy of the various versions of the model in predicting
actual growth, an attempt is made to answer the question "how close is close" by using
appropriate statistical tests.
(vii) The "true" balance of payments constrained growth rate is obtained by estimating
the rate of growth in the absence of capital flows, 24 that would have prevented further
deterioration (improvement) in the initial current account deficit (surplus). This "true" growth
rate which Hussain (1995) refers to as the "counter factual" growth rate, is calculated for
Jamaica.
6.4.2 The Import and Export Functions.
Appendix 6.A. 1 summarises the data needed to test the simple and extended models for
the period 1961-92, using both export growth (x) and the growth of world demand (sz).
Following the approach of nearly all researchers in the field, 25 the model is first estimated using
real merchandise imports and exports. The model is then estimated using the entire current
account, The relevant equations26 for the simple model are:
23	 only does the empirical evidence reviewed in Section 6.2.2 suggest that the role of relative prices changes is
small, but it is argued by Thirlwall that relative prices are stable in the long run on a-priori grounds (see Section
6.2.1). Even if they are not stable, their effects may be insignificant if the price elasticities are low.
24 This differs from the simple model in that the simple model assumes that relative prices are constant,
whereas the "true" growth rate incorporates relative price movements.
25 j (1995) is an exception in that he uses imports and exports of goods and services. Merehandise trade is
generally used given that import price indices are readily available and can be used to obtain real imports.






where x, s, and z are the rate of growth of real exports, 27 the income elasticity of demand for
exports and the rate of growth of real world income respectively. The equations of the extended
model starting from balance of payments disequilibrium are, respectively, (6.14) and (6.13)
above:
* - Ox + (1-0) (f-Pd)
YB	 7'.
and
* - Oez + (1-0) (f-Pd)
YB
where e and (1-9) are the shares of exports and capital flows respectively, in total receipts.28
The term (f-pd) represents real capital flows 29 [inflows if (f-pd)>O and outflows if (f-pd)<O].
27 R1 exports are nominal exports deflated by the export price index.
28 See Section 6.2.1.
29 Real capital flows are the negative of the current account deficit of
the balance of payments deflated by the consumer price index.
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Import and Export functions - merchandise trade basis
______	 (1}_-_10gM	 {2}_-_10gM	 (3) - 10gM	 (4) - logX	 (5) - logX
Vbls.	 coeff. t-ratio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob.
CONST. -2.04 -3.46 0.002 -1.92 -3.67 0.001 -1.60 -2.63 0.009 -0.26 -0.32 0.753 -0.27 -0.33 0.743
logY	 1.24 10.20 0.000 1.21 11.1 0.000 1.07 5.08 0.000
IogTTM	 ____	 -0.15 -5.54 0.000 -0.13 -3.71 0.001 	 ____
logZ	 ____	 ____	 0.31 224 0.033 0.31 2.26 0.032
IogTTX	 ____	 0.02 0.36 0.722
DU77	 -0.34 -3.17 0.004 -0.34 -3.26 0.003 -0.34 -3.22 0.003 	 ____
DU83	 ____	 ____	 -0.34 -2.27 0.032 -0.34 -2.28 0.031
logM(t-1)	 0.15 1.03 0.313 ____	 ____
I0gTTM(t- -0.17 -5.24 0.000 	 ____	 ____
logX(t-1)	 ____	 ____	 0.43 2.79 0.010 0.43 2.79 0.010
I0gTTX(t-1)	 ____	 ____	 0.02 0.38 0.705	 ____
- - - - - - - - -
R-sqrd	 0.90	 0.91	 0.90	 _____ 0.70 _____	 0.70
R bar-sqd	 0.89	 0.90	 0.89	 0.65	 0.65
D.W.	 1.90	 1.92	 _____________	 _________ _____________
Durbin-h _____________ ______________ 	 -0.39 , 0.70	 1.24	 2.46
F	 (3,28) 81.46 ,0.00 (3,29) 95.44 0.00 (4,27) 64.15,0.00 (4,27) 15.6 ,0.00 (4,27) 15.5 ,0.00




ser.corr chi-sq [11	 0.81 chi-sq [1]	 0.02 chi-sq [11	 0.19 chi-sq [1]	 2.74 thi-sq [1]	 2.80
func.forr chi-sq [1]	 0.22 chi-sq [1]	 0.14 chi-sq [1]	 0.24 chi-sq [1]	 0.68 chi-sq [1]	 0.70
normality chi-sq [2]	 0.84 chi-sq [2]	 0.07 chi-sq [2]	 0.15 chi-sq[2]	 0.71 ctii-sq [2]	 0.75
heterosc. chi-sq [1]	 0.74 chi-sq [1]	 0.94 chi-sq [1]	 0.90 chi-sq [1]	 1.31 chi-sq [1]	 1.33
chowtes chi-sq [4]	 0.98 chi-sq [4]	 1.49 chi-sq [4]	 1.3 chi-sq [4] 12.97 chi-sq [4] 13.72
_________ _____________________ 	 I	 _____________________ _____________________ _____________________
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In order to test the model for Jamaica, it is necessary to estimate the income elasticity
of demand for imports (t), and the income elasticity of demand for exports (s) from their
respective import and export functions, For consistency with Thirlwall's approach and in view
of the empirical work reviewed in Section 6.2, imports and exports are specified as
multiplicative functions of income and relative prices measured in a common currency (see
equations (6.3) and (6.5)). The variables are all measured in real terms for the period 1961-.
92° and are estimated in logarithms in order to obtain the elasticities directly. The estimation
technique used is Ordinary Least Squares.
Table 6.1 summarises the regression results of three import and two export equations.
We will deal with the import function first. Real imports (in logarithms) are regressed on real
domestic GDP (Y) and a relative price term (TTM) intended to measure import prices relative
to the prices of import substitutes. To obtain an approximate measure of this relationship, the
import price index is divided by the consumer price index. Given the long-run nature of the
balance-of-payments constrained growth model, it is necessary to obtain the long-run
elasticities. One method is to use the stock-adjustment approach (see Hussain, 1995) of
equation { 3 }, Table 6.1. The short and long run elasticities will be the coefficient (say 6) on
the income term (log Y) and (8/1-q) respectively, where q is the coefficient on the lagged
dependent variable. However, log M (t.i) is insignificant in equation {3 }.
Given the dependence of Jamaica on imports of consumer, intermediate and capital
goods, a high income elasticity of imports can be expected. This would also be consistent with
the income elasticities of imports found for many developing countries. The static equation {2}
of table 6.1 which omits the insignificant lagged dependent variable, gives a higher income
elasticity than equation {3 }: 1.21 compared to 1,07. In effect, the traditional import function
specification of equation {2} treats the coefficient on log Y as the long-run (or constant)
elasticity.
Atesoglu (1993) lags the relative price term by one period in order to capture the so-
called J-curve effect. In many developing countries including Jamaica, there may be an
insufficiency of close substitutes for imports, or there may exist bottlenecks that give rise to
soumes are the International Financial Statistics and the World Tables published by the I.M.F and World
Bank respectively. Data for all the variables are available only up to 1992.
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time lags between changes in relative prices and the ease of substituting imports for
domestically produced goods and vice versa. In addition, in the context of our current
discussion, the lagged price or J-curve effect (if it exists for Jamaica), may well have an income
effect. That is, taking account of changes in lagged rather than current time, relative prices
may well provide a better estimate of the income elasticity of demand for imports because of
the lagged effect that changing prices have on real income. We therefore use the import
function of equation {1}, Table 6.1:
log M = -2.04 + 1.24 log Y - 0.17 log TTM(t..l )-0.34 Du77	 (6.20)
where M is real imports of goods, Y is real domestic GDP, TTM is the relative price variable,
and Du77 is a dummy variable for 1977, a year in which real imports plunged to their 1965
level as a result of the signing of a Standby Agreement with the IMP. 31 The equation is well
determined and all the variables have the correct signs and are significant at the five per cent
confidence level (see Table 6.1 for the full results).
The income elasticity of demand for imports is 1.24 from equation (6.20), while the
price elasticity is -0.17. The income elasticity is, as expected, significant and positive, while
the price elasticity is, as expected, negative and small. Comparing equation (6.20) with
equation 2) of Table 6.1, two points can be made concerning the existence of a J-curve effect
in Jamaica and its impact on the elasticity of demand for imports. The only difference in the
variables between the two equations is the lag on the price term. This gives a price elasticity of
demand for imports that is 13 per cent higher (0.17 instead of 0.15) and a slightly higher
income elasticity (1.24 compared to 1.21). It seems that in Jamaica it does take time for
imports to adjust to relative price changes,but that the resulting measured increase in the price
elasticity is not large. 32 In addition, the income effect of allowing for the adjustment to relative
price changes, results in a slightly higher elasticity of demand for imports of 1,24. It is worth
noting from Table 6.1 that the Chow test for predictive failure run on equation 6.20 (i.e.
equation { 1) of Table 6.1) indicates that the parameters are stable. A 2() value of 0.9776
is well within the required limit.
31 Although a two yaer agreement was signed in July 1977, it was abandoned in December 1977 when the
government failed the eligibility criteria (see Chapter 1).
3201 course, the price elasticity itself is significant and this has implications for the balance of payments
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Exports are also specified in Thiriwall's model as a multiplicative function of income
and relative prIces expressed in a common currency. In order to calculate the income elasticity
of demand for exports (e), it is necessary to regress exports on world income (z), in accordance
with Thirlwall's balance of payments constrained growth model. In practice we use a weighted
average of the real GDP of the main countries to which Jamaica exports. Table 6.2
summarises the percentage of real exports to, and the real output levels of the five main
purchasers of Jamaica's exports. For present purposes, world income is then calculated as the
average GDP of the five countries, weighted by their respective export percentages. It should
be noted that on average the five countries (the USA, the UK, Canada, the Netherlands and
Norway) account for eighty per cent of Jamaica's exports over the period 1960-1992.
In the case of the export function, the stock-adjustment model is used in both equations
{4} and {5} of Table 6.1, since the lagged dependent variable is significant. Either equation
may be used, since the respective price and income elasticities are almost the same across the
two equations. For consistency with the import function and also because of its marginally
lower standard error, equation {4} is presented below.
log X =-0.26 + 0.31 log Z + 0.019 log TTX(tl) + 0.43 log X(tl) - 0.34DU83
(6.21)
where X is real exports of goods, Z is the weighted average "world" income explained above
and TTX is the relative price term. 33 The results in full are summarised in Table 6.1. The
lagged relative price term has the wrong sign and is statistically insignificant. We were unable
to fmd any significant J-curve effect of relative price changes on exports. The coefficient on
the lagged dependent variable X(t.l ) is significant, suggesting that 57 per cent of adjustment to
long-run equilibrium exports takes place in one year. In addition, the short and long-run income
elasticities of demand for exports are quite different. The short-run elasticity is 0.31, while the
long-run elasticity is 0.54. These results are almost the same if equation {5} is used instead of
equation {4}.
As Table 6.1 shows, the Chow test of parameter instability indicates that the
parameters in both equations {4} and {5} are unstable. The value for 2() is ponsiderably
ITX is the inverse of 'TTM described earlier.
220Table 6.2(a)
________ ________ ________ Food & Crude I__Manuf Total	 ________
6evMaterials ________ _________ ________
____ _____ ___ _____ (%)	 (%)	 (%)	 (%) _____
________ ________	 1964 ________	 45.4	 46.5	 8.1	 100	 _____
_______ ________	 1965 _______	 41.2	 51.8	 7.0	 - 100 _______
_______ _______	 1966 _______	 40.5	 524	 7.1	 100 _______
________ _______	 1967 ________	 38.6	 53	 8.4	 100 ________
________ _______	 1968 ________	 37.1	 53.8	 9.1	 100 ________
_____	 ______	 1969 _______	 30.7	 60.8	 8.5	 -	 100 _______
________ ________	 1970 ________	 22.7	 70.7	 6.6	 100 ________
________ _______	 1971 ________	 23.6	 68.4	 8.0	 100 ________
_______ _______	 1972 _______	 24.5	 67.7	 7.8	 100 _______
_______ ________	 1973 ________	 24.3	 68.4	 7.3	 100 _______
_______ ________	 1914 ________	 19.5	 75.5	 5.0	 100 _______
_______ _______	 1975 _______	 28.3 _____ 67	 4.7	 100 _______
________ ________	 1976 ________	 20.7	 721	 6.6	 100 _______
________ _______	 1977 ______	 20.2	 73.6	 6.2	 100 _______
________ _______	 1978 ________	 18.5	 75.4	 6.1	 100 ________
_______ ________	 1979 ________	 16.8	 76.3	 6.9	 100 _______
_______ ________	 1980 ________	 13.4	 78.8	 7.8	 100 _______
________ ________	 1981 ________	 12.9	 80.3 _____ 6.8	 100 ________
______ ________	 1982 ________	 17.1	 7f14	 12.5	 100 _______
_______ _______	 1983 _______	 21.6	 66.1	 12.3	 100 _______
_______ _______	 1984 _______	 16.8	 71.3	 11.9	 100 _______
________ _______	 1985 ________	 24.6	 56.7	 18.7	 100 ________
________ _______	 1986 ________	 27.0	 54.0	 19	 100 _______
	
_____ _______	 1987 _______	 26.1	 50.4	 23.5	 100 _______
-	 1988 ______	 24.7	 53.6	 21.7	 100 _______
______ _______	 1989 _______	 18.0	 61.2	 20.8	 100 _______
_______ _______	 1990 _______	 19.8	 65.1	 15.1	 100 _______
________ ________	 1991 ________	 201	 58.5	 28	 100 ________
_______ _______	 1992 _______	 23.3	 54.7	 22.0	 100 _______
Structure of Real Exports
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above its acceptable limit in both cases. Performing the Chow test for varying periods and
examining the values of the income elasticity of demand for exports (s) and the relative price
term (which is insignificant) confirm that they are both unstable. In the balance of payments
constrained growth model, the income elasticity () captures non-price competition and the
characteristics of the goods exported. There is considerable evidence in support of the notion
that non-price competition may be of even greater importance in international trade than
relative prices. It seems highly likely that the instability of s in the export equations reflects
elements of non-price competition as well as the changing structure of exports. According to
Engels' Law, there is a tendency for primary products to have an income elasticity of demand
less than unity, and for industrial products more than unity. Jamaica is a primary producer35
and the income elasticity of demand for its exports (c) is less than unity. However, the
changing structure of its exports over the three decades of this study, may account in part, for
the instability of (c)36
Table 6.2(a) shows the structure of real exports between 1964 and 1992, comprising
the percentage of exports attributable to: (i) food and beverages 37 (including primary
agricultural cominodoties such as bananas, coffee, citrus, etc.), (ii) crude materials including
bauxite, alumina and fuels, and (iii) manufactured goods. The importance of agricultural
commodities declined from 45 per cent of total merchandise exports in 1964 to under 13 per
cent in 1981 and then recovered to around 23 per cent in 1992. At the same time, exports of
crude materials (mainly bauxite and alumina), rose from 47 per cent of exports in 1964 to 80
per cent in 1981, and then declined to 55 per cent in 1992. Manufactured exports increased
from 8 per cent in 1964 to 22 per cent in 1992. In general, the substantial changes in the
structure of exports over the three decades of this study, seem to underlie the instability of the
income elasticity of demand for exports (e). According to Engel's Law, primary products
probably have income elasticities of demand less than unity, while manufactured items have
income elasticities of demand greater than untiy.
' See Chapter 4 of McCombie and Thirlwall (1994) and McCombie (1989).
u See Chapter 1.




The income elasticities of demand for imports and exports and the corresponding
relative price elasticities have been obtained from the import and export functions estimated in
this sub-section. The next sub-section makes use of the income elasticities in the models of
balance-of-payments constrained growth, to predict the real growth rate.
6.4.3 The Balance-of-Payments Constrained Growth Model: The Evidence On
Jamaica.
This sub-section tests the different versions of the balance-of-payments constrained
growth model for Jamaica between 1961 and 199238 and evaluates the statistical accuracy of
the predicted growth rates. The model is tested in its simple and extended forms using export
growth [equations (6.15) and (6.14) respectively], and using the growth of world demand
(6z)[i.e. equations (6.8) and (6.13) respectively].
The first four numbered columns of appendix (6.1) give the year-by-year and period
average (1961-92) values for real export growth (x), real capital flows (f-pd),39 and their
respective weights in total nominal export earnings [0 and (1-0)]. Colunms 5} - {8} inclusive
show the predicted growth rates of the simple models using (x) and (ez). Column {9} shows
the actual growth rate (y). The period averages (196 1-92) for theta and (1-theta) are simple
averages, whereas the averages for (x), (f-p d) and (y) are the continuously compounded growth
rates of the respective variables. The income elasticities of demand for imports and exports are
1.24 and 0.54 respectively.
38 The available data set is from 1960 to 1992 but the effective period is 196 1-92 because of the use of lagged
variables and growth rates.
(f-ppO for inflows and (f-pd)<O for outflows.
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Table 6.3
The predictions of the model are summarised in table 6 3. The actual average
(continuously compounded) long-nm growth rate is 2.1 per cent over the period 1961-92. The
basic model using exports (x/it) over-predicts the long-run growth rate by 0.3 percentage
points, while the corresponding extended model (yb*) with capital flows (column {3 }) under
predicts growth by 1.3 percentage points. Applying to the logic of the model implies that the
rate of growth of real capital flows is less than the rate of growth of real exports [see equation
(6.18) and the ensuing discussion]. Indeed, Appendix 6.A. 1 not only confirms that exports
grew faster than capital flows, but that the latter figure was negative (-3.14 per cent), while the
former was positive (2.87 per cent). The under-prediction of the extended model (i.e growth of
0.8 per cent compared to actual growth of 2.1 per cent) is much more severe than the over-
prediction of the simple model (2.4 per cent compared to actual growth of 2.1 per cent). This is
consistent with our findings in chapter four that lower net capital inflows have adverse
implications for investment and growth.
Real net capital inflows declined by 20 per cent between 1960 and 1992 for two
reasons. Firstly, real private capital inflows fell substantially after 1973 as a result of loss of
confidence in the authorities and the economy. This went hand-in-hand with the decline in
foreign investment40 as the government pursued inward-looking policies. In addition,
developments in the international bauxite market led to a loss of Jamaica's market share.40
40 See Chapter 1.
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Secondly, as found in Chapter 5, net capital inflows declined because of capital flight.
Not only might capital have been exported by foreign-owned multi-national companies
operating principally in the export sector, but there may well hae been substantial capital flight
via the informal financial market (though concrete facts and figures in support of this are hard
to come by).
Considering the growth rates in Table 6.3, column 6} shows the difference between
actual growth and the simple model (using export growth). The difference of (-0.3) is more
than accounted for by capital flows growing more slowly than exports. This should have
caused actual growth to be even lower (by 1.3 percentage points), but by implication
favourable relative price movements worked in the opposite direction to prevent further
deterioration in actual growth. The implied relative price movement comprises a pure terms of
trade effect, and a volume effect on imports. 4' The pure terms of trade effect of 0.2 per cent is
obtained independently from the change in the terms of trade (divided by it). 42 This leaves an
import volume effect of 1.1 percentage points. In terms of our earlier discussion in Section 6,2,
this residual is a measure of both the import volume effect of relative price changes (related to
the relative price elasticities of imports in the previous sub-section), and any effects of omitting
other current account variables from the measurement of imports and exports. Given the close
approximation of the simple model's predicted growth rate to the actual growth rate, it seems
that the effect of omitted variables must be minimal.
Indeed, if the simple model in the form (BzITc), is used, the actual growth rate is
predicted accurately. It appears that the estimates of the income elasticity of demand for
exports (s) and the weighted average proxy for the growth of world demand (z) are accurate.
Once again, the extended model significantly under-predicts actual growth for the same reasons
given above. The contribution of capital flows growing more slowly than exports (indeed the
growth rate of capital inflows is negative as before), now stands at (-1.5) percentage points,
while the implied relative price movement is (1.5) percentage points.
The simple model using (8zIlr) gives a better prediction than either of the extended
models or the simple form (x/ic). However, the question of "how close is close" in a statistical
divided by the income elasticity of demand for imports (it).
42The 'terms of trade' is the export price index diVided by the import price index.
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sense needs to be addressed. A test suggested by McCombie (1989) to evaluate the accuracy of
the model's predictions, and appropriate for an individual country will be employed. First y is
set equal to y and the income elasticity of demand for imports (it ') that would maintain balance-
of-payments equilibrium, is calculated. That is, & = xly. There will then be two expressions
for growth: y x/ir 1 and y = xIiV', where it" is the estimated income elasticity of demand for
imports from the appropriate regression. If it 1 and1rr are not statistically different then that will
also be true of y and YB.
The absolute values of the t-statistic (!tj) are calculated using the standard errors of the
appropriate regressions, and the results recorded in Table 6.3. It can be seen from the table
that both simple models are statistically accurate, with the one using (Ez/it) being superior, as
expected. Both extended models are well outside the range of acceptability. The simple Harrod
growth rule and the model in the form (Ez/ic) predict long run growth in Jamaica quite well.
Long-run growth in Jamaica is export driven rather than foreign capital accommodated.
indeed, because of the reduction in capital inflows over the period, growth has been slower than
otherwise would have been the case.
In order to arrive at some notion of what growth might have been in the absence of
capital flows, Hussain (1995) calculates what he calls the "Counter-Factual" balance-of-
payments constrained growth rate. He 43 defmes this as the rate of growth of real income that
would have prevented further deterioration (improvement) in the initial current account deficit
(surplus) with no nominal capital inflows. In effect, Hussain sets the rate of growth of
nominal capital inflows to zero, in his version of equation (6.11), which is reproduced here in a
slightly changed form with (x) replacing (az):
YB
	 (O17 +L')(p d- e - pf) + (pd- e -pf) + Ox + (1-O)(f-pd)
(6.22)
Setting the growth of nominal capital flows to zero gives:
43 op Cit.
44 Although Hussain refers to setting nominal capital flows to zero, it is the gpth rate of nominal capital flows
that he sets to zero, and this is implied in his version of equation (6.23).
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YB 
- (0i+yI) (p d- e - p f) + (Pd- e -Pf) + Ox - Pd (1-0)
(6.23)
However, the variables explaining real growth in ThirIwall's model are real variables.
In our view the rate of growth of output that would have prevented further change in the
position of the initial current account (i.e. the true counter factual growth rate), should exclude
the effects of real, not nominal, capital growth. The approximate counter-factual balance-of-
payments constrained growth rate can be obtained directly from Table 6.3 in one of two ways.
Assuming that the models with (x) are being considered, it can either be found by taking away
the contribution of capital flows in column {7} from actual growth in column 5}, or by adding
the contribution of implied relative price movements (column {8}) to the simple model
prediction of column { 1 } (which does not include capital flows or price movements). In both
cases the "true" or Counter-Factual balance of payments constrained growth rate without real
capital growth is 3.7 percent. Without the damaging effect of negative capital flows growth (or
equivalently, without the contraction of capital inflows), the Jamaican economy would have
grown by approximately 3.7 per cent on average instead of 2.1 per cent over the period.
Similar reasoning applies if (&z) is used instead of (x).
Our finding that economic growth in Jamaica is constrained by the balance of
payments, is consistent with the apparent under utilisation of domestic resources, Many writers
(e.g. Stone and Wellisz 1993, Levitt 1991, Boyd 1988 and Brown 1981) comment on the
unemployment of resources that existed throughout the thirty-odd years covered by this study.
This is an indication that growth was not constrained by full capacity, while our fmdings in this
chapter suggest that the balance of payments might be the main constraint on growth.
Resource under-utilisation might well be associated with diminishing-returns activities
in the agricultural sector45 which is an important part of the Jamaica economy. In addition,
unemployment and under-employment may be partly linked to the political and social instability
which characterised the post 1973 period. Also, the shortfall in capital inflows to fmance
domestic activity will have been related to the apparent under-utilisation of resources.
Unemployment went together with the constraint on growth imposed by the balance of
payments.
See McCombie and Thirlwall (1994).
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Import and Export functions - current account basis
______	 {1} - IogM	 {2} - logM	 C3}_-10gM	 {4} - IogX	 {5)_-logX
Vbls.	 Tf. tjErob. coeff. itio ob. coeff. I-ratio prob. coeff. t-ratio prob. -_
CONST. -2.15 -3.06 0.005 -2.04 -3.20 0.003 -1.77 -2.40 0.024 0.82 1.30 0.204 0.77 1.22 0.234
logY	 1.40 9.63 0.000 1.37 10.3 0.000 	 1.1 4.57 0.000
IogTTM ____	 -0.15 -4.66 0.000 -0.11 -2.83 0.01
logZ	 ____	 0.29 2.91 0.007 0.27 2.73 0.011
I0gTTX	 ____	 0.19 3.87 0.001
DU77	 -0.45 -3.54 0.001 -0.45 -3.58 0.001 -0.46 -3.73 0.001
DU83	 ____	 -0.27 -2.46 0.020 -0.28 -2.5 0.019
logM(t.1)	 ____	 0.23 1.56 0.130	 ____
IOgTTM(t- -0.18 -4.58 0.000	 ____
logX(t-1)	 0.32 2.19 0.037 0.35 2.44 0.022
I0gTTX(t-1	 ____	 0.21 4.01 0.000
R - sqrd.	 0.88	 _____ 0.89 ____	 0.89	 0.90	 0.90
R bar-sqd	 0.87	 0.88	 0.88	 0.89	 0.88
D.W.	 1.64	 1.67	 _____________ _____________ _____________
Durbin-h ______________ _____________ 	 0.07	 0.88	 1.84
F	 (3,28) 70.71 , 0.00 (3,29) 79.10 0.000 (4,27) 56.27 0.000 (4,27) 61.7 , 0.00 (4,27) 59.9 , 0.00
S.E.	 0.12	 0.12	 0.12	 0.11	 0.11
_	
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ser.corr chi-sq[1]	 0.70 chi-sq [1]	 0.45 chi-sq [1J	 0.12 chi-sq [1]	 1.19 chi-sq [1]	 1.79
func.fm. chi-sq [1]	 4.44 chi-sq [1]	 3.64 chi-sq [1]	 3.98 chi-sq [1]	 0.36 chi-sq [1]	 1.10
normal. chi-sq [21	 6.02 chi-sq [2]	 2.83 chi-sq [21	 1.71 chi-sq 121	 0.04 chi-sq [2]	 0.40
heterosc. chi-sq [1]	 0.34 chi-sq[1]	 0.75 chi-sq[1]	 0.98 chi-sq [11	 0.05 ctii-sq [1]	 0.04
chow tes chi-sq [4]	 2.60 chi-sq[4]	 4.39 chi-sq [4]	 3.79 chi-sq [4]	 2.07 chi-sq [4]	 1.81
_____	 I	 ____________ ____________	 I
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6.4.3.1 The Current Account and the Balance of Payments Constrained Growth
Model.
The derivation of Thirlwa1l's' model starts with equation (6.1) (P dX = PIME), which
represents the current account equilibrium of the balance of payments. In principle the entire
current account should be considered, but in practice merchandise trade is used for the reasons
discussed earlier. In this sub-section, the whole current account is used to test the model.
However, taking this approach will not guarantee the better performance of the model.
Whether or not it predicts better than the model based on merchandise trade (which performed
with statistical accuracy in the case of Jamaica), depends on the accuracy of the price indices
and parameter estimates [especially (it) and (E)] from the import and export equations.
Table 6.4 summarises the results of three import and two export equations.
Considering the import function 47 first, equation (3) shows that the lagged dependent variable
is insignificant. In addition, an examination of equations (1) and (2) indicates that lagging the
relative price term log TTM in equation (1 } results in a slightly higher relative price elasticity
(-0.18 compared to -0.15) and income elasticity of demand for imports (1.40 compared to
1.37). However, equation (1 } does not pass the test for normality and functional form. The
static equation (2) is well-specified, has a lower standard error, and is therefore to be
preferred. There is then no measurable J-curve effect and the import function is
log M = -2.04 + 1.37 log Y - 0.15 log TTM - 0.45 Du77 	 (6.24)
where imports (M) comprise all debit items on the balance-of-payments current account
deflated by the consumer price index. The variables Y, TTM and Du77 are, respectively, real
GDP, the relative price term, and the dummy variable for 1977 (as before). All the variables
are significant and have the expected signs. The complete results and tests of equation (6.24)
are summarised in Table 6.4 (as equation (2)).
Op. Cit.
47 Jdeally, price indices should be obtained for each component of the current account. In practice total imports
and exports are deflated by the consumer price index.
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Deflating all the current account debits by the consumer price index to obtam (M),
inevitably provides an approximate value of total real imports and the potential for error is
substantial. The long-run 48 elasticity of demand for total imports is 1.37 compared to 1.24
when merchandise trade is used. The parameters of the equation are stable (see Chow's 2()
test of predictive failure for equation {2} of Table 6.4).
Two export equations are summarised in Table (6.4), both of which are well-
determined. The lagged dependent variable is significant in both, and equation {4} which has a
slightly lower standard error than equation {5}, is used for the export function:
log X =0.82+0.29 log Z+0.21 log TTX (t..i) + 0.32 log X (t 1) - 0.27 Du83.	 (6.25)
where X is the sum of all the credit items on the current account of the balance of payments,
and the other variables are the same as for the merchandise export function, All the variables
are significant. The short-run income eLasticity of demand for total exports is 0.29 and has the
expected positive sign, while the long-run elasticity () from the above stock-adjustment
equation is 0.42. The relative price term (log TTX) is significant, but appears to be perverse
(i.e. it has an unexpected positive sign). The equation as a whole passes the test for parameter
stability, but an examination of individual parameters 49 indicates that the income and price
elasticities both exhibited some variability (which possibly cancelled out in the equation as a
whole).
Appendix 6.2 gives the detailed annual data for the basic and extended models using
both export growth (X) and foreign demand growth (Ez). It is similar to Appendix 6.1. Table
6.5 below shows the various growth rates predicted by the simple [(x/ir) and (s/z)], and
extended models (see columns {2} and {4} for the extended model predictions).
48 Since the lagged dependent variable is insignificant in the stock-adjustment models, equation (6.24) is
used to obtain (at).
49 Several Chow tests were perfonned over varying periods.
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_______ _____	 Balance of Payments Constrained Growth Model 	 _______ _______
_____ _______ Current Account basis (p1=1.4, e=0.42) _______ ______ _______
(1}	 {2} _____ {3}	 f4}	 {5}	 (6)	 7}	 {8}_____ (9)
Simple	 mple	 Extended Extended Actual 	 Difference Contributn lmped 	 Pure
Equflib.	 Equilib.	 Disequilib. Disequilib. Growth	 between of capital relative	 termsof
_____ Model	 Model	 Model	 Model	 rate	 actual grth flows to price	 trade
________ with exp. with forgn with exp. with forgn. ________ and simpl difference movement effect on
________	 diF growth	 dem. grth ________ mod. x/pi in col. (6) effect 	 growth
xlpi	 ezlpi	 yb*	 ybl*	 y	 (5}-(1} (3}-{1} {6}-(7} _______
1961-92 ____ 2.7	 1.4	 1.7	 0.6	 2.1	 -0.6	 -1.0	 0.4	 0.2
It I 	 2.505	 3.302	 2131	 6.692 ________ ________ ________ _______ ________
TABLE 6.5
The simple Harrod growth rate (x/ir) seems to predict actual growth well: a predicted
rate of 2.7 per cent (column { 1)) as against actual growth of 2.1 per cent (column { 5}). The
simple model using export growth (x) overpredicts, while the corresponding extended model
under-predicts (1.7 per cent in column {3}, compared to actual growth of 2.1 per cent). The
difference between actual growth and the prediction of the simple model using (x), is (-0.6) per
cent (col. {6}), while capital flows growing more slowly than exports (see columns (4) and {2}
respectively, of Appendix 6.2,), should have made the "deficiency" in growth (-1.1) instead of
(-0.6). This must imply that favourable relative price movements partially offset the influence
of capital growth by 0.5 per cent. Given the pure terms of trade effect of 0.2 per cent (as
before), the effect of relative price changes (other than pure terms of trade movements) on
growth, via their effects on imports, is 0.3 per cent. Given that the entire current account was
used in the import and export functions, this last residual (0.3 per cent) is free of the effects of
variables omitted from the current account and is perhaps more reasonable than the residual in
the trade-based model.
On the other hand, the much greater imprecision in measuring the price elasticities and
in estimating the income elasticities seem to have rendered the predictive power of the simple
model less accurate than the model based on trade data alone. The trade-based model using (x)
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predicts growth of 2.4 per cent, the current account-based model gives a prediction of 2.7 per
cent, while actUal growth is 2.1 per cent. In fact, when the t-statistic test on the predictive
power of the model based on the whole current account is applied, all the versions of the model
failed, including the simple model xhr which predicts growth of 2.7 per cent (although the
extended model using export growth only just failed. In other words the prediction of 2.7 per
cent is not statistically close to actual growth of 2.1 per cent when the whole current account is
used. A cursory inspection of Table 6.5 suggests that both the income elasticities of demand
for imports (it) and exports (e) are under-estimated. It seems that the parameters of the simple
(x/it) trade-based model can be estimated with greater statistical precision, despite (perhaps
because of) the omission of the invisible items of the current account. The prediction of both
versions of the simple model using trade data are statistically accurate, while those of the
extended model are not (see the previous sub-section). All versions of the current account
model are statistically imprecise.
6.5	 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has analysed the Balance-of-Payments Constrained Growth model and
tested it on data for Jamaica for the period 1961-1992. The simple and extended versions of
the model with capital flows were estimated using both export growth (x) and growth in world
demand (cz). The model was tested using merchandise imports and exports in the first instance,
and then total current account5° imports and exports. Income and price elasticities of demand
were estimated from static and simple dynamic import and export functions in logarithmic
form, using ordinary least squares.
Chow tests of parameter instability were performed as part of the usual diagnostic tests.
The parameters, particularly the income elasticity of demand for imports (it), are important for
the performance of the model and the precision of its predictions of growth. The crucial
parameter it was found to be stable. T-tests were carried out on the predicted growth rates of
the model to determine their statistical accuracy and to evaluate the performance of the
different versions of the model.
50 of the balance of payments.
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The fundamental question to be answered is whether or not the long run growth rate in
Jamaica is balance-of-payments constrained and whether the balance of payments constrained
growth model accurately predicts long-nm growth. It was found that the simple model in both
its forms predicted growth with statistical accuracy. With actual average growth between 1961
and 1992 being 2.1 per cent, the version (xhr) gave a predicted growth rate of 2.4 per cent,
while (sz/it) gave 2.1 per cent. In general, the predictions of the extended models incorporating
capital flows were not statistically accurate.
Growth in Jamaica was found to be export driven and balance-of-payments constrained,
supporting Thirlwall's model. In the long run growth approximates to the rate of growth of
exports divided by the income elasticity of demand for imports. The growth rate in the long run
must be consistent with the constraints imposed upon it by the balance of payments. Not only
was growth found to be export led, but declining capital inflows were found to have an adverse
effect on the growth process. The economy could have grown at an average rate of 3.7 per cent
instead of 2.1 per cent between 1961-1992, had it not been for declining real capital inflows
over the period 1960-1992.
The policy implication is that the development planning process in Jamaica must
include measures to encourage export growth if sustained economic growth is a macroeconomic
goal. Attention would also need to be paid to improving the structure of production in the
export sector away from primary commodities with income elasticities of demand less than
unity, and in favour of industrial commodities with income elasticities of demand greater than
unity. In addition, in the light of possible evidence of inconsistency in the quality of exported
goods, the authorities would do well to improve the quality assurance mechanisms in the export
sector. At the same time, measures to discourage capital flight and the loss of capital inflows
could be worth up to an additional 1.6 percentage points on the real growth rate per annum.
These measures might also improve resource utilisation which seems to have been severely
impaired in Jamaica.
In addition, the pure terms of trade effect was found to have a favourable but small
effect on real growth (0.2 per cent). The effect of changes in relative prices on the volume of
imports seems to have been much bigger though surprisingly high (1.3 per cent) and to have
offset the adverse impact of declining capital inflows to some extent. The price elasticity of
demand for imports was found to be normal and this would have offset the favourable
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movement in the terms of trade to some extent. There is some evidence that the price elasticity
of demand for exports could be perverse.51
It was found that the simple trade-based model gave statistically more accurate
predictions than the model based on the whole current account. The imprecision in measuring
price indices and in estimating the income and price elasticities more than offset any theoretical
advantage of the latter approach.
The general implications of our fmdings are that faster growth in Jamaica can be
achieved by making exports more attractive and expanding export capacity, by reducing the
income elasticity of demand for imports, and by creating a favourable domestic economic (and
political) climate that would encourage capital inflows.
51 That evidence comes from the export function using data for the current account of the balance of payments.




_________ ________ Balance of Payments Constrained Growth Model (pi=1 2; e0.54) ________ ________
____ ____	 I	 ____________
_________ ________ (Imports and Exports refer to merchandise trade only) 	 ________ ________ ________
________ {1}	 {2}	 {3}	 {4}	 {5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)
Period	 Exports	 Export	 Capital	 Capital	 Equilib.	 Equilib.	 Dsequilib. Disequilib. Actual
________ Share	 Growth Flows	 Flows	 Model	 Model	 Model	 Model	 Growth
________ _________ ________ Share 	 Growth x/pi	 ezlpi	 (with x) (with ez) ________
_______ (theta)	 x	 (1-theta) (f-pd)	 yb	 ybi	 yb*	 ybl*	 y
1961-92	 0.685912	 2.87 0.314088	 -3.14	 2.4	 2.1	 0.8	 0.6	 2.1
1961 0.899041 1.529263 0.100959 -64.5243 1.274386 13.4926 -4.28287 6.701807 2.374205
1962 0.924121 1.730638 0.075879 -25.6158 1.442198 6.139493 -0.28699 4.053874 0.924341
1963 1.11869 11.25849 -0.11869 -243.761 9.382071 -4.92969 34.60553 18.59511 4.358766
1964 0.721068 2.999265 0.278932 -475.537 2.499387 6.859784 -108.733 -105.589 8.465748
1965 0.788287 -3.50995 0.211713 -33.0077 -2.92496 6.061288 -8.12918 -1.04544 7.979626
1966 0.774944 25.27934 0.225056 35.46771 21.06612 3.292758 22.97691 9.203555 4.057047
1967 0.632006 -2.87286 0.367994 94.73346 -2.39405 2.315123 27.5381 30.51432 2.064641
1968 0.565974 -0.23943 0.434026 31.38875 -0.19953 2.24911 11.24002 12.62589 5.833764
1969 0.544197 9.275686 0.455803 19.35053 7.729738 0.304716 11.55652 7.515843 7.336475
1970 0.531114 2.184456 0.468886 7.707052 1.82038 14.4148 3.978271 10.66734 6.983939
1971 0.503369 -4.51571 0.496631 6.708428 -3.76309 -3.17924 0.882115 1.176012 4.112456
1972 0.49345 -4.13385 0.50655 -0.25358 -3.44487 0.96932 -1.80692 0.371268 8.010773
1973 0.445568 4.744498 0.554432 26.96577 3.953748 1.202185 14.22056 12.99456 3.007396
1974 0.811543 50.91927 0.188457 -71.8348 42.43272 4.875265 23.15446 -7.32502 -5.28
1975 0.586324 -8.42588 0.413676 178.2229 -7.02156 -5.70495 57.32179 58.09376 -1.32157
1976 0.518688 -26.0614 0.481312 -2.75454 -21.7178 6.584838 -12.3696 2.310651 -6.03299
1977 0.89214 1.080399 0.10786 -86.8304 0.900333 -3.44843 -7.00136 -10.8811 -2.42645
1978 0.882553 29.77635 0.117447 42.84702 24.81362 2.094902 26.09289 6.042413 0.591271
1979 0.739716 -4.73392 0.260284 151.8945 -3.94493 9.993308 30.02828 40.33862 -1.89318
1980 0.738437 -6.72472 0.261563 -6.10385 -5.60393 -4.85468 -5.4686 -4.91533 -5.70397
1981 0.590804 -10.2631 0.409196 - 75.46686 -8.55257 0.972595 20.68103 26.30854 2.561282
1982 0.481098 -26.0413 0.518902 15.17357 -21.7011 -5.47949 -3.87905 3.925153 1.37584
1983 0.487626 -13.1539 0.512374 -15.3944 -10.9616 0.033043 -11.9183 -6.55698 2.22237
1984 0.498156 63.53132 0.501844 56.78514 52.94277 17.46234 50.12149 32.44671 -0.82461
1985 0.457589 -9.17734 0.542411 6.866967 -7.64778 -7.19466 -0.39561 -0.18826 -469429
1986 0.836645 -11.2426 0.163355 -85.3801 -9.36882 -1.48232 -19.4611 -12.8629 -2.11906
1987 0.68385 12.86414 0.31615 167.2374 10.72011 2.259463 51.39106 45.60524 7.601431
1988 0.990243 15.16798 0.009757 -97.5455 12.63998 0.750231 11.72356 -0.05019 3.12362
1989 0.561045 3.714521 0.438955 8135.741 3.095434 2.059366 2977.754 2977.173 5.898664
1990 0.599896 18.64171 0.400104 1.137463 15.53476 -6.3704 9.698498 -3.44233 7.855598
1991 0.695663 10.44371 0.304337 -27.5562 8.703089 4.54817 -0.93424 -3.82466 -1.27922




________ _________ ________ Balance of Payments Constrained Growth Model (p1=1.4, e=O.42) ________
________ ________ ________ (Imports and Exports refer to the entire current account) ________ ________
________	 {1}	 {2}	 {3}	 {4}	 {5}	 {6}	 {7}	 (8]	 (9]
Period	 Exports	 Export	 Capital	 Capital	 Equilib.	 Equilib. Disequilib. Disequilib. 	 Actual
________ Share	 Growth	 Flows	 Flows	 Model	 Model	 Model	 Model	 Growth
________ ________ ________ Share 	 Growth	 xlpi	 ezfpi	 (with x) (with ez) ________
_______ (theta)	 x	 (1-theta) (f-pd)	 yb	 ybi	 yb*	 ybl*	 y
1961-92 0.765592	 3.8	 0.214408	 -3.14	 2.7	 1.4	 1.7	 0.6	 2.1
1961 0.936488 0.222564 0.063512 -64.5243 0.158974 8.995068 -2.77832 5.496571 2.374205
1962 0.953149 2.631434 0.046851 -25.6158 1.879596 4.092995 0.934308 3.044008 0.924341
1963 1.067979 11.01563 -0.06798 -243.761 7.868304 -3.28646 20.23936 8.326303 4.358766
1964 0.808207 0.728978 0.191793 -475.537 0.520699 4.57319 -64.7254 -61.4502 8.465748
1965 0.867847 4.400729 0.132153 -33.0077 3.143378 4.040859 -0.38778 0.391099 7.979626
1966 0.850047 16.93777 0.149953 35.46771 12.09841 2.195172 14.08314 5.664928 4.057047
1967 0.733925 -5.24515 0.266075 94.73346 -3.74654 1.543415 15.25475 19.13718 2.064641
1968 0.697433 9.797095 0.302567 31.38875 6.997925 1.499407 11.6643 7.829457 5.833764
1969 0.671427 5.806006 0.328573 19.35053 4.147147 0.203144 7.325982 4.677873 7.336475
1970 0.651762 -1.35144 0.348238 7.707052 -0.96531 9.609866 1.287909 8.180409 6.983939
1971 0.633315 -1.52793 0.366685 6.708428 -1.09138 -2.11949 1.065869 	 0.41475 4.112456
1972 0.632484	 -0.6097 0.367516 -0.25358 -0.4355 0.646213 -0.34202 0.342152 8.010773
1973 0.583596 3.397737 0.416404 26.96577 2.426955 0.801457 9.43682 8.488185 3.007396
1974 0.861875 25.39716 0.138125 -71.8348 18.14083 3.250177 8.547881 -4.28601 	 -5.28
1975 0.667405 -10.5267 0.332595 178.2229 -7.51908 -3.8033 37.32174 39.80167 -1.32157
1976 0.608044 -24.8217 0.391956 -2.75454 -17.7298 4.389892 -11.5517 1.898061 -6.03299
1977 0.919734 -2.72429 0.080266 -86.8304 -1.94592 -2.29895 -6.76799 -7.09268 -2.42645
1978 0.914634 33.56906 0.085366 42.84702 23.9779 1.396601 24.54363 3.890003 0.591271
1979 0.817646 5.415959 0.182354 151.8945 3.868542 6.662205 22.94776 25.23198 -1.89318
1980 0.815106 -7.68163 0.184894 -6.10385 -5.48688 -3.23645 -5.27851 -3.44417 -5.70397
1981 0.706402 -4.23589 0.293598 75.46686 -3.02564 0.648397 13.68905 16.2844 2.561282
1982 0.645266 -12.9256 0.354734 15.17357 -9.23256 -3.65299 -2.11277 1.487545 1.37584
1983 0.664478 -7.88681 0.335522 -15.3944 -5.63344 0.022029 -7.43271 -3.67477 2.22237
1984 0.666761 58.40156 0.333239 56.78514 41.7154 11.64156 41.33064 21.27859 -0.82461
1985 0.678036 12.47973 0.321964 6.866967 8.914096 -4.79644 7.623303 -1.67293 -4.69429
1986 0.929719 -8.1649 0.070281 -85.3801 -5.83207 -0.98821 -9.70836 -5.20493 -2.11906
1987 0.842404 7.984722 0.157596 167.2374 5.703373 1.506309 23.6302 20.09458 7.601431
1988 0.996132 18.25176 0.003868 -97.5455 13.03697 0.500154 12.71704 0.228712 3.12362
1989 0.746797 -5.67832 0.253203 8135.741 -4.05594 1.372911 1468.393 1472.447 5.898664
1990 0.762877 10.32129 0.237123 1.137463 7.372353 -4.24693 5.816857 -3.04723 7.855598
1991 0.827859 8.290511 0.172141 -27.5562 5.921794 3.032113 1.514148 	 -0.8781 -1.27922




The fmancmg of economic development has been identified by many researchers as a
critical element of the growth and development process. This thesis has examined the financing
of economic growth and development in Jamaica over the period 1960-1992. In so doing, three
broad issues were explored: the impact of fmancial variables and fmancial policy on the real
economy; the effect of debt accumulation on domestic savings, investment, growth and balance
of payments stability; the effect of foreign capital flows on the domestic economy, and the
extent to which economic growth is constrained by the balance of payments.
Chapter One gave an overview of economic performance and the policy stance of
successive governments over the three decades of this study. In addition, three sub-periods
were identified and economic developments analysed for each: the years of steady growth and
low inflation, 1960-1972; the years of crisis when inflation was high and growth was negative,
1973-1980; and the period of faltering recovery, 1981-1992, during which the growth
performance and inflation experience were mixed,
It was seen in Chapter One that the economic fortunes of Jamaica were greatly
influenced by the ideological stance of the government of the day and the policies it employed to
give practical effect to that stance. In particular, the rapid public sector expansion and inward-
looking policies of the nationalist government 1 of the 1 970s led to high inflation, high external
debt ratios and negative economic growth. Subsequent attempts by the conservative
government2 to generate growth by slashing the government deficit, while undergoing IMF
programmes, resulted in the severe recession of 1984-1986 and an escalation in foreign
indebtedness. Attempts by both political parties to stimulate savings, growth and investment
and to lower inflation by raising interest rates were unsuccessful.
Chapter Two provided a survey of the literature on financial liberalisation and the role
of the fmancial system in economic development. The hypothesis that raising the real interest
rate increases saving, investment and growth was seen to have weak support, even from a
'The People's National Party led by Michael Manley.
2	 Jamaica Labour Party led by Edward Seaga.
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theoretical point of view. Theoretically, the effect of interest rates on saving is ambiguous, the
outcome depending on the relative strengths of the negative substitution 3 and positive income
effects on savings. The net effect could be positive, negative or neither. In addition, raising the
interest rate might deter rather than increase investment by lowering its yield relative to that on
financial assets.
The empirical evidence on the impact of the interest rate and fmancial deepening on
savings, investment and growth in Jamaica was examined in Chapter Three. It was found that
the real interest rate was insignificant in detennining both total saving and private saving.
Private and total saving were both strongly influenced by real income, in keeping with
Keynesian analysis. However, real interest rates have a positive effect on financial savings,
with savers substituting financial for non-fmancial savings, curb market assets, or savings held
abroad, in response to rising real deposit interest rates. In addition, no support was found for
the hypotheses that fmancial deepening increases saving (though there is some evidence that
fmancial deepening encourages private saving), and that higher required reserve ratios on the
banking system reduce the amount of credit available for investment.
Chapter Three found that investment in Jamaica is determined by both supply and
demand factors. The availability of credit has a positive effect on investment, so that the rate
of interest (r) has an indirect positive effect on investment since raising (r) increases financial
savings and credit availability. However, higher rates of interest lower expected investment
yields and have a significant direct negative effect on investment which outweighs the positive
effect via credit availability. The most significant positive determinant of investment was
found to be the lagged accelerator,4 indicating that demand conditions are the principal
determinant of investment, but that investors take time to respond to changes in demand. In
addition, the rate of interest and fmancial deepening have no significant effect on the
productivity of investment. It is the rate of economic growth that improves investment
productivity in Jamaica. Also, the rate of interest has no significant effect on real economic
growth, while the rate of growth of exports and the ratio of foreign savings to GDP have a
positive impact on growth.
There are several policy implications of our fmdings regarding the effects of the interest
rate and financial variables on savings, investment and growth in Jamaica. If stimulating real
growth is a macro-economic goal, it will be better served by measures aimed at stimulating
i.e. the substitution of financial for non-financial savings.
in real GDP lagged one period.
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exports and providing the right domestic climate for foreign capital inflows. Attempting to
generate growth by raising the interest rate is ill-conceived at best.
In addition, raising the interest rate may deter investment by adversely affecting future
yields. It would be more appropriate to actively target the export sector and foreign investment
to stimulate growth, which will in turn stimulate 5 investment. Increasing real output rather than
raising the interest rate will also have a positive effect on private and total savings. If for some
reason the composition of total or private savings is deemed to be undesirable, e.g. if the
government wishes to attract informal savings into the formal financial market, then the interest
rate could be raised. However, the right interest rate level would have to be found so as not to
affect investment adversely.
Chapter Four found that raising the interest rate does not lower inflation in Jamaica and
that pursuing a high interest rate policy to control inflation is inappropriate (and as seen in
Chapter Three, may be inimical to investment). Inflation on the one hand and monetary growth
and currency depreciation on the other, are positively related. Fiscal expansion working
through the growth in the money supply, was in all likelihood inflationary, particularly as
government production was not very efficient. Improving government productivity might be
one way to increase effective real supply of goods and services to reduce excess demand and
contain inflationary pressures, In addition, a more stable currency (and economy) might reduce
the numerous and substantial currency depreciations which occurred during the 1970s, 1980s
and early 1990s, thereby reducing one source of inflationary pressure.
Chapter Four also found that inflation relative to expected inflation does not lower
fmancial savings or reduce the availability of credit for investment. In addition, Inflation has no
significant overall effect on investment and growth in Jamaica. However, there is some
evidence that investment is stimulated at low levels of inflation (but not significantly), and
deterred when inflation is high (but again not significantly). Inflation is probably an integral
part of the growth process and implementing policies which attempt to eradicate it completely6
might be inimical to the growth process. However, excessive inflation (perhaps above ten per
cent)7 might have an adverse effect on growth. Bringing the high inflation of the 1990s under
control will be no mean task for the Jamaican Authorities.
i.e. with a lag.
6 this were possible.
' See Ghatak (1981).
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An important conclusion of Chapter Four is that inflation widens the government deficit
in Jamaica, as revenue lags behind expenditure when inflation is high. In addition, larger
deficits increase government borrowing from the fmancial system at the expense of private
borrowing (though this crowding out effect is small). Not only is there financial crowding out
of the private by the public sector, but it was found that the investment of the latter reduces
private investment by competing with the private sector for scarce resources. Moreover, public
investment was found to be less efficient than private investment. Rapid expansion of the
government sector occurred simultaneously with negative economic growth during the 1 970s.
From the point of view of economic policy, urgent measures to improve public sector
management and efficiency, particularly of capital programmes, are called for. This is not
incompatible with private enterprise, and private sector investment and initiative should be
encouraged at the same time.
Our findings in Chapter Five indicate that foreign capital inflows have no significant
effect on saving in Jamaica. Similarly, the main components of capital inflows viz.,
government borrowing, foreign direct investment and private sector borrowing all have no
significant impact on domestic savings. In addition, foreign capital inflows are used mainly for
investment rather than consumption purposes, and this is supported by the significant positive
relationship between capital inflows and investment. However, capital inflows have no
significant effect on the productivity of investment. Financial variables, whether domestic or
foreign, do not seem to have any significant impact on investment productivity which is
determined instead by the real growth rate.8
Capital outflows which can deprive the economy of resources for investment, were
found to have a negative impact on real growth, while capital inflows were found to be a
stimulant to growth. Policies which encourage capital inflows and discourage outflows
articularly capital flight) can be expected to provide additional resources to the domestic
economy and to raise the growth rate. In particular, foreign direct investment and private
sector borrowing from abroad have significant favourable effects on investmeni and should be
encouraged.
Savings, investment and growth were adversely affected by foreign debt accumulation,
but there seemed to be no tendency for higher foreign debt to destabilise the balance of
8 which may in turn be positively influenced by investment productivity in a beneficial circle.
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payments in the sense that the current account progressively deteriorates without any self-
correcting mechanism. Capital programmes should be fmanced more from public sector
savings than from foreign borrowing. Reducing the debt burden built up over two decades is a
considerable challenge for the government in the 1990s.
The main conclusion of Chapter Six is that the long-run rate of economic growth is
constrained by the balance of payments. In other words, Jamaica cannot grow faster than that
rate which permits equilibrium on the current account of the balance of payments. Growth in
the long run must be consistent with the constraints placed upon it by the balance of payments.
Growth in Jamaica is not only balance-of-payments constrained, but is export driven.
Policy measures to encourage export growth should have a significant positive impact on
economic growth. In addition, re-structuring exports from primary commodities to
manufactures should improve export demand, while proper quality control mechanisms can
only be helpful to the export effort. The Balance of Payments Constrained Growth Model used
in Chapter Six and which accurately predicts the long-run growth, implies that reducing the
income elasticity of demand for imports is likely to have a stimulating effect on growth.
In addition, our fmdings in Chapter Six re-affirm the importance of foreign capital
inflows to the growth process. Declining capital inflows were found to have a negative effect
on real growth. A favourable domestic environment is likely to encourage capital inflows and
discourage outflows, thereby increasing the availability of resources for investment and growth.
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